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Harmonization and Its Discontents:  
A Case Study of TRIPS Implementation 
in India’s Pharmaceutical Sector 
Amy Kapczynski† 
INTRODUCTION 
The last few decades have seen a surge of new intellectual property (IP) 
treaties, part of a trend of “upward harmonization” aimed at making IP rights 
stronger around the world, and especially in developing countries. The most 
important of these treaties is the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
(TRIPS) Agreement, which requires all members of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) to adopt and enforce relatively high minimum standards 
of IP protection.1   
Those who support upward harmonization argue that it will have positive 
effects on trade, foreign direct investment, and global innovation.2 Opponents 
contend that such harmonization could ossify the imperfect IP system of the 
North and impede development.3 The most acute criticisms of the trend have 
focused on the potential impact of TRIPS on health. Because TRIPS requires 
developing countries to provide patents on pharmaceuticals, it has the potential 
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1. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 
I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].  
2. See, e.g., Keith E. Maskus, Intellectual Property Rights in the Global 
Economy 186–94 (2000) (describing and evaluating these claims).  
3. See, e.g., Jerome H. Reichman & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Harmonization Without 
Consensus: Critical Reflections on Drafting a Substantive Patent Law Treaty, 57 Duke L.J. 85, 
94–99, 103–08 (2007). 
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to limit the access of patients in those countries to less expensive generic 
versions of new medicines. 
The effects of the TRIPS Agreement, however, depend on empirical 
questions that have yet to receive much attention in the literature: Can TRIPS 
in fact oblige developing countries to “harmonize” their IP laws with those of 
developed countries?4 Will the Agreement achieve the primary goal that most 
agree was set for it—to require developing countries to adopt IP regimes 
comparable to those in developed countries?5 Conversely, how much flexibility 
does the legalistic framework of TRIPS offer developing countries, not only in 
theory but also in practice?6 This is an opportune moment to address these 
questions because we are entering a new age of implementation in international 
IP law. TRIPS transition periods for developing countries have mostly expired,7 
new multilateral harmonization efforts have foundered,8 and conversations 
have shifted toward topics of implementation and enforcement.9   
The refrain that TRIPS is a “harmonizing agreement” implies that the 
Agreement will bring the laws and practices of WTO members into substantial 
 
4. “Harmonization” is not usually defined in the international IP literature and is 
susceptible to a variety of meanings. It may be thought of as “the adoption of an international 
standard that adjusts the regulatory standards or procedures of two or more countries until they are 
the same.” Sidney A. Shapiro, International Trade Agreements, Regulatory Protection, and Public 
Accountability, 54 Admin. L. Rev. 435, 436 (2002). A looser definition would treat harmonization 
as the adoption of standards or agreements that bring state practices closer to one another. Here I 
intend the term to refer to whether the TRIPS Agreement can require developing countries to 
adopt developed-country-style IP protections, and produce standardization between countries that 
might reduce costs for applicants and patent offices.  
5. See, e.g., John F. Duffy, Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law, 17 Berkeley 
Tech. L.J. 685, 695–96 (2002).  
6. I focus on TRIPS because it is the most comprehensive and important international IP 
treaty today, particularly because it is enforceable through the WTO’s dispute resolution process. 
Flexibilities available under TRIPS may be restricted by other international agreements, including 
new multilateral agreements and bilateral free trade agreements. The potential implications of 
such initiatives for the flexibilities addressed here are discussed infra at text accompanying notes 
402–06.  
7. See TRIPS, supra note 1, arts. 65–66; see also World Trade Organization, Ministerial 
Declaration of 14 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha 
Declaration] (extending the transition period for least-developed country members with respect to 
pharmaceutical products). 
8. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Some Remarks on the Limits of Harmonization, 5 J. 
Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 596, 603 (2006) (“[T]he current political economy of 
intellectual property lawmaking nationally and internationally makes it hard to see much progress 
on substantive treaty-based harmonization in the next few years.”); Amy Kapczynski, The Access 
to Knowledge Mobilization and the New Politics of Intellectual Property, 117 Yale L.J. 804, 836 
(2008) (discussing the collapse of broadcasting rights and substantive patent law treaty 
negotiations at the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)).  
9. See, e.g., Liza Porteus Viana, US Lawmakers Seek to Fuel International IP Enforcement 
Activities, Intell. Prop. Watch, Nov. 8, 2007, http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/ 
index.php?p=816 (discussing various new enforcement initiatives supported by the United States, 
including a proposed Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, domestic bills on IP enforcement, and 
the recent dispute initiated at the WTO by the United States against China regarding copyright 
enforcement).  
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conformity with one another. There is, of course, room for skepticism. Some 
proponents of TRIPS suggest that developing countries will cheat by failing to 
enforce the Agreement or by ignoring its requirements.10 Experts in 
international IP law have emphasized instead that TRIPS leaves significant 
“wiggle room” for developing countries, and that, if pressured, these countries 
may invoke its flexibilities to resist the Agreement’s objectives.11   
To date, the academic conversation about the harmonizing power of 
TRIPS has been largely theoretical, based on predicted effects and the formal 
flexibilities available under the Agreement.12 This Article advances that 
literature by adopting an empirical case study approach, based on field research 
and interviews in one key location: the pharmaceutical sector in India. The 
location is well suited to an inquiry into the dynamics and limits of 
harmonization under TRIPS, for several reasons. It is in the domain of 
pharmaceuticals that the Agreement is arguably the most consequential and 
controversial. As we will see, India has exceptionally strong motivation and 
capacity to implement TRIPS in a fashion that responds to local needs.13 Many 
developing countries, particularly the poorest ones, have adopted IP laws that 
are more restrictive than TRIPS requires.14 India has instead mapped out an 
 
10. See, e.g., Charles S. Levy, Implementing TRIPS—A Test of Political Will, 31 L. & 
Pol’y Int’l Bus. 789, 789 (2000) (“The real test of TRIPS and the WTO will be whether 
developing countries meet these obligations, and if they do not, whether developed countries will 
hold them accountable until they reach full compliance with TRIPS. Although it is still early, all 
indications point toward significant noncompliance by key developing countries.”); John 
Gladstone Mills III, A Transnational Patent Convention for the Acquisition and Enforcement of 
International Patent Rights, 88 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 958, 961 (2006) (“The creation 
of the WTO and the signing of the TRIPs Agreement gave support to the complete harmonization 
approach. However, the first five years of TRIPs provide scant basis for optimism about prospects 
for complete harmonization. Of developed, developing, and least-developed countries, only the 
developed countries appear to be capable of compliance in the near term.”). 
11. J.H. Reichman, The TRIPS Agreement Comes of Age: Conflict or Cooperation with the 
Developing Countries?, 32 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 441, 458–59, 461 (2000). The term “TRIPS 
flexibility” designates domains of IP law that may be adjusted, consistently with the Agreement, 
to respond to local context and priorities. See infra p. 1588.  
12. See, e.g., Carolyn Deere, The Implementation Game: The TRIPS Agreement 
and the Global Politics of Intellectual Property Reform in Developing Countries 21 
(2009) (noting that “[t]o date, WTO scholars have generally examined implementation from a 
legal or descriptive perspective, often overlooking the ways in which it is a dynamic political 
process and the scope for different interpretations of legal commitments” and noting that there has 
been “surprisingly little . . . analysis of the implementation process”). Deere’s new study is 
unusual for its focus on implementation, but adopts a survey approach rather than the in-depth 
case study used here. Janice Mueller has written a comprehensive guide to the new Indian Patents 
Act, but does not focus on the issues of implementation and harmonization that provide the 
impetus for the present Article. See Janice M. Mueller, The Tiger Awakens: The Tumultuous 
Transformation of India’s Patent System and the Rise of Indian Pharmaceutical Innovation, 68 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 491 (2007). 
13. See infra Part I; see also Deere, supra note 12, at 310 (citing India as one of the few 
developing countries that has had “access to national or regional experts capable of tailoring the 
implementation of international IP obligations to foster national development objectives”). 
14. Deere, supra note 12, at 13 (concluding from a review of formal legal implementation 
2 - Kapczynski FINAL (Do Not Delete) 2/9/2010  4:47 PM 
1574 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  97:1571 
extraordinary array of TRIPS flexibilities, some of which are unknown 
elsewhere in the world. 
The primary aim of the Article is to contribute to the international IP 
literature by enriching our understanding of the nature and utility of TRIPS 
flexibilities, and of the potential for TRIPS to serve as a harmonizing force. It 
demonstrates, first, that TRIPS offers developing countries substantially more 
formal flexibility in the domain of pharmaceuticals than has commonly been 
recognized. To date, conversations about TRIPS flexibilities have focused 
largely on the mechanism of compulsory licensing.15 I use the Indian example 
to detail several other important flexibilities that have received much less 
attention in the literature, including limits on patentable subject matter, 
expansive procedural opportunities to challenge patents, and restrictions on 
injunctive remedies.16 Using these flexibilities, countries could facilitate 
substantial competition in the pharmaceutical sector without the need to ever 
issue a compulsory license. 
Second, I demonstrate the substantial difficulties that developing countries 
face in implementing TRIPS flexibilities, contributing to the existing literature 
by providing a structured and detailed account of these obstacles and by 
demonstrating that they are not ancillary to the transnationalization of patent 
law, but intimately tied up with it.17 While TRIPS as a formal matter cannot 
produce deep harmonization, it nonetheless channels a strong harmonizing 
force, because it inserts countries into a transnational circuit that fills in the 
gaps in the Agreement and that works against the use of TRIPS flexibilities. 
Limits on administrative resources, the influence of transnational legal 
networks, and the threat of unilateral retaliation from high-protection 
jurisdictions all make it difficult for countries like India to implement an 
autonomous vision of patent law. The case study approach permits us to bring 
such obstacles into view, and to develop a more concrete account of the 
implications of the transnationalization of law in this domain, particularly for 
developing countries. 
Third, I identify three compensating strategies that may facilitate the 
effective use of TRIPS flexibilities, responding to the transnationalized 
pressures that TRIPS implementation sets up.18 I call these strategies 
fragmentation, mimicry, and counter-harmonization. As I will describe, 
fragmentation identifies the ability of unique local legal requirements to 
introduce friction into transnational circuits of influence. Mimicry works these 
circuits against the grain by legitimating local law with reference to the law of 
 
of TRIPS that more than one-third of developing country members implemented “a broad range of 
TRIPS-plus provisions in their laws”).  
15. See infra note 99. 
16. See infra Part II. 
17. See infra Part III.  
18. See infra Part IV. 
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high-protection countries while reinscribing the meaning of those texts and 
precedents. Counter-harmonization seeks to rewrite these transnational circuits 
by creating an alternative model of patent law that is coordinated among 
developing countries. As I demonstrate, the last strategy shows the most 
promise, because it offers countries safety in numbers, can lower the 
administrative costs of implementing an alternative patent law, and can 
generate a transnational legal counterculture.  
Rather than reject TRIPS, India has entered fully into the Agreement, 
while also creatively interpreting its terms. (I deliberately avoid the 
terminology of “resistance” here, because that term presupposes that TRIPS 
means and requires what its proponents intended it to mean and require. The 
dynamics of TRIPS implementation in developing countries instead precisely 
call into question what it means to faithfully adhere to TRIPS.) This suggests 
that the age of TRIPS implementation will constitute a new kind of global 
community of disagreement about the terms of IP law. In previous work, I have 
discussed the potential of international law to constitute global publics, by 
drawing movements and counter-movements into its language and terms.19 
Here I extend this perspective to governmental actors. TRIPS has pulled Indian 
parliamentarians and patent examiners alike into a transnational discourse of 
patent law. This has important implications for how India implements its new 
law, and for how we conceptualize the operation of international law more 
generally. Although India has incorporated an exceptionally broad range of 
flexibilities into its patent law, the dynamics identified here (related to resource 
limitations, transnational legal cultures, and the continued existence of 
extralegal pressure) make it difficult for India to implement these flexibilities.  
As I show, these dynamics are not ancillary to, but intimately bound up with, 
the legalization of the transnational domain of patent law. This suggests that 
legalization cannot simply be identified, as some prominent trade law scholars 
have suggested, with the substitution of politics for principle, and with the 
leveling of power differences between states. It also suggests a new perspective 
on the debate over whether the WTO has a “constitutional” form, and if so, 
what this means. To date, those who claim a constitutional nature for the WTO 
have identified that nature with a move beyond politics. The analysis offered 
here suggests that if the WTO has a constitutional nature, it lies in its capacity 
to mobilize and channel, rather than to suppress or transcend, political 
disagreement. While the implications of these points cannot be fully elaborated 
here, some possibilities are discussed in the Conclusion. 
The Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I provides the background needed 
to understand the dynamics and implications of TRIPS implementation in 
India’s pharmaceutical sector. Part II identifies and explains the most important 
flexibilities emerging in India, which include novel subject matter limitations, a 
 
19. See Kapczynski, supra note 8, at 879–83. 
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high threshold for obviousness, procedural limitations such as oppositions and 
disclosures, limits on injunctive remedies, and strong patent misuse standards. 
Part III leverages the case study approach to enumerate the dynamics that make 
it difficult for India to fully and autonomously make use of these flexibilities 
and demonstrates that these dynamics are not ancillary to, but are rather shaped 
by, the increasingly transnationalized nature of patent law. Part IV discusses 
three strategies emerging in India to counteract these barriers, strategies that I 
call fragmentation, mimicry, and counter-harmonization. The Conclusion 
elaborates on the contributions of the Article to the international IP literature, 
and to recent debates about the implications of the legalization and 
constitutionalization of the world trading order.   
I 
TRIPS AND THE EVOLUTION OF INDIA’S PATENT LAW  
In 2005, in order to comply with the requirements of TRIPS, the Indian 
government introduced product patents on pharmaceuticals. For the previous 
three decades, such patents had been forbidden, allowing India to develop one 
of the most robust generic pharmaceutical industries in the world. Prior to 
TRIPS, Indian companies and global health advocates operated largely in 
ignorance of the relationship between patent law and pharmaceutical policy. 
Over the decade that followed the signing of TRIPS in 1995, these groups 
developed a new sophistication about patents, which they put to work in the 
debates concerning the shape of India’s new patent law. Responding to their 
advocacy, the Indian government adopted several novel and far-reaching 
flexibilities in its new law, which Part II will describe in detail. Indian 
government officials thus were drawn into the language of TRIPS, seeking to 
implement its requirements in a manner that met local concerns about access to 
healthcare and the development of local industry. In the process, they were 
inserted into a circuit of transnational influences and dynamics that shape how 
India’s patent law operates, as Parts III and IV will show.  
A. The Pre-TRIPS Era 
Pharmaceutical patents were first introduced to India by the British in the 
colonial era.20 In 1970, concerned about the dominance of foreign 
pharmaceutical firms and the high price of medicines, India changed course, 
passing a patent law prohibiting product patents on medicines.21 At the time, 
 
20. India’s first patent law was passed in 1856, during the rule of the British East India 
Company and just prior to the formal beginning of the British Raj. P. Narayanan, Patent Law 
5 (4th ed. 2006).  
21. The Patents Act, 1970, No. 39, § 5 (India), reprinted in P. Narayanan, Patent Law 
546 (3d ed. 1998) (excluding patents on “substances intended for use, or capable of being used, as 
food or as medicine or drug”).  
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foreign firms controlled about 70 percent of the Indian market,22 and Indian 
drug prices were among the highest in the world.23 Colonial era patent laws 
were an important factor: foreign firms used them to their advantage, winning 
victories in court that helped suppress competition from local companies.24  
The 1970 Act served as a substantial driver of three decades of growth in 
the domestic pharmaceutical industry.25 In the years that followed it, the 
number of patents granted in India dropped precipitously.26 Although the law 
permitted process patents related to medicines, they were very limited in 
scope27 and rarely sought.28 The law thus created significant space for the entry 
of local pharmaceutical firms,29 and they rapidly increased their share of the 
 
22. See Sudip Chaudhuri, The WTO and India’s Pharmaceuticals Industry: 
Patent Protection, TRIPS, and Developing Countries 1, 29 (2005) (estimating 68 percent); 
P. K. Ramachandran & B. V. Rangarao, The Pharmaceutical Industry in India, 7 Econ. & Pol. 
Wkly. M-27, M-30 (1972) (estimating 75 percent). 
23. Staff of S. Comm on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly, 
87th Cong. 1st Sess., Rep. No. 448 (June 27, 1961) 41 tbl.19 (showing India with the highest 
prices of the seventeen countries surveyed, which included the United States). 
24. Chaudhuri, supra note 22, at 128–32. 
25. See, e.g., Jean O. Lanjouw, The Introduction of Pharmaceutical Product Patents in 
India: “Heartless Exploitation of the Poor and Suffering”? 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 6366, 1998), available at www.oiprc.ox.ac.uk/EJWP0799.pdf; Interview with 
Raghu Cidambi, Advisor, Dr. Reddy’s Labs. Ltd., in Hyderabad, India (May 25, 2007) (notes and 
transcript on file with author); Chaudhuri, supra note 22, at 39.  
26. Lanjouw, supra note 25 (citing evidence that the number of patents granted fell by 75 
percent in the decade after the 1970 Act was passed); Aradhna Aggarwal, Strategic Approach to 
Strengthening the International Competitiveness in Knowledge Based Industries: The Indian 
Pharmaceutical Industry 16 (Research & Info. Sys. for Dev. Countries, Discussion Paper No. 80, 
2004), available at http://www.ris.org.in/Dp80_pap.pdf.  
27. For example, such patents only lasted for the shorter of five years from the date of grant 
or seven years from the date the patent was filed. The Patents Act, 1970, No. 39, § 53(1)(a), 
reprinted in P. Narayanan, supra note 21, at 563. They were also automatically endorsed as 
“Licenses of Right” three years after their grant, permitting any person interested in working them 
to do so. Id. §§ 87–88, reprinted in P. Narayanan, supra note 21, at 574.  
28. See H. Ashok Chandra Prasad & Shripad Bhat, Strengthening India’s Patent System: 
Implications for Pharmaceutical Sector, 28 Econ. & Pol. Wkly. 1037, 1053 tbl.20 (1993) 
(reporting, for example, that from 1972–89, Ranbaxy obtained eight such patents, while Pfizer 
obtained four). According to D.G. Shah, such patents were secured primarily for defensive 
purposes. Interview with Dilip G. Shah, Sec’y Gen., Indian Pharm. Alliance, in New Delhi, India 
(May 23, 2007) (transcript on file with author). 
29. Other government policies likely also played a supportive role in the substantial growth 
that followed in the industry. Shortly after product patents were eliminated, the government 
imposed new regulations on foreign and domestic pharmaceutical companies designed to 
encourage the development of the local sector. Aggarwal, supra note 26, at 7; Interview with B.K. 
Keayla, Convenor, Nat’l Working Group on Patent Laws, in New Delhi, India (May 21, 2007) 
(transcript on file with author). For example, many drugs could be produced only by the Indian 
public sector or by companies with 60 percent or more Indian equity. Chaudhuri, supra note 22, 
at 133; Aggarwal, supra note 26, at 7. Strict regulations were also imposed to encourage the local 
production of active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs or “bulk drugs”) which require the greatest 
technical sophistication. Chaudhuri, supra note 22, at 133–36. These were supplemented by 
import restrictions on formulations and tariffs. Lanjouw, supra note 25, at 4. Price control 
regulations imposed in the 1970s reduced local prices on medicines, likely further diminishing 
foreign firms’ interest in the Indian market. See id.; Chaudhuri, supra note 22, at 276–78. 
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Indian market.30  












Indian firms also rapidly became more technically sophisticated. For 
example, they first produced active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs) in the 
mid-1970s, with production steadily increasing over the next three decades.32 
Indian companies became skilled in reverse engineering and developing new 
processes for drug production.33 Some launched foreign drugs locally before 
the originator did, apparently even in cases where the originator sought to be 
the first in the market.34 Over time, the Indian industry also evolved to become 
extraordinarily competitive and diverse.35 Although comprehensive price com-
parisons between countries are difficult to come by, numerous surveys indicate 
that Indian drug prices by the 1990s were among the lowest in the world.36  
 
30. Chaudhuri, supra note 22, at 18 tbl.2.2; cf. Aggarwal, supra note 26, at 17 (citing 
evidence that Indian firms accounted for 70 percent of the bulk drugs and 80 percent of the 
formulations in 1991). Agrawal and Saibaba estimated that local firms supplied 95 percent of the 
Indian market in 2001, presumably measuring by volume rather than price. Pradeep Agrawal & P. 
Saibaba, TRIPS and India’s Pharmaceuticals Industry, 36 Econ. & Pol. Wkly. 3787, 3787 
(2001).  
31. Chaudhuri, supra note 22, at 18 tbl.2.2. In 2001, the export market reached over $1.5 
billion, or more than 4 percent of India’s total exports. Agrawal & Saibaba, supra note 30, at 
3787. 
32. Chaudhuri, supra note 22, at 40–41 tbl.2.4; Aggarwal, supra note 26, at 23. APIs 
require significantly more technical sophistication to produce than do the subsequent drug 
formulations and are the most important determinant of the overall cost of production of a drug. 
33. Chaudhuri, supra note 22, at 52. This began in the 1970s, expanded in the 1980s, and 
achieved real success in the 1990s. Interview with Raghu Cidambi, supra note 25. By 1995, the 
time needed to reverse engineer a drug dropped from three to four years to just one year. Dilip G. 
Shah, Generic to Innovative: Transition of Indian Pharmaceutical Companies, 5 Pharma Focus 
Asia 13, 14 (2007).  
34. Chaudhuri, supra note 22, at 54; Lanjouw, supra note 25, at 22. 
35. By 2003, the Indian market was supplied by at least 5800 drug manufacturing units, 
more than one-fifth of which were involved in the production of bulk drugs. Chaudhuri, supra 
note 22, at 15. Others put estimates of the number of local firms substantially higher, at 7000 to 
8000 firms. Aggarwal, supra note 26, at 16.  
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B. The Era of Transition: 1995 to 2005 
Another era of transition began in 1995, when India joined the WTO and 
with it, the TRIPS Agreement. TRIPS was a bold initiative, one that radically 
altered the terrain of international IP law. It was the product of a concerted 
campaign by multinational firms in information-intensive industries that 
persuaded the United States, Europe, and Japan that their national trade 
supremacy depended on stronger protection for IP abroad, and especially in 
developing economies.37 Supporters promoted TRIPS as a way to solve several 
problems in the existing international IP system. The incentive to join 
traditional IP treaties was often fairly limited for information-importing 
countries, but the “single undertaking” nature of the WTO ensured that 
countries would have to accept TRIPS if they wanted to be part of the WTO.38 
Treaties administered through the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO) had no effective enforcement mechanism, but the WTO incorporated a 
new dispute settlement system, allowing for adjudication of TRIPS disputes 
and for trade sanctions against countries found to be in violation of the 
Agreement.39 Finally, TRIPS added substantially to the degree of IP protection 
required by existing treaties, particularly in the area of patents.40 
TRIPS has caused the most controversy in the domain of access to 
medicines because it requires patents on pharmaceutical products, which at 
 
HAINews, Apr.–May 2000, available at http://www.haiweb.org/pubs/hainews/ 
Patents%20and%20Prices.html; Prasad & Bhat, supra note 28, at 1046 tbl.15A, 1051 tbl.18A; 
Lanjouw, supra note 25, at 8–9. Some signs indicate that the private market in India may have 
become less competitive since these estimates were produced, perhaps attributable to the steady 
decline of the scope of price controls and/or in the number of small drug companies. Interview 
with Biswajit Dhar, Professor & Head, Ctr. for WTO Studies, Indian Inst. of Foreign Trade, in 
New Delhi, India (June 6, 2007) (transcript on file with author); see also Chaudhuri, supra note 
22, at 209–10; Anita Kotwani et al., Prices & Availability of Common Medicines at Six Sites in 
India Using a Standard Methodology, 125 Indian J. Med. Res. 645, 653–54 (2007).  
37. For a discussion of the lobbying and negotiations that led to the TRIPS Agreement, and 
the catalytic role played by industry, see Susan K. Sell, Private Power, Public Law: The 
Globalization of Intellectual Property Rights (2003). 
38. Previously, countries had chosen their IP commitments (for example, to treaties 
administered by WIPO) in à la carte fashion, with no implications for their participation in the 
world trading regime.  
39. Prior to the WTO, multilateral treaties such as the Berne Convention referred parties to 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for the settlement of disputes. See, e.g., Berne Convention 
for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 33, Sept. 9, 1886, as last revised at Paris, July 
24, 1971, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27, 828 U.N.T.S. 221. No actions under IP treaties were ever 
brought before the ICJ, suggesting that this was an unappealing venue for enforcement efforts. 
Frederick M. Abbott et al., International Intellectual Property in an Integrated 
World Economy 330 (2007).  
40. For example, TRIPS signatories must offer patents “for any inventions, whether 
products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive 
step and are capable of industrial application.” TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 27.1. The Agreement also 
establishes other important requirements, including minimum patent terms and limitations on 
members’ ability to derogate from patents. TRIPS, supra note 1, arts. 31, 33. 
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least fifty developing countries did not offer at the time of its adoption.41 
Patents tend to generate deadweight social losses in the form of higher prices 
for consumers.42 In the domain of medicines, such losses translate into more 
limited access to medicines, particularly in developing countries.43 The most 
important potential gain associated with stronger patent law is the marginal 
incentive for pharmaceutical innovation that will be provided by additional 
exclusivity in the new country.44 But the marginal effects of patents in 
jurisdictions that are a very small portion of the world’s market will be small, 
and not likely to outweigh the costs to local consumers.45 It is thus fairly clear 
from the economics literature that higher patent standards for medicines will 
reduce welfare in developing countries.46   
Many developing countries strongly opposed the incorporation of TRIPS 
into the new WTO regime, because they understood its likely negative effects 
 
41. See Carlos M. Correa, Patent Rights, in Intellectual Property and 
International Trade: The TRIPS Agreement 227, 229 (Carlos M. Correa & Abdulqawi A. 
Yusuf eds., 2d ed. 2008).  
42. See, e.g., F. M. Scherer, A Note on Global Welfare in Pharmaceutical Patenting, 27 
World Econ. 1127, 1128 (2004). Perfect price discrimination could eliminate this deadweight 
loss but is not expected in practice. 
43. Generic medicines are typically substantially less expensive than patented versions, and 
patients in resource-poor settings are particularly reliant on generic medicines. World Health 
Org., The World Medicines Situation 31, 68–69 (2004).  
44. Alan V. Deardorff, Should Patent Protection Be Extended to All Developing 
Countries?, 13 World Econ. 497, 503 (1990). Extending patent protection to a new jurisdiction 
could produce gains other than innovation. For example, if a firm refuses to sell in a market and 
others cannot copy the product (e.g., because it requires closely held know-how), the introduction 
of patents could induce the firm to enter the market and thus improve social welfare. Id. at 502. In 
the pharmaceutical sector, however, reverse engineering is common and rapid. See supra text 
accompanying notes 33–34. Stronger IP protection could also stimulate foreign direct investment 
(FDI), but “[i]t is difficult to establish strong theoretical and empirical linkages between 
intellectual property rights and FDI and technology trade.” Keith E. Maskus, Implications of 
Regional and Multilateral Agreements for Intellectual Property Rights, 20 World Econ. 681, 
689 (1997). 
45. See Carlos A. Primo Braga & Carsten Fink, The Economic Justification for the Grant of 
Intellectual Property Rights: Patterns of Convergence and Conflict, 72 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 439, 
442–43 (1996). Scherer shows that if extending patents to all low-income nations increased rents 
by these nations’ share of global GDP (20 percent), the innovative effect would be far less than 
required to offset the projected deadweight loss. See Scherer, supra note 42, at 1128–29. If lesser 
patent protection in low-income countries eroded protection in wealthy countries, for example 
because of arbitrage between markets, it could lessen incentives to innovate in wealthy countries 
and thus diminish welfare for patients in poor countries who could benefit from cheap copies of 
these innovations. But evidence from the AIDS drugs context suggests that such arbitrage is still 
for the most part theoretical, despite substantial existing price differentials across countries. See 
Kevin Outterson, Pharmaceutical Arbitrage: Balancing Access and Innovation in International 
Prescription Drug Markets, 5 Yale J. Health Pol’y L. & Ethics 193, 262–65 (2005). 
46. See Scherer, supra note 42, at 1128 (“It is reasonably well established in the economics 
literature that, especially in a world of AIDS and resistant tuberculosis epidemics, low-income 
nations enjoy higher economic welfare when they can free-ride on pharmaceutical innovations 
made and patented in the first world than when they must pay monopolistic prices for the newest 
and most effective drugs.”). 
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in this and other areas.47 India opposed TRIPS, and particularly its patent 
provisions,48 as did the bulk of the Indian pharmaceutical industry.49 Faced 
with the alternative of remaining entirely outside the WTO framework, India 
nonetheless acceded to the Agreement, negotiating in the process for certain 
flexibilities that would limit the effects of the changes it required. 
For example, India is often credited with the fact that developing countries 
were afforded “transition periods” of several years before they had to fully 
comply with TRIPS.50 India was not required to comply with the product patent 
requirements of TRIPS until 2005,51 although it did have to create a “mailbox” 
for the filing of patent applications that would be examined when the 2005 
changes came into effect.52 While the full legal effects of the Agreement were 
suspended during this transition period, its effects on India were nonetheless 
substantial, because of its impact on the behavior and thinking of industry and 
health advocates. 
Facing the looming deadline of TRIPS and fearing that they would lose 
ground in the local market, Indian firms began to look for new markets. This 
led them in two directions: towards exports and towards research and 
development (R&D) targeted at developed-country markets. India first 
achieved a positive trade balance in pharmaceuticals in the late 1980s, but firms 
focused their exports largely on unregulated markets in developing countries.53 
Wealthy countries have the most lucrative markets for generic drugs,54 but 
extensive regulation creates high barriers to entry.55 Indian companies therefore 
 
47. Peter Drahos & John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: Who Owns the 
Knowledge Economy? 133–34, 136 (2002); Sell, supra note 37, at 108–11.  
48. George K. Foster, Opposing Forces in a Revolution in International Patent Protection: 
The U.S. and India in the Uruguay Round and its Aftermath, 3 UCLA J. Int’l L. & Foreign Aff. 
283, 311 (1998). 
49. Id. at 307–11.  
50. Id. at 312; see also TRIPS, supra note 1, arts. 65–66. 
51. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 65.4.  
52. Id. art. 70.8(a); Appellate Body Report, India—Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical 
and Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS50/AB/R (Dec. 19, 1997) [hereinafter India—
Patents] (requiring India to comply with Art. 70.8(a)). The mailbox was implemented by the 
Patents (Amendment) Act, 1999, No. 17, Acts of Parliament, 1999, §§ 2, 3. India took other steps 
towards complying with TRIPS requirements in 2002, when it extended a twenty-year term to all 
patents, reversed the burden of proof in process infringement cases, and introduced for the first 
time a definition of “inventive step.” The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2003, No. 38, Acts of 
Parliament, 2003, §§ 27, 43, 3(f).  
53. Chaudhuri, supra note 22, at 45 tbl.2.5; Aggarwal, supra note 26, at 26. 
54. The United States makes up 50 percent of the global market in pharmaceuticals, and 
generic drugs make up about 63 percent of the U.S. market by volume. William Greene, The 
Emergence of India’s Pharmaceutical Industry and Implications for the U.S. Generic Drug 
Market 21–22 (U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n Office of Econ., Working Paper No. 2007-05-A, 2007). 
This represented a generics market of $54.1 billion in 2006. Id. at 21. By comparison, the entire 
Indian pharmaceutical market in 2005 was valued at approximately $6.3 billion. Gautam Kumra 
et al., McKinsey & Co., India Pharma 2015: Unlocking the Potential of the Indian 
Pharmaceuticals Market 11 (2007).  
55. Chaudhuri, supra note 22, at 180–81, 188 (reporting that “Drug Master File” [DMF] 
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did not make a serious effort to enter the U.S. generics market until the mid-
1990s.56 Notably, the first time Indian companies directly encountered patent 
issues was when they entered U.S. markets.57   
As Indian companies gained expertise in navigating patent and regulatory 
filings, their share of U.S. drug filings skyrocketed. Today, Indian companies 
constitute 25 to 50 percent of all applications for generic drug approval in the 
United States.58 The result has been new, cutthroat competition in some sectors 
of the U.S. generics market.59 Paradoxically, it may be that, as a top executive 
of one of the largest Indian drug companies asserted, “U.S. consumers are the 
biggest beneficiaries, in value terms, of the Indian generics industry.”60   
Along the way, India has developed a significant trade advantage.61 It has 
become one of the largest suppliers of pharmaceutical formulations in the 
world by volume, as well as one of the top API suppliers.62 Top-tier Indian 
companies are also increasingly transnationalized. Leading Indian firms now 
make substantially more of their revenue through exports than they do through 
 
applications cost up to $200,000 and the more complex “Abbreviated New Drug Application” 
[ANDA] filing can cost up to $1 million and take up to five years to complete); cf. Aggarwal, 
supra note 26, at 56.  
56. Shah, supra note 33, at 11; Interview with Gopakumar Nair, Gopakumar Nair Assocs., 
in Mumbai, India (June 11, 2007) (transcript on file with author); see also Aggarwal, supra note 
26, at 29 tbl.13 (explaining that the United States was less than 4 percent of India’s export market 
in 1989–90).  
57. Interview with Raghu Cidambi, supra note 25; Interview with Gopakumar Nair, supra 
note 56.  
58. Most Indian companies that sell into the U.S. market supply APIs under the DMF 
procedure. Chaudhuri, supra note 22, at 196. The share of U.S. DMF filings made by Indian 
companies increased from 14 percent in 2000 to about 50 percent in 2007. Hitesh Gajaria, India to 
Be Amongst Top Three Generic Makers in the World, Express Pharma, Jan. 16–31, 2008, 
available at http://www.expresspharmaonline.com/20080131/indianpharmain202008.shtml. Only 
a select group of top Indian companies file ANDAs, but here too, growth in recent years has been 
explosive. Chaudhuri, supra note 22, at 196–97. The first ANDA filed by an Indian company 
was in 1998. Interview with Dilip G. Shah, supra note 28. Today, Indian companies are the 
second-largest filers of ANDAs in the United States, with a share of approximately 25 percent. 
Greene, supra note 54, at 17; Gajaria, supra. 
59. Interview with Raghu Cidambi, supra note 25; see also Greene, supra note 54, at 23. 
The U.S. generics market has in fact become so competitive that profitability has declined and 
Indian companies have turned increasingly to higher margin export markets such as Europe and 
Japan. Greene, supra note 54, at 20. 
60. Interview with Raghu Cidambi, supra note 25. Indian companies still represent a fairly 
small percentage of the U.S. generics market, Greene, supra note 54, at 23–25, but they are 
important in the markets where they compete, as well as in driving down the price of APIs. Id. at 
26–27.  
61. Chaudhuri, supra note 22, at 45 tbl.2.5; Aggarwal, supra note 26, at 26. 
62. Some estimate India as the largest supplier of drug formulations by volume and “one of 
the largest” producers of APIs. See, e.g., Shubham Chaudhuri, Pinelopi K. Goldberg & Panle Jia, 
Estimating the Effects of Global Patent Protection in Pharmaceuticals: A Case Study of 
Quinolones in India, 96 Am. Econ. Rev. 1477, 1481–82 (2006). Others rank India among the top 
five pharmaceutical producers in the world by volume and in the top twenty exporters of APIs. 
See, e.g., Aggarwal, supra note 26, at 1–2. The reason for the discrepancy is not clear.  
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local sales.63 Several of the biggest names have recently acquired companies in 
other markets, or have been acquired by companies based outside of India.64   
Intriguingly, key players in the Indian industry credit these recent 
successes to the globalization of IP norms. According to Gopakumar Nair, an 
expert on IP issues with four decades of experience in the Indian industry,  
if the patent and product patent regime had not come to India, the 
tendency to learn more about patents would not have come . . . [and 
the industry would not have had the] ability to go to markets like Japan 
and Australia. . . . Indians have now become global players because 
global standards of intellectual property have come to India.65  
D.G. Shah, the secretary general of the Indian Pharmaceutical Alliance (IPA), 
contends that the progression towards export markets was a direct response to 
TRIPS, because the Agreement forced leading Indian companies to look 
outside of India when planning their strategy for growth.66 According to him, 
when the “Indian industry saw that one of the drivers of growth, which was 
new product[s], [was] going to be hit with the patent regime, their response was 
‘let’s go into the larger market’ . . . . They started going to [the] US in only ’98, 
not before.”67 
The entry of Indian companies into new product R&D was also triggered 
in part by the TRIPS Agreement.68 Commentators often suggest that TRIPS 
will stimulate R&D because of the incentivizing power of patents,69 but the 
Indian example suggests a different mechanism, where TRIPS acts not as a 
carrot but as a stick. Raghu Cidambi, a top advisor to Dr. Reddy’s, one of the 
 
63. Greene, supra note 54, at 19. For example, more than 80 percent of the sales of the 
leading firm Ranbaxy occur outside of India. Ranbaxy Labs. Ltd., Annual Report 12–14 
(2007), http://www.ranbaxy.com/investorinformation/annual_pr2007.aspx.  
64. Dr. Reddy’s recently purchased the German Betapharm, Ranbaxy purchased the 
Romanian Terapia, and Matrix acquired the Belgian Docpharma. See Pharma Getting the Dose 
Right, Financial Express (India), Oct. 29, 2006, available at http://www.financialexpress.com/ 
news/pharma-getting-the-dose-right/182225/0. The U.S. company Mylan later purchased Matrix. 
Id. One of the largest Japanese drug firms recently acquired a controlling share of Ranbaxy. See 
Ranbaxy Labs’ Singh Dynasty Comes to an End as Chief Executive Resigns, Daily Telegraph 
(London), May 25, 2009, at 2. 
65. Interview with Gopakumar Nair, supra note 56. Nair was a CEO, headed the Indian 
Drug Manufacturers’ Association, participated in the TRIPS negotiations, and now leads a top IP 
consulting firm. See About Dr. Gopakumar G. Nair, http://www.gnaipr.com/gkgnair.php (last 
visited Oct. 21, 2009). 
66. Interview with Dilip G. Shah, supra note 28. The IPA is one of the two major lobbying 
groups for Indian generic companies, and represents mostly larger, export-oriented companies. 
67. Id.; see also Interview with Gopakumar Nair, supra note 56 (stating that the threat of 
product patents in India accelerated the export orientation of Indian firms). 
68. Chaudhuri, supra note 22, at 157–60. Expenditure on R&D by Indian companies 
grew sharply in the decade after TRIPS, from approximately $30 million a year in 1996 to nearly 
$250 million a year in 2004. Ernst & Young, Unveiling India’s Pharmaceutical Future 7 
(2005) (on file with author). R&D expenditures as a proportion of sales had fallen from the 1960s 
to the 1990s. Aggarwal, supra note 26, at 22.  
69. See, e.g., Alan O. Sykes, TRIPS, Pharmaceuticals, Developing Countries, and the 
Doha “Solution”, 3 Chi. J. Int’l L. 47, 49 (2002). 
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first Indian firms to begin new product R&D, explained that knowing the 
company would “face limitations on the number of products that we [could] 
introduce and grow, we took a conscious decision in the early ’90s to expand 
our international presence and also to enter into the discovery and innovation 
businesses.”70 Cidambi characterized the process as part of the natural 
progression of the industry, but one for which TRIPS “provided a trigger.”71 
The orientation of R&D in India’s pharmaceutical sector supports the 
theory that TRIPS acted by threatening local markets rather than by creating the 
possibility of new profits in India. To date, Indian firms engaged in R&D have 
targeted their efforts on diseases prevalent in developed countries, rather than 
those specific to India.72 This is a predictable response to the comparative size 
of developed-country markets: in 2005, North America, Europe, and Japan 
accounted for 86 percent of the world’s pharmaceutical market, while India 
made up just 1.2 percent.73 To the extent that Indian companies do begin to 
invest in R&D, then, we should not expect these R&D activities to be oriented 
to local markets and patent incentives, but rather to global markets and patent 
incentives. 
TRIPS may thus have perverse implications for the multinational firms 
that advocated for it. Although they aimed to push Indian competitors out of the 
low-value Indian market, they may have also pushed Indian companies into the 
U.S. and EU markets on which their profits much more substantially rely. The 
desire to retain local markets also pushed Indian companies to advocate 
strongly in favor of expansive flexibilities during debates over the shape of the 
patent law, as will be demonstrated.  
In the decade prior to TRIPS implementation in India, the Agreement also 
had a significant influence on local and international health activists, leading 
them for the first time to appreciate the relationship between patent protection 
and access to medicines in developing countries. As Ellen ‘t Hoen, long-time 
leader of the Access to Medicines Campaign at Médecins Sans Frontières 
(Doctors Without Borders or MSF) has noted, it was after TRIPS was signed 
 
70. Interview with Raghu Cidambi, supra note 25. On Dr. Reddy’s leading role in Indian 
R&D efforts, see Chaudhuri, supra note 22, at 160. 
71. Interview with Raghu Cidambi, supra note 25.  
72. See Interview with Dilip G. Shah, supra note 28 (noting that Indian companies engage 
in R&D for diseases that affect the West and Japan, because they depend for development on 
partnerships with multinational companies, who demand products with substantial sales potential). 
A recent review of the R&D activities of the major Indian firms involved in attempts to develop 
new drugs reported no projects that are clearly targeting diseases with markets predominantly in 
developing countries, and numerous projects for cancer, metabolic disorders (such as diabetes), 
asthma, and anti-infectives. See Aggarwal, supra note 26, at 49, 51. Anti-infectives could include 
projects relevant to tropical diseases, but it seems more likely that they would be tested at least 
initially on conditions prevalent in the North. 
73. See Comm’n on Intellectual Prop. Rights, Innovation and Pub. Health, 
World Health Org., Public Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property Rights 15 
(2006) (2005 data provided by IMS health).  
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that at an international meeting in 1995, for “the first time public health 
advocates raised the concern that the globalization of new international trade 
rules and the harmonization of regulatory requirements would restrict 
countries’ ability to implement drug policies that would ensure access to 
medicines for all.”74 Some meeting participants responded in telling fashion, by 
suggesting that any problems could be remedied with generic substitution 
policies (which call for the replacement of patented drugs with generics in 
instances where patents pose no barrier). As ‘t Hoen has stated, such “comments 
made it apparent that even drug policy experts at the time had a very limited 
understanding of the ramifications of new international rules on intellectual 
property.”75 
Much changed from 1995 to 2005. Pushed by nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) such as Health Action International, the World Health 
Organization (WHO) began to study the relationship between the WTO and 
national essential medicines policies.76 NGOs accelerated their activities in 
connection with the activities at the WHO, the 1999 WTO Ministerial 
Conference in Seattle, and flashpoints such as the lawsuit brought by thirty-
nine pharmaceutical companies against the South African government over a 
law designed to facilitate access to generic medicines.77 The HIV/AIDS crisis 
provided a focal point for access to medicines campaigners, who articulated 
TRIPS as a key barrier to affordable generic AIDS medicines in developing 
countries.78 In 2000, India became central to the debate, because a leading 
Indian company, Cipla, offered breakthrough price discounts, promising to 
provide HIV therapy for $385 per year rather than the $10,000 per year charged 
by patent-holding companies.79 The highpoint of health activists’ engagement 
with the WTO came in 2001, when NGOs working closely with developing 
countries secured the passage of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public 
Health. The Declaration extended the transition period afforded to least-
developed countries with regard to pharmaceuticals, addressed certain 
limitations on the export of generic medicines under compulsory license, and 
affirmed unequivocally that TRIPS “can and should be interpreted and 
implemented in a manner supportive of WTO members’ right to protect public 
 
74. Ellen ‘t Hoen, The Revised Drug Strategy: Access to Essential Medicines, Intellectual 
Property and the World Health Organization, in Access to Knowledge in the Age of 




78. See, e.g., James Love, Panel Discussion, AIDS Drugs and the Developing World: The 
Role of Patents in the Access of Medicines, 12 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 683, 
705 (2002) (discussing the access to medicines crisis and suggesting that “[t]he WTO agreement 
is the most important thing”). 
79. Médecins Sans Frontières, Untangling the Web of Antiretroviral Price 
Reductions 6 (11th ed. 2008), available at http://www.msfaccess.org/fileadmin/ 
user_upload/diseases/hiv-aids/Untangling_the_Web/Untanglingtheweb_July2008_English.pdf. 
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health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all.”80 
By 2005, activists had successfully pushed for massive new HIV/AIDS 
treatment programs, which Indian generic medicines have played a significant 
part in sustaining.81 Thus, when the time came for India to enter fully into the 
TRIPS Agreement by implementing product patents for medicines, both local 
industry and local and global health advocates were poised to play a key role in 
the negotiations. 
C.  Implementing TRIPS in India 
In order to meet the December 31, 2004, TRIPS deadline for the 
introduction of product patents, India passed an ordinance that temporarily 
brought its law into compliance.82 The measure was set to expire in 
approximately three months, setting the stage for a period of intense advocacy 
around the shape of the new bill. The Indian National Working Group on 
Patents, which had been seeking since 1998 to influence the government’s 
implementation of TRIPS, lobbied heavily,83 as did the two major lobbying 
groups for the local generic industry.84 The IPA, which represents the largest 
local generics companies, insisted that the Act include a specific limitation on 
patentability that would prevent the patenting of new uses of known substances, 
as well as the patenting of many new forms of known substances.85 Local 
HIV/AIDS organizations such as the Delhi Network of Positive People (DNP+) 
organized local protests against the bill,86 and worked with activist groups 
abroad who staged actions in the United States, France, Uganda, and Kenya.87 
 
80. Doha Declaration, supra note 7, ¶ 4. A compulsory license is granted by the 
government and overrides the exclusivity of the patent in exchange for a royalty. For more on 
compulsory licensing under TRIPS, see infra Part II.D. 
81. For data on the role of generic competition in reducing prices of AIDS medicines, and 
current data on the price of generic versus patented AIDS medicines, see Médecins Sans 
Frontières, supra note 79, at 6, 67–70. 
82. Patents (Amendment) Ordinance, No. 7 of 2004. 
83. Interview with K. M. Gopakumar, Research Officer, Ctr. for Trade & Dev., in New 
Delhi, India (June 6, 2007) (transcript on file with author); Interview with B. K. Keayla, supra 
note 29. 
84. Interview with Dilip G. Shah, supra note 28; Interview with Gajanan Wankankar, 
Executive Dir., Indian Drug Mfrs. Ass’n (IDMA), in New Delhi, India (June 19, 2007) (notes on 
file with author).  
85. This resulted in the amendment of section 3(d) of the 1970 Act. See infra Part III.A.1. 
The ordinance was set to expire and the Congress Party needed the approval of either the BJP 
party or the left parties to pass the Amendment. See Amit Sen Gupta, Mashelkan Committee Trips 
Again, People’s Democracy, Sept. 20, 2009, 
http://pd.cpim.org/2009/0920_pd/09202009_7.html. According to D.G. Shah, after lobbying, both 
the BJP and Left refused to ratify the ordinance as it was. “At that point, with back to [the] wall, 
Government said, ‘Okay, tell us what do you want.’ And [the local industry] gave six points. 
[section] 3(d) was one of those . . . .” Interview with Dilip G. Shah, supra note 28. 
86. Interview with Loon Gangte, President, Delhi Network of Positive People, in New 
Delhi, India (June 20, 2007) (transcript on file with author). 
87. See, e.g., Press Release, Act Up-Paris, Global Access to Medicines is Threatened: The 
Indian Government Must Postpone Amending its Patent Law (Dec. 6, 2004), available at 
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The humanitarian group MSF also weighed in, sharply criticizing the ordinance 
for failing to include sufficient safeguards to prevent increases in the price of 
medicines. In particular, MSF urged that the bill should prohibit patenting of 
new uses of known substances, make full use of TRIPS provisions permitting 
export under compulsory license, and restore the system of pre-grant 
oppositions that the ordinance had removed.88 Representatives from the WHO 
and the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) also wrote 
to the government, urging it to implement a law that would facilitate access to 
medicines and that did not go beyond the minimum required by TRIPS.89  
The debates in Indian Parliament reflected the messages voiced by these 
local and transnational groups. Parliamentarians referred to the interventions of 
international organizations, called for the amendments that industry and 
activists urged, and emphasized the stakes of the decision for patients in India 
and in other developing countries.90 Throughout, many members noted the 
importance of TRIPS compliance, but also urged that India should not go 
beyond what TRIPS required.91  
The exceptionally globalized advocacy efforts around the bill resulted in 
several consequential changes in the new law. These changes consisted of, 
most importantly, new subject matter exclusions with significant import in the 
domain of pharmaceuticals, and the resurrection of a full pre-grant opposition 
 
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/c/india/actupparis12062004.html; African AIDS Sufferers Plea 
for India to Drop Patents Bill, Agence France Presse, Mar. 21, 2005.  
88. Médecins Sans Frontières, Will the Lifeline of Affordable Medicines for 
Poor Countries Be Cut? 5–6 (2005), available at http://www.msf.fr/drive/2005-02-01-msf.pdf. 
89. Letter from Jim Yong Kim, HIV/AIDS Dir., World Health Org., to Dr. A. Ramadoss, 
Minister of Health and Fam. Welfare, Gov’t of India (Dec. 17, 2004), available at 
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/c/india/who12172004.html; Letter from Achmat Dangor, Dir. of 
Advocacy, Comm. and Leadership, UNAIDS, to Kamal Nath, Minister of Com. and Indus., Gov’t 
of India (Feb. 23, 2005), available at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/c/india/ 
unaids02232005.html.  
90. See, e.g., Lok Sabha Debates, 4th Sess. (14th Lok Sabha, Vol. VII No. 18), Mar. 22, 
2005, at 684, (statement of Shri Suresh Kurup referring to the interventions of the WHO and 
UNAIDS); id. at 632 (statement of Shri Uday Singh noting that “the livelihood of millions of 
people not only in India but in the lesser developed countries which are dependent on India for 
medical treatment” were implicated by the bill); id. at 675–79 (statement of Shrimati Maneka 
Gandhi urging a series of points also demanded by industry and activists); see also id. at 649 
(statement of Shri Rupchand Pal noting calls of concern received from developing countries such 
as South Africa).  
91. See, e.g., id. at 633 (statement of Shri Uday Singh); id. at 641–42 (statement of Shri 
Pawan Kumar Bansal); id. at 701–04 (statement of Shri Kinjarapu Yerrannaidu); see also id. at 
647 (statement of Shri Rupchand Pal: “We cannot wish away TRIPS. But, our endeavour, struggle 
and position have all along been to derive as much benefit as possible using the flexibility clauses 
of the TRIPS.”); id. at 675–78 (statement of Shrimati Maneka Gandhi that the “WTO gives us the 
right to protect our consumer rights in the name of public health” and urging maximal use of 
flexibilities); id. at 717, 719 (statement of Shri Kamal Nath, Minister of Com. and Indus., noting 
that “whenever we have to meet a commitment . . . if we can, then we should,” but also that other 
developing countries “are looking at us to find out whether we have got the maximum flexibility” 
and assuring members that the amendments “use[] the maximum flexibility”). 
2 - Kapczynski FINAL (Do Not Delete) 2/9/2010  4:47 PM 
1588 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  97:1571 
system.92 The resulting law substantially limits the implications of the 
introduction of product patents on pharmaceuticals, providing a road map to 
TRIPS flexibilities in this area that is more varied, and that has much more 
potential to limit exclusivity, than the existing academic literature suggests. 
II 
TRIPS FLEXIBILITIES IN THE INDIAN CONTEXT 
As scholars have noted, “All intellectual property rights regimes . . . have 
certain policy levers in common, wielded to a greater or lesser extent. All 
establish, for example, a length of protection, a breadth of protection . . . , and 
some fair use or policy-based limitations on the scope of protection.”93 In the 
area of patent law, even seemingly minor adjustments in patent scope can have 
substantial economic effects.94 In the domestic context, such domains of 
adjustment are often referred to as “policy levers” that can be used to calibrate 
the law’s application to particular contexts.95 In the TRIPS literature, such 
domains are typically called “flexibilities,” denoting where patent law may be 
adjusted, consistent with TRIPS, to adapt to different domestic innovation and 
IP policies. 
While TRIPS includes many relatively clear obligations, such as the 
requirement that patents last at least twenty years,96 it also includes many vague 
and undefined commitments, such as the requirement to engage in “reasonable” 
efforts to negotiate with patent holders before overriding a patent.97 Given the 
stakes of the Agreement, its flexibilities have been the subject of substantial 
attention in recent years, particularly in the context of developing-country 
access to pharmaceuticals. The mechanism of compulsory licensing98 has 
received the lion’s share of attention in this regard, in both academic and policy 
circles.99 A close examination of the Indian context, however, reveals several 
 
92. The 1970 Act had included pre-grant oppositions, but the Ordinance had significantly 
curtailed them. Compare Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, No. 15, Acts of Parliament, 2005, § 23, 
with Patents (Amendment) Ordinance, No. 7 of 2004, § 23, and Patents Act, 1970, No. 39, § 25, 
reprinted in P. Narayanan, supra note 21, at 553–54. 
93. See Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse 
Engineering, 111 Yale L.J. 1575, 1649 (2002).  
94. See Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent 
Scope, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 839, 839 (1990). 
95. See, e.g., Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 93, at 1649 (introducing the term); Dan 
L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 Va. L. Rev. 1575 (2003) (further 
developing the concept). 
96. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 33. 
97. Id. art. 31(b). 
98. For a definition of compulsory licensing, see supra note 80. 
99. See, e.g., Frederick M. Abbott, The WTO Medicines Decision: World Pharmaceutical 
Trade and the Protection of Public Health, 99 Am. J. Int’l L. 317 (2005); Frederick M. Abbott, 
The TRIPS-Legality of Measures Taken to Address Public Health Crises: A Synopsis, 7 Widener 
L. Symp. J. 71 (2001); Nabila Ansari, International Patent Rights in a Post-Doha World, 11 
Currents Int’l Trade L.J. 57 (2002); Aditi Bagchi, Compulsory Licensing and the Duty of 
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other flexibilities with expansive potential that have received far less attention 
in the literature.   
In the process of interpreting the TRIPS Agreement, and in part through 
the intervention of local industry and health advocates, India introduced robust 
versions of familiar flexibilities such as compulsory licensing, but also 
introduced some less common and even entirely new flexibilities. Among those 
innovations are novel limitations on subject matter, an exceptionally high 
inventive step standard, procedural requirements that could substantially 
decrease the grant rate, a patent misuse standard that may sharply constrain 
voluntary licensing activity, and perhaps most strikingly, limits on injunctive 
remedies. Rather than rejecting TRIPS, India has entered fully into its terms. In 
the process, it has demonstrated that, at least formally, TRIPS leaves 
developing countries with far more expansive flexibility in the area of 
medicines than has generally been recognized.  
A. Subject Matter and Inventive Step  
India has adopted a set of exclusions to patentability unknown elsewhere 
in the world and which could sharply limit the number of patents granted in the 
pharmaceutical context. It has also adopted an exceptionally high threshold for 
inventive step (or obviousness), which if applied rigorously would have the 
same effect. These two moves alone could invalidate a substantial percentage 
of the patents on medicines that would be granted in a jurisdiction such as the 
United States. And yet they appear to be fully TRIPS compliant. 
 
Good Faith in TRIPS, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 1529 (2003); Paul Champ & Amir Attaran, Patent Rights 
and Local Working Under the WTO TRIPS Agreement: An Analysis of the U.S.-Brazil Patent 
Dispute, 27 Yale J. Int’l L. 365 (2002); Sykes, supra note 69; Sara Germano, Note, Compulsory 
Licensing of Pharmaceuticals in Southeast Asia: Paving the Way for Greater Use of the TRIPS 
Flexibility in Low- and Middle-Income Countries, 76 UMKC L. Rev. 273 (2007); Sisule F. 
Musungu & Cecilia Oh, World Health Org., The Use of Flexibilities in TRIPS by 
Developing Countries: Can They Promote Access to Medicines? (2005), 
http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/studies/ TRIPS_flexibilities/en/index.html. Experts in 
international IP have noted that other levers exist, but generally have not examined their operation 
in detail or in context. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Two 
Achievements of the Uruguay Round: Putting TRIPS and Dispute Settlement Together, 37 Va. J. 
Int’l L. 275 (1997) (discussing the flexibility developing countries have with respect to, inter 
alia, the idea/expression distinction, inventive step, antitrust, patent misuse, and compulsory 
licensing); J. H. Reichman, From Free Riders to Fair Followers: Global Competition Under the 
TRIPS Agreement, 29 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 11, 30–35 (1996–1997) (noting that developing 
countries could choose, inter alia, restrictive standards for novelty, high standards for non-
obviousness, oppositions, and disclosure requirements). The Indian example has spurred new 
interest in policy circles in some of the policy levers discussed here. See Carlos Correa, 
Guidelines for the Examination of Pharmaceutical Patents: Developing a Public 
Health Perspective 6–25 (Jan. 2007), available at http://www.iprsonline.org/resources/ 
docs/Correa_Patentability%20Guidelines.pdf (drawing heavily on the Indian example, and 
offering developing countries comprehensive recommendations for strict patentability standards, 
e.g., that they treat new formulations, compositions, salt patents, and enantiomers as obvious, and 
employ opposition systems).  
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1. Subject Matter Exclusions 
Patent laws typically exclude certain things a priori from the scope of 
patentability, making the definition of patentable subject matter an issue of 
substantial importance.100 India’s subject matter exclusions are for the most 
part quite conventional,101 but a few are novel and have significant implications 
in the area of pharmaceuticals. 
The most important exclusion is section 3(d), which forbids patents on 
both new uses of known substances and on new forms of known substances 
that do not enhance “efficacy.”102 An important explanatory note clarifies the 
restriction on patents on new forms:103 “For the purposes of this clause, salts, 
esters, ethers, polymorphs, metabolites, pure form, particle size, isomers, 
mixtures of isomers, complexes, combinations, and other derivatives of known 
substance shall be considered to be the same substance, unless they differ 
significantly in properties with regard to efficacy.”104 Other countries have 
limited patents in some of the ways included in section 3(d), for example, 
restricting patents on new uses of known substances.105 But the scope of section 
3(d), and in particular its expansive exclusion of patents on new forms of 
known substances, is new to patent law.106 It can be explained as a classic act 
of legal borrowing:107 the definition was taken virtually word-for-word from an 
EU drug regulatory directive.108 The motivation was to enhance access to 
medicines and prevent so-called “evergreening” (where companies secure 
 
100. See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981) (excluding “laws of nature, 
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas”); Convention on the Grant of European Patents arts. 52–
53, Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 199 [hereinafter EPC] (excluding patents on inventions contrary 
to “ordre public,” “plant or animal varieties,” “discoveries, scientific theories and mathematical 
methods,” “aesthetic creations,” “schemes, rules and methods for performing mental acts, playing 
games or doing business, and programs for computers,” and “presentations of information”).  
101. These cover, for example, public order, discoveries of scientific principles or natural 
substances, plants and animals other than microorganisms, business methods and algorithms, 
computer programs “per se,” and “any process for the medicinal, surgical, curative, prophylactic 
[diagnostic, therapeutic] or other treatment of human beings.” The Patent Amendment Act, No. 15 
of 2005, § 3, India Code (2005) [hereinafter India Patents Act]. Compare these, for example, to 
the exclusions in the EPC, supra note 100. 
102. India Patents Act, supra note 101, § 3(d) (prohibiting, in relevant part, patents on “the 
mere discovery of a new form of a known substance which does not result in the enhancement of 
the known efficacy of that substance or the mere discovery of any new property or new use for a 
known substance”).  
103. Explanatory notes are common in Indian legislative practice and are used to avoid or 
dispel any ambiguity about a provision’s application. See, e.g., Hardev Motor Transport v. State of 
M.P. (2006) 8 S.C.C. 613.  
104. India Patents Act, supra note 101, § 3(d).  
105. See infra note 150.  
106. See Mueller, supra note 12, at 550.  
107. See, e.g., Alan Watson, Legal Transplants 21–22 (2d ed. 1993). 
108. See Council Directive 2004/27/EC, Amending Council Directive 2001/83/EC on the 
Community Code Relating to Medicinal Products For Human Use, art. 10(2)(b), 2004 O.J. (L 136) 
34, 39. For a description of how the act of borrowing occurred, see supra note 85. 
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successive patents to extend the effective period of their exclusive control over 
a drug).109  
The significance of the provision can only be appreciated when situated in 
the context of contemporary pharmaceutical patent practice. In the United 
States and European Union, for example, pharmaceutical compounds are rarely 
protected only with a patent on the active ingredient itself. Companies 
frequently seek other forms of patents, in order to generate or extend their 
exclusive rights over a medicine.110  
Patents on the new use of a known substance (for example, claiming the 
use of a given compound to treat HIV) are common in the United States and 
Europe today, and do not cover a compound but rather a compound’s use in a 
particular way.111 New forms of known substances that have pharmaceutical 
applications are also commonly patented. Such patents may claim new 
structural forms of a compound with different properties, such as polymorphs 
(new crystalline forms)112 or enantiomers (mirror-image isomers).113 They may 
also claim particular salts, esters, or ethers of a base compound. Salts, for 
example, are formed in a reaction between acids and bases; adding different 
acids to a base will produce different salts with potentially distinct properties. 
Pharmaceuticals are typically administered in salt form because salts dissolve 
more easily into the bloodstream and are thus more “bioavailable” than base 
compounds.114 Different salts of the same base compound may also differ 
substantially in properties that are important to manufacturing and storage, such 
as yield, hygroscopicity (attraction to water), stability, and stickiness.115   
Salt selection is a straightforward, trial-and-error process, one that has 
been well described in the field of pharmaceuticals for more than thirty 
years.116 Nonetheless, patents on pharmaceutical salts have been granted for 
 
109. See Novartis AG v. Union of India, W.P Nos. 24759 & 24760 of 2006, at ¶ 10 
(Madras H.C., Aug. 6, 2007), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/456550/High-Court-order-
Novartis-Union-of-India; Lok Sabha Debates, supra note 90, at 684–85 (statement of Shri 
Suresh Kurup). 
110. See, e.g., Michael Burdon & Kristie Sloper, The Art of Using Secondary Patents to 
Improve Protection, 3 Int’l J. Med. Marketing 226 (2003); European Commission, 
Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry: Final Report 184–92 (2009), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/ pharmaceuticals/inquiry/staff_working_paper_part1.pdf.  
111. John R. Thomas, Pharmaceutical Patent Law 44–49 (2005); see also Int’l 
Centre for Trade & Sustainable Dev. (ICTSD) & United Nations Conference on Trade 
& Dev. (UNCTAD), Resource Book on TRIPS and Development 356–57 (2005).  
112. See Dean L. Fanelli, Claiming Novel Polymorphic Forms of Drug Products, 88 J. Pat. 
& Trademark Off. Soc’y 1053, 1054 (2006).  
113. Jonathan J. Darrow, The Patentability of Enantiomers: Implications for the 
Pharmaceutical Industry, 2007 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 2, ¶ 3.  
114. Stephen M. Berge et al., Pharmaceutical Salts, 66 J. Pharmaceutical Sci. 1, 10 
(1977).  
115. Philip L. Gould, Salt Selection for Basic Drugs, 33 Int’l J. Pharmaceutics 201, 201 
(1986). 
116. See, e.g., id.; Berge et al., supra note 114.  
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decades in the United States, upon a showing that the salt differed from the 
previously disclosed compound in an unexpectedly beneficial way.117 Patents 
on enantiomers were rejected by U.S. courts in the 1940s, because enantiomers 
are necessarily present in the disclosed “racemic” mixtures from which they are 
derived.118 Such patents nonetheless have been accepted in recent years, also on 
a showing that they possessed surprisingly superior properties over the prior 
art.119  
Section 3(d) imposes substantial limits on these kinds of claims, excluding 
patents on new uses outright, and limiting patents on new forms of known 
substances to those that have increased efficacy. The definition of the term 
“efficacy” is of enormous importance, as illustrated by a recent dispute in India. 
The multinational firm Novartis sought a patent on the beta crystalline form of 
the salt imatinib mesylate, covering its powerful anti-cancer drug Gleevec. 
Novartis contended that the beta crystalline form had several qualities that 
made it more “efficacious” than the base compound imatinib (which was 
invented before 1995 and therefore could not be patented in India). It was 
allegedly easier to store and process, and also 30 percent more bioavailable 
than imatinib.120 These are common advantages of new salt and crystalline 
forms, so if Novartis had won the argument, section 3(d) would have had little 
bite. So far, however, the two lower courts to address the matter both decided 
in favor of a narrower “therapeutic” efficacy standard that requires the new 
form to show improved healing effect in the body.121 This standard has been 
incorporated into the Draft Patent Manual.122 If it holds, few new forms are 
 
117. See, e.g., In re Papesch, 315 F.2d 381, 391 (C.C.P.A. 1963). In a decision widely 
regarded as departing from previous precedent, the Federal Circuit recently invalidated a salt-
selection patent as obvious, relying on the relatively small number of pharmaceutically acceptable 
acid-addition salts known in the art and on the reasonable expectation that the salt would have the 
desired properties. Pfizer v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2007), panel reh’g & 
reh’g en banc denied, 488 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Some suggested that the case cast doubt on 
the future viability of a substantial number of patents in the pharmaceutical sector. See, e.g., 
Pfizer, 488 F.3d at 1384 (2007) (Rader, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). 
Subsequent decisions may, however, have limited its scope. See, e.g., Sanofi-Synthelabo v. 
Apotex, Inc., 550 F.3d 1075, 1089 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (upholding a district court’s finding of non-
obviousness of an enantiomer patent, despite the obviousness to try enantiomer isolation, because 
the properties of the enantiomer were “unexpected and unpredictable”).  
118. See In re Williams, 171 F.2d 319, 320 (C.C.P.A. 1948); see also Darrow, supra note 
113, ¶ 12. 
119. See, e.g., Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc., v. Mylan Labs, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 2d 713, 749 
(N.D.W. Va. 2004). After KSR, the Federal Circuit also rejected an enantiomer patent as obvious. 
Aventis Pharma Deutschland GmbH v. Lupin, Ltd., 499 F.3d 1293, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2007). But see 
Sanofi-Synthelabo, 550 F.3d at 1089. 
120. Novartis AG v. Union of India, Order No. 100/2009 (Intellectual Prop. App. Board, 
June 29, 2009) at 14, 23, available at http://www.i-mak.org/pharma-patent-decisions (reviewing 
Novartis’s arguments). 
121. Id. at 184–89; See Novartis AG v. Union of India, W.P. Nos. 24759 & 24760 of 2006, 
¶ 19 (Madras H.C., Aug. 6, 2007), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/456550/High-Court-
order-Novartis-Union-of-India. 
122. Patent Office (India), DRAFT MANUAL OF PATENT PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 58 
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likely to be eligible for patents in India, creating substantial scope for 
competition in the pharmaceutical sector.  
2. Inventive Step Threshold 
A second novel aspect of the patentable subject matter lever in India’s 
new patent law is its unusually high threshold for “inventive step.” India’s law 
defines inventive step as “a feature of an invention that involves technical 
advance as compared to the existing knowledge or having economic 
significance or both and that makes the invention not obvious to a person 
skilled in the art.”123 The requirement that an invention be “non-obvious to a 
person skilled in the art” is standard in patent law,124 but the requirement that 
the invention also represent a technical advance or have “economic 
significance” is unusual, and perhaps unique.125 Technical and economic 
effects are often considered relevant to obviousness jurisprudence,126 but 
India’s law requires one of the two. This heightened standard appears to 
narrow the class of inventions that may be granted protection in India, although 
by precisely how much is not clear.127 
The standard adopted for obviousness jurisprudence can have a substantial 
impact on the scope of exclusivity offered by a patent law.128 A new form of a 
known substance with increased efficacy, for example, could survive section 
3(d) but fail a robust inventive step requirement. Section 3(d) imposes no 
restrictions on new compound patents, but a new compound that was obvious 
to synthesize in light of prior art might fail a strict inventive step standard. 
India could thus exclude a very extensive range of patents in the 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology domains by applying its obviousness 
requirement strictly. 
 
(2008). The draft manual is not the result of formal rule-making and does not have the force of 
law. See id. at 3. But it will play a substantial role in guiding examiner decisions, as affirmed by 
the eager anticipation of the manual in the patent offices I visited.  
123. India Patents Act, supra note 101, § 2(ja) (emphasis added). 
124. See, e.g., EPC, supra note 100, art. 56 (“An invention shall be considered as involving 
an inventive step if, having regard to the state of the art, it is not obvious to a person skilled in the 
art.”).  
125. India Patents Act, supra note 101, § 2(ja); see also Mueller, supra note 12, at 563–64.  
126. The “secondary effects” doctrine in the United States, for example, incorporates 
consideration of factors such as “commercial success.” See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 
U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966); 2 Donald Chisum, Chisum on Patents § 5.05. European courts also 
consult such factors when assessing obviousness. See, e.g., Haberman v. Jackel Int’l, Ltd., [1999] 
F.S.R. 683, 699-701 (Ch. (Pat. Ct.)) (U.K.).  
127. For a discussion of the narrow interpretation so far given to this provision, see infra 
text accompanying notes 340–41.  
128. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic 
Perspectives on Innovation, 76 Calif. L. Rev. 805, 812 (1988); Burk & Lemley, supra note 95, at 
1648–50.  
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3. Implications and Consistency with TRIPS 
India’s law, if interpreted and enforced in its most expansive fashion, 
could substantially curtail the number of pharmaceutical patents in India and 
thus facilitate substantial competition in the pharmaceutical market. D.G. Shah, 
for example, estimated that very few of the almost seven thousand 
pharmaceutical patents pending in India’s mailbox claim new chemical entities, 
and that the vast majority are thus likely to be invalidated by section 3(d).129 
Section 3(d) is also supplemented by other important subject matter exclusions, 
such as the prohibition on patents on “mere admixture[s],”130 which could 
preclude patents on combinations of known therapies as well as formula-
tions.131 Also potentially important is India’s exclusion applied to “an invention 
which, in effect, is traditional knowledge or which is an aggregation or duplica-
tion of known properties of traditionally known component or components.”132  
The impact of these subject matter exclusions is difficult to estimate with 
precision because we lack detailed empirical data regarding the role of different 
types of patents in providing exclusivity in the pharmaceutical sector. (We also 
currently know little about the percentage of drugs derived from traditional 
knowledge, in part because the term is subject to different interpretations, but 
also because patent systems in the global North do not require such informa-
tion.) A precise estimate of the degree to which section 3(d) will narrow 
exclusivity in India’s pharmaceutical industry must await research that can tell 
us (1) how often a new drug is covered only by patents regarding new uses, 
new forms of known substances, or combinations; and (2) where compound 
patents are combined with these other patent types, how many additional years 
of exclusivity the latter types typically grant.133 It is clear, however, that India’s 
restrictions, if interpreted in robust fashion, should substantially diminish the 
extent of exclusive rights over medicines in India. India’s inventive step 
standard, if applied expansively, could do all of this and more.  
India’s innovative lawmaking also creates a potential model for other 
developing countries. Whether India ultimately interprets “efficacy” in section 
3(d) as the more demanding “therapeutic efficacy” standard, and whether it 
interprets its inventive step standard as more stringent than inventive step 
standards in, for example, Europe, remains to be seen. But other countries 
could do both, and thereby sharply reduce exclusivity in the domain of 
medicines. With this lever, governments can render a substantial percentage of 
medicines open to generic competition without ever needing to consider a 
compulsory license.   
 
129. Interview with Dilip G. Shah, supra note 28.  
130. India Patents Act, supra note 101, § 3(e). 
131. Such patents are well-known in the United States. Thomas, supra note 111, at 44.  
132. India Patents Act, supra note 101, § 3(p).  
133. Colleagues and I are seeking to produce estimates of both figures in an ongoing 
research project. 
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Such a move also appears to be fully consistent with TRIPS. TRIPS is 
interpreted according to standards set forth in the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties.134 The treaty’s terms must thus be understood “in accordance 
with the ordinary meaning . . . in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose.”135 Subsequent agreements of the parties “regarding the interpretation 
of the treaty or the application of its provisions” are relevant in interpreting its 
terms, as is subsequent state practice that “establishes the agreement of the 
parties” regarding the interpretation of TRIPS.136 Treaty preparatory work and 
other “supplementary means of interpretation” may be used only to confirm a 
meaning, or to guide interpretation in cases where the meaning is “ambiguous 
and obscure” or “manifestly absurd.”137   
Rulings of WTO Panels and especially the Appellate Body are typically 
treated as authoritative guidance on the meaning of WTO treaty requirements, 
although most experts contend that these decisions have no official stare 
decisis effect.138 Unfortunately, there are few dispute settlement decisions 
addressing TRIPS, and even fewer addressing the more significant provisions 
of the Agreement. As such, interpretative efforts turn largely on the tools 
outlined in article 31 of the Vienna Convention and on the views of 
commentators. Absent an authoritative dispute resolution addressing a 
particular flexibility, all interpretations necessarily carry with them some 
uncertainty. I therefore limit myself to the conclusion that India’s flexibilities 
“appear” to comply with TRIPS. It is important to recall, however, that the 
dispute resolution system does not authorize retroactive sanctions, thus 
providing an incentive for countries to utilize fully the flexibilities that they 
believe the Agreement permits. 
Turning to the issue at hand, TRIPS article 27.1 requires all signatories to 
provide patent protection for inventions “in all fields of technology, provided 
that they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial 
application.”139 The Agreement nowhere defines these terms. However, article 
1 states that members are not required to give more extensive protection than 
required by the treaty, and “shall be free to determine the appropriate method of 
implementing the provisions of this Agreement within their own legal system 
and practice.”140 This suggests that the treaty should not be read to impose 
obligations stricter than those present on its face. Commentators widely 
 
134. See, e.g., India—Patents, supra note 52, ¶ 43.  
135. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 8 I.L.M. 679. 
136. Id. art. 31.3(a)–(b).  
137. Id. art. 32. 
138. See, e.g., Pierre Pescatore, Drafting and Analyzing Decisions on Dispute Settlement, 
in 1 Handbook of WTO/GATT Dispute Settlement pt. 2 at 32 (Pierre Pescatore et al. eds., 
1998); William J. Davey, The WTO/GATT World Trading System: An Overview, in 1 Handbook 
of WTO/GATT Dispute Settlement, supra, at 13, 20. 
139. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 27.1. 
140. Id. art. 1.  
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interpret the openness of the terms of article 27.1 as indicating that countries 
have substantial leeway in implementing its three patentability requirements.141 
Indeed, countries do diverge in the way they implement these requirements.142  
Articles 7 and 8, which set forth the Agreement’s “objectives” and 
“principles,” respectively, also lend support to India’s interpretation.143 Both 
articles are part of the TRIPS Agreement itself, included at the insistence of 
developing countries.144 Following the general interpretive principle that all of 
a treaty’s terms should be given effect,145 both provisions must be allocated 
some meaning. Additionally, neither can be read to negate other provisions in 
the Agreement. These dual objectives are achieved by treating these articles as 
a lens through which to interpret other terms of the Agreement. The Doha 
Declaration specifically affirmed this approach,146 as did the panel in Canada—
Generics.147   
 
141. See, e.g., Correa, supra note 99, at 3; ICTSD & UNCTAD, supra note 111, at 358; 
Mueller, supra note 12, at 357–58, 562; Reichman & Dreyfuss, supra note 3, at 97–98.  
142. For example, countries have taken various approaches to defining novelty, particularly 
with regard to the role of prior art and the availability of a grace period for disclosures made by 
inventors. See F. Scott Kieff et al., Principles of Patent Law: Cases and Materials 335–
41 (4th ed. 2008). Standards for inventive step or obviousness have also diverged, sometimes with 
important consequences. See, e.g., Amy Nelson, Obviousness or Inventive Step as Applied to 
Nucleic Acid Molecules: A Global Perspective, 6 N.C. J.L. & Tech. 1, 30–31 (2004) (contrasting 
U.S. obviousness standards in the area of nucleic acid sequence patents with the stricter standards 
of Europe and Japan). 
143. Article 7 states that IP rights should “contribute to the promotion of technological 
innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of 
producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and 
economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations.” TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 7. 
Article 8 states that TRIPS members can, when shaping their domestic laws and regulations, 
“adopt measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the public 
interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological development, 
provided that such measures are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement.” It also declares 
that “[a]ppropriate measures, provided that they are consistent with the provisions of this 
Agreement, may be needed to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by right holders or 
the resort to practices which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international 
transfer of technology.” Id. art. 8.  
144. See Abdulqawi A. Yusuf, TRIPS: Background, Principles, and General Provisions, in 
Intellectual Property and International Trade: The TRIPS Agreement, supra note 41, 
at 3, 12–16; Daniel Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis 203 
(3d ed. 2008); see also Peter K. Yu, The Objectives and Principles of the TRIPS Agreement, 46 
Houston L. Rev. (forthcoming 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1398746 (describing 
the genesis of articles 7 and 8 and suggesting possible interpretive uses of the articles). 
145. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, Argentina—Safeguard Measures on Imports of 
Footwear, ¶ 88, WT/DS121/AB/R (Dec. 14, 1999).  
146. Doha Declaration, supra note 7, ¶ 5(a). The precise legal status of the Doha 
Declaration is debatable, but at a minimum it should be treated as an important interpretive tool. 
See, e.g., James Thuo Gathii, The Legal Status of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public 
Health Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 15 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 291, 292–
317 (2002); cf. Steve Charnovitz, The Legal Status of the Doha Declarations, 5 J. Int’l Econ. L. 
207, 211 (2002). 
147. Panel Report, Canada—Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, ¶ 7.23, 
WT/DS114/R (Mar. 17, 2000) [hereinafter Canada—Generics] (stating that “[b]oth the goals and 
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What this means in practice likely depends upon the provision in question. 
For example, one objection that might be leveled against section 3(d) is that 
India is imposing “additional” criteria for the grant of a patent, beyond the 
approved criteria of novelty, inventive step, and utility. But the section’s 
requirements can all be characterized as per se articulations of the standards 
expressed in article 27.1. The restriction on patents on new forms that lack 
significantly enhanced therapeutic efficacy, for example, can be understood as 
a codification of a particular approach to the law of obviousness.148 Article 7 
suggests that the article 27.1 requirements for patentability are not ends in 
themselves, but rather should be crafted to respond to the objectives 
incorporated into TRIPS. This in turn counsels against the kind of formalism 
that would require countries to explicitly label an application of the inventive 
step standard as such in their local laws. 
It could be argued, alternatively, that per se subject matter exclusions such 
as those found in section 3(d) run afoul of the article 27.1 prohibition on 
discrimination by field of technology. If pharmaceuticals qualify as a field of 
technology, then it is notable that nothing in section 3(d) explicitly restricts its 
application to pharmaceuticals.149 TRIPS members also frequently adopt 
subject matter exclusions that apply to certain technological fields,150 and 
differentiate between technological fields in the way they apply basic patent 
law standards such as inventive step.151 Further, the Canada—Generics 
decision concluded that the article 27.1 nondiscrimination provision does “not 
prohibit bona fide exceptions to deal with problems that may exist only in 
 
the limitations stated in Articles 7 and 8.1 must obviously be borne in mind” when considering the 
meaning of other provisions in the Agreement). 
148. See Novartis AG v. Union of India, Order No. 100/2009 (Intellectual Prop. Appellate 
Board, June 29, 2009) at 190, available at http://www.i-mak.org/pharma-patent-decisions 
(describing section 3(d) as a “higher standard of inventive step”); see also Interview with Raghu 
Cidambi, supra note 25 (“[G]iven the national stage of understanding of patents in India, the fact 
that the patent office has just been set up and the patent examiners have just been trained, I think 
what the government has done is actually set a standard of obviousness in the statute . . . .”). In 
fact, a recent Federal Circuit decision in the United States, decided on obviousness grounds, bears 
striking resemblance to the Indian standard. See Pfizer v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 
2007); see also Brief of Amicus Curiae Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America 
In Support of the Combined Petition of Plaintiff-Appellee Pfizer Inc. for Rehearing and Rehearing 
En Banc at 2, Pfizer, 480 F.3d 1348 (No. 2006-1261) (arguing that the panel’s holding 
“inappropriately requires that patentability in the pharmaceutical field must be derived from 
improvements in therapeutic effects”). 
149. See Novartis AG, Order No. 100/2009, at 188. 
150. For example, the EPC excludes patents on software and business methods “as such,” 
EPC, supra note 100, art. 52 ¶ (2), (3), and many developing countries exclude patents on new or 
second uses of known substances, a restriction with particular importance in the pharmaceutical 
context, Deere, supra note 12, at 79; Laurence R. Helfer, Karen J. Alter & M. Florencia 
Guerzovich, Islands of Effective International Adjudication: Constructing an Intellectual Property 
Rule of Law in the Andean Community, 103 Am. J. Int’l L. 1, 30 (2009). 
151. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 
Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1155, 1156 (2003).  
2 - Kapczynski FINAL (Do Not Delete) 2/9/2010  4:47 PM 
1598 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  97:1571 
certain product areas.”152 The nature of a “bona fide exception” has not been 
elaborated upon, but should be informed by the areas given special solicitude 
under article 8. Thus, exceptions to patentability adopted in order to protect 
public health might not be deemed to discriminate by field of technology, even 
if they have applications only to particular fields.153 
The same arguments apply to India’s unusually stringent inventive step 
test. TRIPS does not define “inventive step,” and thus does not restrict 
countries to a single articulation of that requirement. Countries formulate their 
inventive step requirements in different ways, suggesting that signatories 
understand the Agreement to permit flexibility in this regard.154 Reading article 
27.1 in light of article 7 suggests that different formulations of an inventive step 
test are appropriate if they are necessary to respond to different contexts in a 
way that meets the goals of the Agreement. Each interpretive tool thus points to 
the same conclusion: India’s subject matter exclusions and inventive step 
standard appear to be consistent with the terms of the TRIPS Agreement. They 
thus map out a novel set of flexibilities that developing countries could adopt 
that would, if applied rigorously, substantially reduce the scope of exclusive 
rights in medicines in such countries. 
B. Procedural Mechanisms: Patent Oppositions and Disclosure Requirements  
India has also introduced several innovative procedural mechanisms that 
could help examiners identify suspect patents and that could create hurdles for 
applicants. These also offer examples of rarely discussed TRIPS flexibilities 
that could be adopted by other developing countries and that appear to fully 
comply with the Agreement. 
1. Oppositions and Revocation Proceedings 
India offers three administrative opportunities to challenge the grant of a 
patent: pre-grant and post-grant oppositions before the patent offices155 and 
patent revocation proceedings that may be initiated before the Intellectual 
Property Appeal Board or via a counterclaim in an infringement suit.156 
The pre-grant procedure has been the most important of these, in part 
because of the substantial backlog of patents pending in the mailbox. Pre-grant 
opposition proceedings are not new to patent law, but high-protection 
 
152. Canada—Generics, supra note 147, ¶¶ 7.91–.92.  
153. Cf. Gervais, supra note 144, at 358 (noting that the Doha Declaration specifically 
singles out pharmaceutical products for special treatment, suggesting that this may be a domain 
where “compelling public interests” constitute bona fide reasons for differentiation). 
154. See supra note 142. 
155. For historical reasons, India has four separate regional patent offices, located in 
Kolkata, New Delhi, Chennai, and Mumbai. Office of the Controller Gen. of Patent 
Designs & Trademarks, Gov’t of India, Annual Report 2007–2008, at 3 (2008), 
http://www.patentoffice.nic.in/ [hereinafter IPO Annual Report 2008]. 
156. India Patents Act, supra note 101, § 64. 
2 - Kapczynski FINAL (Do Not Delete) 2/9/2010  4:47 PM 
2009] HARMONIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 1599 
jurisdictions have almost uniformly rejected them in favor of post-grant 
oppositions or no opposition proceedings.157 The posture of pre-grant 
oppositions tends to favor opponents, because the patent’s grant may be 
avoided entirely or at least delayed for a period in which competitors may work 
the invention without threat of penalty.158 It is not yet clear how long it will 
take, on average, for India’s patent offices to resolve pre-grant oppositions. To 
date, periods of two years or longer are not unusual.159   
India’s pre-grant procedure is notable for its expansive standing provision: 
“any person” can file a pre-grant opposition with the relevant patent office, 
which the patent offices have interpreted to mean not only potential generic 
competitors but also groups representing patients’ interests in affordable 
medicines.160 The available grounds for pre-grant opposition are also broad.161 
The Act does not directly state whether any of the grounds are curable, but 
courts could conclude that any legitimate grounds for opposition, including, for 
example, the fact that an applicant has failed to disclose the fate of parallel 
patent applications in other jurisdictions, is grounds for denial of the patent.162 
Nearly 200 pre-grant oppositions had been filed in India by mid-2007, not 
only by Indian companies, but in a substantial number of cases, by public 
 
157. See, e.g., Jay P. Kesan, Carrots and Sticks to Create a Better Patent System, 17 
Berkeley Tech. L.J. 763, 781–82 (2002) (Germany and Japan abandoned pre-grant systems for 
post-grant systems in 1981 and 1994 respectively). Notably, Australia retains both pre- and post-
grant patent oppositions. See Patents Act, 1990, § 59 (Austl.); IP Austl., Patent Oppositions 
(2005), http://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/pdfs/patents/specific/oppositn.pdf. Brazil and Jordan also 
permit pre-grant oppositions. See Mueller, supra note 12, at 568. The Andean Community also 
has an active opposition system. Helfer, Alter, & Guerzovich, supra note 150, at 19.  
158. Furthermore, pre-grant oppositions may produce more accurate results than post-grant 
oppositions because the patent office has not already entrenched its position by approving the 
patent. Kesan, supra note 157, at 777. Data from the periods where Germany and Japan had pre-
grant opposition proceedings also suggest that pre-grant procedures are much more likely than 
post-grant procedures to be used. Id. at 781–82. 
159. As of this writing, several patent oppositions filed in 2006 had not been acted upon. 
Some oppositions have, however, been decided within one or two years. See Boehringer 
Ingelheim Pharma v. Cipla Ltd., Delhi Patent Office (2008), available at http://www.i-
mak.org/pharma-patent-decisions (opposition filed Aug. 29, 2007 and granted June 11, 2008); 
Novartis AG v. Torrent Pharmaceuticals Ltd., Chennai Patent Office (2007), available at 
http://www.i-mak.org/pharma-patent-decisions (opposition filed Dec. 1, 2005 and granted Oct. 24, 
2007). 
160. One of the opponents to the patent on Gleevec, for example, was the Indian Cancer 
Patients’ Aid Association. See Novartis AG, Chennai Patent Office, at 1.  
161. They include the contention that the invention does not meet the statutory 
requirements for novelty and inventive step, that it is covered by an exclusion such as 3(d), that it 
fails the requirements of specification, and that the applicant has not disclosed the status of 
parallel applications in other jurisdictions or the geographical origin or source of biological 
materials used. India Patents Act, supra note 101, § 25. 
162. The text of the Act suggests this interpretation, because no distinction is made in 
article 25 between grounds that would clearly result in denial of a patent (say, lack of inventive 
step) and grounds such as failure to comply with disclosure requirements. A strict penalty is also 
arguably necessary to enforce provisions that require the applicant to produce information, given 
that a patent office with limited resources can only detect violations with difficulty.  
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interest organizations.163 No source provides systematic information about 
oppositions filed or their dispositions, but an NGO has collected and made 
available those decisions that it has been able to identify to date.164 This sample 
does not purport to be comprehensive or representative, but it is nonetheless 
informative. Of the twenty-two substantive decisions on pre-grant oppositions 
to product patents in the area of pharmaceuticals represented there, opponents 
were successful 77 percent of the time.165 Oppositions sometimes also lead 
firms to abandon patent applications.166 The effects of these oppositions have 
reached far beyond this handful of cases, shaping the emerging jurisprudence of 
pharmaceutical patents. The “therapeutic” efficacy interpretation adopted by 
the High Court in Novartis, for example, was urged by opponents in that case, 
and now guides activities in the patent offices.167  
India’s law also permits post-grant oppositions and patent revocation 
proceedings on similar grounds as are provided for pre-grant oppositions.168 
However, the parties that may pursue post-grant oppositions and revocation 
proceedings are more limited: “any person interested” may file a post-grant 
opposition or revocation proceeding while “any person” may file a pre-grant 
opposition.169 The implication of this difference has not yet been determined, 
and is perhaps the most important outstanding legal question with respect to 
these two proceedings.170 Also important, and unclear, is whether any rule of 
issue or claim preclusion will apply to patent oppositions.171  
 
163. Interview with Dilip G. Shah, supra note 28. The latest IPO Report indicates that 
sixty-four pre-grant opposition proceedings were initiated in 2007–2008. IPO Annual Report 
2008, supra note 155, at 9.  
164. See I-MAK, Pharmaceutical Patent Decisions, http://www.i-mak.org/pharma-patent-
decisions (last visited July 16, 2009). The Indian government has recently made a search interface 
available where one can look for decisions, but it can only be browsed with criteria such as patent 
number, making any systematic assessment of outcomes difficult. See Indian Patent Office, Patent 
Decision Search, https://www.ipindiaonline.gov.in/patentdecisionsearch/patentsearch.aspx (last 
visited Nov. 11, 2009). 
165. Information collated from decisions available at http://www.i-mak.org/pharma-patent-
decisions (last visited July 16, 2009). The most common grounds for denial of patents involved 
inventive step and section 3(d). 
166. For example, GlaxoSmithKline abandoned applications on two of its HIV drugs, 
Combivir and Abacavir. See Priti Radhakrishnan, Access to Anti-Retrovirals (ARVs) in India: 
Patents and the Way Forward, Infochange, Sept. 2008, http://www.hivaidsonline.in/index.php/ 
Response/access-to-anti-retrovirals-arvs-in-india-patents-and-the-way-forward.html.  
167. See supra text accompanying notes 120–22. 
168. India Patents Act, supra note 101, §§ 25(2), 64. 
169. Compare id. § 25(2) (post-grant opposition), with § 25(1) (pre-grant opposition).  
170. In at least one post-opposition case, a patent controller expressed doubt that NGOs 
have standing to file post-grant oppositions on the grounds that they have an interest in affordable 
medicines, but the issue was not decided because the patent holder had not raised an objection on 
standing grounds at the appropriate time. See F. Hoffmann-La Roche AG v. Wockhardt Ltd., 
Chennai Patent Office (2009), at 20–21, available at http://www.i-mak.org/pharma-patent-
decisions. The same case concluded that pharmaceutical companies do have standing as 
“interested persons” to file post-grant oppositions. Id. at 4. 
171. Interview with Biswajit Dhar, supra note 36; Interview with Ms. H. Rajeshwari, 
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2. Disclosures During Application 
Applicants must also make a series of disclosures during the application 
process. For example, section 8 of the Indian Act requires all applicants to 
inform the patent office of any application they (or a surrogate) have filed for a 
patent in another country with respect to “the same or substantially the same 
invention.”172 Applicants are also required, until the time of the patent’s grant, 
to keep the Controller General up to date, in writing, about the “detailed 
particulars of such application[s].”173 The law does not specify exactly what 
must be reported, but a reasonable interpretation is that applicants must report 
any amendments to claims or any adverse office actions that affect parallel 
applications. The value of this information to the Indian Patent Office is 
substantial: it puts examiners on notice of potential problems with applications, 
which is particularly valuable in light of the office’s limited examining 
resources.174  
Applicants must also “disclose the source and geographical origin of [any] 
biological material in the specification, when used in an invention.”175 This 
provision was added to the Act in 2005, and appears to derive from concerns 
about the misappropriation of biological materials (or “biopiracy”).176 Again, 
the precise contours of the requirement are still unclear, but failure to 
accurately report under either section could be grounds for denial or revocation 
of a patent.177   
3. Implications and Consistency with TRIPS 
The procedural lever in TRIPS is capable of three kinds of effects relevant 
here: it can (1) leverage the information of third parties to help patent offices 
identify important and suspect patents; (2) induce the applicant to give 
examiners information that may be relevant to patentability; and (3) increase 
compliance costs for applicants. Together, these effects can both increase the 
accuracy of determinations in the patent office and decrease the grant rate. This 
too is a powerful form of flexibility that countries can use to adapt TRIPS to 
their local context. 
 
Partner, K&S Partners, in New Delhi, India (June 20, 2007) (notes on file with author); see also 
Mueller, supra note 12, at 567–68 (suggesting that a pre-grant opposition does not preclude a later 
court challenge); Pfizer Prods. Inc. v. Natco Pharma Ltd., Delhi Patent Office (2007), at 26, 
available at http://www.i-mak.org/pharma-patent-decisions (stating that the losing opponent could 
“if still aggrieved” proceed to post-grant opposition). 
172. India Patents Act, supra note 101, § 8.  
173. Id.  
174. See infra Part III.A. 
175. India Patents Act, supra note 101, § 10(4)(d)(ii)(D).  
176. On the discourse of biopiracy, see Cynthia M. Ho, Biopiracy and Beyond: A 
Consideration of Socio-Cultural Conflicts with Global Patent Policies, 39 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 
433 (2006).  
177. India Patents Act, supra note 101, §§ 64(1)(m), 64(1)(p).  
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Opposition proceedings with broad standing, for example, should decrease 
the cost of identifying and examining suspect claims. Scholars argue that it may 
be rational for a country like the United States to limit the resources it commits 
to patent examination, since few issued patents are ultimately licensed or 
litigated.178 However, denying invalid patents is clearly preferable to paying the 
costs generated by bad patents (for example those associated with strategic 
behavior, licensing, and litigation), if patents that are likely invalid can be 
identified at low cost.  
India’s opposition proceedings help the patent offices achieve this. Before 
filing, potential competitor firms and public interest organizations review 
pending patents and determine which ones merit opposition, no doubt consider-
ing both the social or market value of the patent and its potential vulnerabilities. 
Their oppositions provide important signals to patent examiners, and bring to 
light additional arguments regarding patentability. Because public interest 
organizations have a different orientation than generic firms, their participation 
may be a particularly salient indicator of the social importance of a patent 
decision.179 Section 8 of India’s law provides another mechanism that helps 
examiners identify suspect patents and arguments relevant to patentability, and 
imposes the costs of providing the information on the applicant.   
The procedural lever can also be used as an information-forcing 
mechanism.180 For example, applicants must report the source of biological 
materials. They can likely provide this information most cheaply, justifying the 
placement of this burden upon them. The information garnered through this 
provision may be of use to governments, which enjoy certain sovereign rights 
over genetic resources under the Convention on Biological Diversity.181 It 
could also, if publicly accessible, elicit opponents to the patent that might bring 
important information and arguments to the examiner. Finally, it may help 
locals obtain compensation from patent-holders in jurisdictions where informed 
consent laws make that possible. Of course, such mechanisms will only 
 
178. Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1495, 
1497 (2001).  
179. For example, over time, larger generic firms may develop an interest in weakening 
certain aspects of India’s law, such as the limitation on patenting of new dosages or formulations. 
Generic firms may also decline to bring oppositions altogether in certain cases, instead entering 
into licensing agreements. For a more general discussion of the potential role of public interest 
groups in improving regulatory outcomes and discouraging capture, see Ian Ayres & John 
Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate 54–100 
(1992).  
180. For an influential discussion of information-forcing default rules, see Ian Ayres & 
Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 
Yale L.J. 87, 127–30 (1989). Ayres and Gertner call attention to how penalties can encourage 
private contracting around. I use the term “information forcing” here in a more basic sense, to 
designate that applicants are obliged to provide information directly to the patent office on pain of 
some penalty.  
181. See United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity arts. 3, 15, June 5, 1992, 1760 
U.N.T.S. 79, 31 I.L.M. 818, 823–24.  
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function if they are enforced with sanctions sufficient to induce compliance.  
Finally, differences in patent application procedures from country to 
country clearly increase costs for applicants. These costs formed one of the 
primary justifications for the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) and regional 
patent-granting systems such as the European Patent Office (EPO) and the 
African Regional Intellectual Property Organization (ARIPO).182 Those who 
advocate for increased global harmonization frequently cite the savings to 
applicants as one of the main justifications.183 Conversely, increasing costs for 
applicants can benefit countries that want to limit the impact of the transition to 
TRIPS.   
TRIPS minimally constrains the procedural lever. The Agreement 
specifically authorizes members to require patent applicants to make 
disclosures, including the “best mode for carrying out the invention,” as well as 
“information concerning the applicant’s corresponding foreign applications and 
grants.”184 Countries can in addition impose all “reasonable procedures and 
formalities” on patent applicants.185 The term “reasonable” is not defined, and 
commentators have shed little light on its meaning.186 In the context of a 
minimum standards agreement, the most sensible interpretation would define a 
reasonable procedure according to its means-ends fit, such that members may 
“impose formalities that are adequate to their purpose, but on the other hand not 
overly restrictive on the applicant.”187 Each of India’s procedural requirements 
has a clear and legitimate objective, such as improving patent quality and 
providing information relevant to patentability to the patent office. As further 
evidence of the reasonableness of at least some of its procedures, India can 
point to the availability of similar requirements in other countries. For example, 
post-grant opposition procedures exist at the EPO,188 pre-grant and post-grant 
procedures exist in Australia,189 and several other countries have laws requiring 
disclosure of geographic origin.190 
 
182. See, e.g., Anneliese M. Siefert, Will the United States Take the Plunge into Global 
Patent Law Harmonization? A Discussion of the United States’ Past, Present, and Future 
Harmonization Efforts, 6 Marq. Intell. Prop. L. Rev. 173, 179–84 (2002).  
183. See Hon. Q. Todd Dickinson, The Long-Term International View of Patents and 
Trademarks, in 4 International Intellectual Property law & Policy 14-1–14-2 (Hugh C. 
Hansen, ed., 2000); Heinz Bardehle, Patent Harmonization: Quo Vadis?, 88 J. Pat. & 
Trademark Off. Soc’y 644, 644 (2006). 
184. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 29. 
185. Id. art. 62.1. 
186. See, e.g., Gervais, supra note 144, at 495 (simply reiterating that “reasonable 
procedures and formalities” are required). 
187. ICTSD & UNCTAD, supra note 111, at 622. 
188. EPC, supra note 100, art. 99; see generally European Patent Office, Guidelines 
for Examination in the EPO pt. D.III.5, http://www.epo.org/patents/law/legal-
texts/html/guiex/e/index.htm. 
189. See supra note 157. 
190. See Carlos M. Correa, The Politics and Practicalities of a Disclosure of Origin 
Obligation (Quaker United Nations Office, Occasional Paper No. 16, 2005) (noting that the 
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Patent granting procedures must also permit patents to be granted “within 
a reasonable period of time so as to avoid unwarranted curtailment of the 
period of protection.”191 Again, the term “reasonable” is undefined. Reliable 
statistics about the time required for the resolution of applications in India are 
not yet available.192 Under the Act and its corresponding Rules it is possible, if 
the applicant seeks quick review of an application, for a patent to be granted in 
as little as six months.193 Patents are granted regularly, and some pre-grant 
oppositions are resolved within two years. Notably, even in patent offices with 
far more resources, delays of several years from application to grant are not 
unusual, as table 2 shows. 
Table 2: Average Pendencies in Months in EPO, JPO, & USPTO (2007)194 
 EPO JPO USPTO 
Avg. pendency to first 
office action  
22.8 26.7 24.9 
Avg. pendency in 
examination (total) 
45.3 32.4 32.0 
Avg. pendency in 
opposition  
18.6 n.a. n.a. 
The average patent examination process takes 3.8 years in the EPO, 2.7 
years in the Japanese Patent Office (JPO), and 2.7 years in the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).195 Statistics from patent offices with 
fewer resources are more difficult to obtain. Given the flexibility of the term 
“reasonable” and the special acknowledgement in TRIPS of the limitations 
 
Andean Community, Brazil, and Costa Rica require disclosure of origin). Some have raised 
doubts about whether disclosure laws are justified under article 62.1, but noted that they might 
instead be conceived of as patent misuse provisions justifiable under article 8. See Nuno Pires de 
Carvalho, Requiring Disclosure of the Origin of Genetic Resources and Prior Informed Consent 
in Patent Applications Without Infringing the TRIPS Agreement: The Problem and the Solution, 2 
Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 371 (2000). 
191. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 62.2. 
192. PhRMA recently asserted that “the average pendency period [in India] is 2–3 years.” 
Pharmaceutical Research & Mfrs. of Am., Special 301 Submission 2008, at 65 (2008). 
Mueller notes the absence of systematic data on pendencies, and cites reports suggesting pendency 
periods that range from three to six years. Mueller, supra note 12, at 627.  
193. Interview with T.C. James (in his personal capacity), Dir., Dep’t of Indus. Policy & 
Promotion, Gov’t of India, in New Delhi, India (June 22, 2007) (notes on file with author); The 
Patent (Amendment) Rules (India), 2005, at R. 24B(2)-(3) (amending The Patent Rules, 2003), 
available at http://ipindia.nic.in/ipr/patent/patents.htm. 
194. European Patent Office (EPO), Japan Patent Office (JPO), & the U.S. Patent 
& Trademark Office (USPTO), Trilateral Statistical Report: 2007 Edition 49 tbl.4 
(2007), http://www.trilateral.net/statistics/tsr/2007/TSR.pdf. The EPO opposition procedures are 
post-grant, so they are not strictly comparable to pre-grant oppositions in terms of implications for 
patentees.  
195. The Report does not make clear whether the EPO “time in examination” includes the 
period of post-grant opposition for those patents that are opposed.  
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faced by developing countries’ legal systems,196 developing countries should be 
accorded extra latitude with regard to pendencies. This is affirmed when article 
62 is read in light of article 7: the time that it takes to evaluate patents in a way 
that protects the “mutual advantage of producers and users” and that is 
“conducive to social and economic welfare” may well be longer in contexts 
with fewer administrative resources.197 Indian procedures thus should meet the 
requirement of reasonableness imposed by TRIPS.   
Here too, in common law fashion, India has developed a mode of 
internalizing TRIPS that could be widely adopted by other developing 
countries, thus improving accuracy in patent offices and making it more 
difficult for applicants to secure patents. 
C.  Remedies  
The TRIPS flexibility that has received the least attention in the existing 
literature also has the most expansive potential. The Indian example illustrates 
how courts could use standard equitable tests for injunctive relief to prevent 
exclusivity from hindering access to medicines. If developing countries follow 
the Indian model, patents on medicines could be subject to a liability rule rather 
than a property rule in all cases where this would enhance access to medicines. 
Perhaps surprisingly, nothing in TRIPS appears to prevent developing countries 
from taking this approach.   
1. Remedies  
The recent U.S. Supreme Court case eBay v. MercExchange has spurred 
renewed attention to the remedies lever in patent law.198 In eBay, the Court 
rejected the notion that injunctions should issue as a matter of course in patent 
cases, and held that courts must apply a four-part equitable test before awarding 
injunctive relief.199 The plaintiff must demonstrate (1) irreparable injury, (2) 
inadequacy of monetary damages, (3) that the balance of the hardships favors 
the plaintiff, and (4) that “the public interest would not be disserved.”200 The 
long-term implications of the case are not yet clear, but it has led to a new 
willingness among district courts to deny permanent injunctions.201 Similarly, 
 
196. See TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 41.5 (TRIPS does not create “any obligation with 
respect to the distribution of resources as between enforcement of intellectual property rights and 
the enforcement of law in general”).  
197. See id. art. 7.  
198. See, e.g., Benjamin H. Diessel, Note, Trolling for Trolls: The Pitfalls of the Emerging 
Market Competition Requirement for Permanent Injunctions in Patent Cases Post-eBay, 106 
Mich. L. Rev. 305 (2007); Benjamin Petersen, Note, Injunctive Relief in the Post-eBay World, 23 
Berkeley Tech. L.J. 193 (2008).  
199. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). 
200. Id.  
201. For a survey of the implementation of eBay in district courts, see Peterson, supra note 
198.  
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under Indian law, a court “may” issue a permanent injunction after 
infringement is found, but is not obliged to.202  
The potential scope of this lever is illustrated by the recent case, Roche v. 
Cipla,203 one of the first patent infringement suits regarding a medicine to come 
before an Indian court. Roche sued Cipla to prevent the Indian company from 
launching a generic version of a Roche drug covered by a patent in India.204 
Cipla counterclaimed, seeking the patent’s revocation,205 and asserted that a 
preliminary injunction should not issue because of the “overwhelming interest 
of society” in access to affordable, life-saving medicines. In support of their 
position, Cipla cited the substantial price differential between the Cipla version 
(Rs. 1,600/month, or about $36 at current exchange rates) and the Roche 
version (Rs. 4,880/month, or about $110 at current exchange rates).206   
Referencing eBay, the court concluded that it should apply the normal 
standards for injunctive relief,207 which in the preliminary injunction context in 
India includes consideration of likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable 
injury, and the balance of convenience.208 After finding that Cipla had a 
credible case on the merits, the court considered the price differential between 
the Cipla and Roche products and stated that it could not “be unmindful of the 
right of the general public to access life saving drugs which are available and 
for which such access would be denied if the injunction were granted.”209 “The 
degree of harm in such eventuality,” it continued, “is absolute; the chances of 
improvement of life expectancy; even chances of recovery in some cases would 
be snuffed out altogether, if [an] injunction were granted. Such injuries to third 
parties are un-compensatable.”210 The court referred again to eBay, and to a 
nonprecedential Federal Circuit decision that cited public health concerns to 
affirm the denial of an injunction in a case involving a drug-eluting stent.211 
 
202. India Patents Act, supra note 101, § 108. One statutory provision of Indian law denies 
injunctions in certain cases. Under section 11A of the Indian Act, holders of patents granted from 
the mailbox are only entitled to a “reasonable royalty” against defendants who have made 
“significant investment and [who] were producing and marketing the concerned product prior to 
[Jan. 1, 2005] and which continue to manufacture the product covered by the patent on the date of 
grant of the patent.” Id. § 11A(7). There appear to have been no requests for compensation made 
yet under section 11A. See Interview with Gopakumar Nair, supra note 56.  
203. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Cipla Ltd., (2008) 642 I.A [hereinafter Roche v. Cipla], 
available at http://www.i-mak.org/storage/F%20Hoffmann%20La%20Roche%20v%20Cipla% 
20Ltd%202008.pdf. 
204. Id. ¶¶ 3–4. 
205. Id. ¶¶ 9–12. 
206. Id. ¶ 14. 
207. Id. ¶ 63. 
208. See, e.g., Standipack Private Ltd. v. M/s. Oswal Trading Co., 2000 A.I.R. 23 (Del.) 
¶ 20.  
209. Roche v. Cipla, ¶ 78, ¶ 85. 
210. Id. ¶ 85. It also indicated that such a result would conflict with the constitutional right 
to life. Id.; see also India Const. art. 21. 
211. Roche v. Cipla, ¶ 85; see also Cordis v. Boston Scientific Co., 99 Fed. Appx. 928, 935 
(Fed. Cir. 2004).  
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Concluding that the harm to third parties would be irreparable, the court denied 
the preliminary injunction.212  
This case is on appeal as of this writing, and the High Court’s reasoning 
might not prevail.213 But if it does, its logic would be easy to apply in the 
permanent injunction context. More importantly, the court, acting in common 
law fashion, has illustrated the enormous potential of the remedies lever to limit 
exclusive rights in the domain of medicines.  
2. Implications and Consistency with TRIPS 
If followed, the Roche precedent would render pharmaceutical patents 
subject to a liability rule in any case where a patent would inhibit access to 
medicines. This does not mean that courts would never grant injunctions. 
Courts might grant an injunction if, for example, the generic firm could not 
provide the product at lower cost, or if affordable alternatives were available in 
the market. If generic companies were confident that the Roche rule would be 
consistently applied, they would presumably enter the market and invite 
infringement suits or licenses wherever they could markedly undercut the 
originator’s price. This would leave patent holders with damages in lieu of 
exclusive rights. The amount of damages awarded would of course be 
important to the effect of the rule. Lost profits would be one way to measure 
damages, and a hypothetical reasonable royalty another.214 Where an injunction 
is denied because of the expected effects of profit-maximizing strategies on 
health, however, the reasonable royalty approach is clearly preferable. 
Depending on how they are calculated, reasonable royalties could substantially 
reduce the costs of medicines for patients.215 
Perhaps surprisingly, TRIPS does little to limit the remedial authority of 
judges. Article 44.1 states that “[t]he judicial authorities shall have the 
authority to order a party to desist from an infringement.”216 As a panel recently 
emphasized in the US—China Copyright case, the phrase “have the authority” 
identifies an obligation “to ‘have’ authority not an obligation to ‘exercise’ 
authority.”217 (While the panel was interpreting the term in the context of 
article 59, there is no obvious reason that its conclusion would not apply to the 
same term in article 44.1.) It also affirmed that the obligation to “have the 
 
212. Roche v. Cipla, ¶¶ 86–87.  
213. An appeal by Roche to the Delhi High Court for an interim injunction was recently 
rejected. See F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Cipla Ltd., FAO (OS) 188/2008 (Apr. 24, 2009), 
available at http://www.i-mak.org/pharma-patent-decisions/.  
214. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000). 
215. For a list of the factors that U.S. courts consider in this analysis, see Georgia-Pacific 
Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). 
216. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 44.1. 
217. Panel Report, China—Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of 
Intellectual Property Rights, ¶ 7.236, WT/DS362/R (Jan. 26, 2009) [hereinafter China—
Copyright]; see also GERVAIS, supra note 144, at 447, 453.  
2 - Kapczynski FINAL (Do Not Delete) 2/9/2010  4:47 PM 
1608 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  97:1571 
authority” is not an obligation to “have the authority to order those remedies 
only,” or to “exercise that authority in a particular way, unless otherwise 
specified.”218  
The panel provided no clarity about the kinds of conditions that could 
legitimately be attached to the exercise of judicial authority to grant an injunc-
tion,219 but did suggest that some degree of discretion might be required to meet 
the requirement to “have the authority.”220 There is room for debate about how 
much discretion article 44.1 gives to judges, but it is hard to see how a flexible 
equitable test such as the one employed in Roche or eBay would deny judges 
the “authority” to grant injunctions.221 That is so even if they exercise that 
authority in predictable ways (as appears to be the case after eBay in the United 
States).222 The exercise of judicial discretion is inevitably bounded in some 
fashion by precedent or statute—and perhaps must be, in light of other TRIPS 
requirements (such as the obligation in article 41.2, discussed below, that 
enforcement procedures be “fair”). Finally, article 44.2 suggests countries may 
be able to go still further and deny, as a matter of law, the application of injunc-
tions altogether, although it is unclear how to reconcile this with article 44.1.223  
 
218. China—Copyright, supra note 217, ¶¶ 7.238–.239.  
219. Id. ¶ 7.248. 
220. Id. ¶ 7.252 (“Whilst authority to order a disposition method not required by Article 59 
does not, in itself, lead to WTO-inconsistent action, to the extent that such authority mandates a 
disposition method in any given circumstance it may preclude authority that is required by Article 
59. The preclusion of such authority may be WTO-inconsistent.”) (emphasis added). The panel 
also suggested that the existence of discretion alone does not shield a law from the requirements 
of article 59, but did not specify the terms under which such discretion would be problematic. See 
id. ¶ 7.253. 
221. If the power in question was never used, an objection might be possible under another 
provision of TRIPS, such as the article 41 requirement “that enforcement procedures be ‘available 
. . . so as to permit effective action against any act of infringement. . . .’” See James Mendenhall, 
WTO Panel Report on Consistency of Chinese Intellectual Property Standards, ASIL Insight, 
Apr. 3, 2009, http://www.asil.org/insights090403.cfm (citing TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 41.1). In 
the judicial remedies context, however, damages might well constitute “effective action” against 
infringement. The claim that a country member systematically refused to apply certain remedies 
would run up against the continued moratorium on nonviolation complaints under TRIPS. See 
World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 18 December 2005, ¶ 45, 
WT/MIN(05)/DEC (2005); Gervais, supra note 144, at 441. 
222. On the aftermath of eBay, see Petersen, supra note 198, at 203 (concluding, for 
example, that courts are “much more likely” to grant an injunction if the patent holder practices 
the invention).  
223. Article 44.2 states:  
“Notwithstanding the other provisions of this Part and provided that the provisions of 
Part II specifically addressing use by governments, or by third parties authorized by a 
government, without the authorization of the right holder are complied with, Members 
may limit the remedies available against such use to payment of remuneration in 
accordance with [article 31(h)]. In other cases, the remedies under this Part shall apply 
or, where these remedies are inconsistent with a Member’s law, declaratory judgments 
and adequate compensation shall be available.”  
TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 44.2. This rarely-noted provision appears to state that money judgments 
will be deemed sufficient in any case where a member’s own law does not permit injunctions. 
This reading gains some support from the preparatory history. It was not included in the initial 
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TRIPS does require enforcement proceedings to be effective and fair. 
Article 41.1 states that enforcement proceedings must “permit effective action 
against any act of infringement of intellectual property rights covered by the 
Agreement, including expeditious remedies to prevent infringements and 
remedies which constitute a deterrent to further infringements.”224 Article 41.2 
states that “[p]rocedures concerning the enforcement of intellectual property 
rights shall be fair and equitable.”225 Again, commentators shed little light on 
the precise implications of these provisions. But they must be read to be 
consistent with article 44, which clearly contemplates that remedies other than 
injunctions will sometimes be imposed. Such remedies cannot, therefore, be 
categorically “unfair” or “ineffective.” If they were, eBay would be no less 
problematic than Roche v. Cipla. Articles 7 and 8 also ought to influence any 
reading of the remedies clauses in TRIPS. Read through the lens of these 
provisions, the nature of an “effective” remedy should be understood not solely 
from the perspective of a patent holder but also from the perspective of 
consumers. If injunctions are denied on the grounds that they conflict with the 
“balance of rights and obligations” or the “public interest,” then damages 
would seem the only “effective” remedy taking into account the perspective of 
both patentees and the public.  
Finally, TRIPS requires that in a case of knowing infringement, judges 
“have the authority to order the infringer to pay the right holder damages 
adequate to compensate for the injury the right holder has suffered.”226 Again, 
the formulation “have the authority” makes clear that the obligation here is to 
provide courts with authority, not to require them to exercise it. No definition 
of “adequate compensation” is offered, leaving commentators to suggest that 
 
1990 draft of the Agreement, which reflected provisions proposed by the European Community, 
the United States, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, China, Cuba, Columbia, Egypt, India, Peru, Nigeria, 
Tanzania, and Uruguay. Gervais, supra note 144, at 147 n.1. It was introduced in the Brussels 
draft, after broader negotiations. Id. at 449. Gervais notes that debates over the remedial 
provisions of TRIPS were difficult, in part because of the “differences amongst legal systems” 
present in the negotiations. Id. at 440. He cites in particular the fact that some Southeast Asian 
countries simply “did not provide for preventive injunctions.” Id. at 441. Some commentators 
have concluded that article 44.2 permits countries broad discretion to limit injunctions. 
Christopher A. Cotropia, Compulsory Licensing Under TRIPS and the Supreme Court of the 
United States’ Decision in eBay v. MercExchange, in Patent Law and Theory: A Handbook 
of Contemporary Research 557, 580 (Toshiko Takenaka ed., 2008) (suggesting that the eBay 
decision falls under the second sentence of article 44.2); Joshua D. Sarnoff, Flexible Application 
of Injunctive Relief in Intellectual Property Enforcement (With Reference to Lessons from the 
Emerging US Jurisprudence), in Intellectual Property Enforcement (Xuan Li & Carlos M. 
Correa eds., forthcoming 2009). This interpretation puts article 44.2 in tension with article 44.1, 
leading some commentators to conclude that article 44.2 merely indicates that injunctions need 
not be permitted in cases challenging a decision to invoke the government use provisions of 
TRIPS. See ICTSD & UNCTAD, supra note 111, at 479. But that interpretation also strains the 
language of the provision, and seems less likely in light of the preparatory history.  
224. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 41.1. 
225. Id. art. 41.2. 
226. Id. art. 45.1.  
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“[m]embers have considerable leeway to determine when the compensation 
would be deemed adequate.”227 
Were other developing countries to apply the logic of Roche, they would 
be able to eliminate exclusivity on medicines in every case where it would 
significantly threaten access to medicines. If courts acted consistently, this 
would create extensive scope for competition in the pharmaceutical sector 
while apparently fully complying with TRIPS. 
D. Government Authorization 
The patent levers that have received the most attention under TRIPS have 
been government use and compulsory licensing.228 Because they are well 
known in the literature, my review of their use in the Indian context will be 
brief.  
1. Government Use and Compulsory Licensing 
India’s primary government use provision states that “the Central 
Government and any person authorised in writing by it, may use [an] 
invention” without the permission of the patent holder.229 In accordance with 
TRIPS requirements, the law provides for “adequate remuneration in the 
circumstances of each case, taking into account the economic value of the use 
of the patent,”230 and requires that the government notify patentees of the use as 
“soon as practicable,” except in cases of emergency.231 Another provision of 
India’s law predicates the grant of patents under the Act on the right of 
government use (for patented processes) and government importation and 
working (for patented machines, apparatuses, or products-by-process).232 
Finally, a provision specifically related to medicines permits the government to 
import patented drugs or medicines “for the purpose merely of its own use or 
for distribution in any dispensary, hospital or other medical institution” 
maintained by or for the government or designated under the Act.233  
India’s law also contains a very broad compulsory licensing provision. It 
may be invoked after three years from the grant of the patent,234 on three 
identified grounds: that (1) the “reasonable requirements of the public have not 
been satisfied”; (2) “the patented invention is not available to the public . . . at a 
reasonably affordable price”; and (3) “the patented invention is not worked in 
the territory of India.”235 If any of these criteria are met, the Controller General 
 
227. ICTSD & UNCTAD, supra note 111, at 592. 
228. See supra note 99.  
229. India Patents Act, supra note 101, § 100(1).  
230. Id. § 100(3); cf. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 31(h).  
231. India Patents Act, supra note 101, § 100(5); cf. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 31(b).  
232. India Patents Act, supra note 101, § 47(1)–(3).  
233. Id. § 47(4).  
234. Id. § 84(1). 
235. Id. Section 84(7) also includes a list of circumstances where the reasonable 
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“may grant a license upon such terms as he may deem fit.”236  
Private companies may apply for a compulsory license directly to the 
patent office that granted the patent.237 The controller who oversaw the grant of 
the patent in question will make the initial decision,238 taking into account 
factors, including “whether the applicant has made efforts to obtain a license 
from the patentee on reasonable terms and conditions and such efforts have not 
been successful within a reasonable period as the Controller may deem fit,” 
identified generally as a period not ordinarily exceeding six months.239 
Another provision of the Indian Act permits export under compulsory 
license if the license is granted with the “predominant purpose of supply in the 
Indian market,” or if a compulsory license is issued to remedy anticompetitive 
practices.240 Special provision is made for compulsory license for export to 
countries with “insufficient or no manufacturing capacity.”241 Where a 
compulsory license is sought for manufacture and export under this last 
provision, the controller apparently has no discretion to deny it.242 
2. Implications and Consistency with TRIPS 
The implications of government use and compulsory licensing provisions 
are straightforward: if employed, such provisions give the government the 
ability to set the terms of use for patents, converting a property rule to a 
liability rule. If widely used, these provisions would provide India and other 
developing countries with substantial freedom to permit competition in the area 
of medicines.  
TRIPS permits both government use and compulsory licensing, as long as 
countries meet specified requirements.243 Decisions must be made on their 
“individual merits.”244 In cases of government use or emergency, there is no 
need for prior negotiation with the rights holder, but in other instances 
applicants must make “efforts to obtain authorization from the right holder on 
reasonable commercial terms and conditions” for a “reasonable period of 
time.”245 Patentees must be “paid adequate remuneration in the circumstances 
 
requirements of the public shall be deemed to be unsatisfied, including where local demand is not 
satisfied, export markets are not satisfied, or the patent is licensed coercively or to prevent patent 
challenges. Id. § 84(7). 
236. Id. § 84(4).  
237. Id. § 84(1).  
238. Interview with T.C. James (in his personal capacity), supra note 193.  
239. India Patents Act, supra note 101, § 84(6)(ii), (iv). 
240. Id. § 90(vii), (ix). 
241. Id. § 92A. 
242. Id. § 92A(2).  
243. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 31. 
244. Id. art. 31(a). 
245. Id. art. 31(b). In cases of government use or emergency compulsory license, “the right 
holder shall be informed promptly.” Id. 
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of each case, taking into account the economic value of the authorization.”246 
They must also be able to challenge the legal validity of the decision before a 
court or other independent body, except in cases of government use.247  
Under TRIPS, countries are free to determine the circumstances in which 
compulsory licenses are appropriate.248 While some of India’s government-use 
provisions do not, by statute, require adequate compensation and notification to 
the rightsholder, these could be provided for by regulation. Alternatively, the 
government could rely on its main government-use provision in article 100, 
which appears to be fully TRIPS compliant. India’s export provisions, finally, 
should be fully consistent with article 31(f) and the recently negotiated waiver, 
assuming that the required notifications are made.249 
In sum, pharmaceutical patents that survive the application of the other 
levers can be overridden via the government authorization lever, within the 
constraints of the TRIPS Agreement. 
E. Patent Misuse  
India’s law also includes robust prohibitions on patent misuse. If 
implemented strictly, these prohibitions could substantially constrain the terms 
of voluntary licenses between multinational and local firms, again consistent 
with the TRIPS Agreement. 
1. Patent Misuse  
In the United States, the common law doctrine of patent misuse evolved to 
restrain licensing or sale practices that violate antitrust laws or that “extend[] 
 
246. Id. art. 31(h). 
247. See id. arts. 31(i), 44.2. 
248. See TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 31; see also Doha Declaration, supra note 7, ¶ 5(b) 
(affirming that signatories have “the right to grant compulsory licences and the freedom to 
determine the grounds upon which such licences are granted”). Some have doubted whether local 
working is a legitimate ground for a compulsory license because article 27.1 states that “patents 
shall be available and patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as to . . . whether products 
are imported or locally produced.” TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 27.1. This arguably conflates rights 
and remedies, conflicts with the Doha Declaration, supra note 7, ¶ 5(b), and is in tension with the 
incorporation of article 5.2 of the Paris Convention into TRIPS. See TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 2 
(incorporating arts. 1–12 and 19 of the Paris Convention); Paris Convention for the Protection of 
Industrial Property art. 5.2, Mar. 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 (revised at 
Stockholm Revision Conference July 14, 1967) (“Each country of the Union shall have the right 
to take legislative measures providing for the grant of compulsory licenses . . . , for example, [for] 
failure to work.”). 
249. Article 31(f) of TRIPS provides that use without the authorization of the patent holder 
“shall be authorized predominantly for the supply of the domestic market,” except in cases of 
anticompetitive practices. TRIPS, supra note 1, arts. 31(f), 31(k). A recent waiver permits 
countries to grant compulsory licenses for export to countries that attest that they have insufficient 
manufacturing capacity, provided that countries report, for example, the quantity of the goods 
exported. See Decision of the General Council, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha 
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/L/540 (Aug. 30, 2003).  
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the patent beyond its lawful scope.”250 It operates as an affirmative defense to 
an infringement proceeding,251 and has been revised over the years to limit a 
fairly narrow set of practices.252 It forbids, for example, “employing the patent 
beyond its . . . term,” and “using a patent which enjoys market power in the 
relevant market . . . to restrain competition in an unpatented product.”253 Tying 
arrangements (or restrictions on the sale of distinct articles) were once treated 
with great suspicion by U.S. courts, but are today only impermissible if the 
defendant demonstrates that the patentee has market power.254 Field of use 
restrictions are “generally upheld” and subject only to the rule of reason.255 
Grant-back provisions are similarly treated with “lenien[cy],”256 although some 
analysts have suggested that exclusive grant-back provisions may be 
problematic and raise anti-competitive concerns.257 
As in the United States, any party that can show patent misuse in India 
enjoys a complete defense to infringement.258 But India’s grounds for finding 
misuse are substantially broader than those in the United States. They cover 
any license, sale agreement, or lease that limits the recipient’s ability to acquire 
or use “any article other than the patented article,”259 or to use “any process 
other than the patented process.”260 Unlike in the United States, India’s 
restriction on tying appears to be absolute. 
Also strictly prohibited are exclusive grant-back requirements,261 
prohibitions on “challenges to validity of [the covered] Patent,”262 and 
“[c]oercive package licensing.”263 All three terms come directly from the 
 
250. 6 CHISUM, supra note 126, § 19.04 (2000); see also Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, 
Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 704 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (suggesting that the concept “arose to restrain practices 
that did not in themselves violate any law, but that drew anticompetitive strength from the patent 
right, and thus were deemed to be contrary to public policy”).  
251. 6 CHISUM, supra note 126, § 19.04.  
252. See Va. Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 869 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (setting 
forth a three-part test for evaluating patent misuse); see also Burk & Lemley, supra note 95, at 
1663 (concluding that patent misuse claims “have been on the wane in patent law”).  
253. B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also 
Va. Panel Corp., 133 F.3d at 869.  
254. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5) (2000); see also Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 
U.S. 28, 45–46 (2006).  
255. B. Braun Med., Inc., 124 F.3d at 1426. 
256. Robert P. Merges, Peter Seth Menell & Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual 
Property in the New Technological Age 340 (4th ed. 2007). 
257. 1 Herbert Hovenkamp et al., IP and Antitrust: An Analysis of Antitrust 
Principles Applied to Intellectual Property Law § 3.3b4 (Supp. 2003); U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual 
Property § 5.6 (1995). 
258. India Patents Act, supra note 101, § 140(3).  
259. Id. § 140(iii)(a)–(b).  
260. Id. § 140(iii)(c).  
261. Id. § 140(iii)(d).  
262. Id.  
263. Id. § 140(iii)(c)–(d). 
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TRIPS Agreement.264 The first two requirements are fairly straightforward. The 
definition of the term “coercive package licensing” is more obscure. It goes 
undefined both in the statute and the Draft Patent Manual. The Act also 
requires that a copy of all “agreements, licenses and other documents affecting 
the title to any patent” be filed with the patent office.265 The provision does not 
appear to be in active use, perhaps because the penalty for failure to comply is 
unclear.266  
2. Implications and Consistency with TRIPS 
The narrow scope of patentability and multiple opportunities for 
challenging patents in India give patent-based firms an incentive to bargain 
around the law and strike voluntary licensing agreements with their local 
competitors. No systematic data about the practice is available, but a recent 
example will illustrate.  
One of the most important AIDS drugs today is Tenofovir, a drug 
marketed by Gilead Inc. and subject to several patent applications in India. 
Several Indian NGOs filed an opposition to one of the patents in May 2006.267 
The next day, Gilead announced that it had concluded voluntary licensing 
agreements covering Tenofovir with several Indian pharmaceutical 
companies.268 One company Gilead had approached was Cipla. According to 
Cipla CEO Yusuf Hamied, in their negotiations, Gilead sought to restrict export 
to countries where Gilead did not hold patents, insisted on the inclusion of 
know-how despite Cipla’s insistence that the company did not need it, 
demanded a grant-back of any improvements made by the licensee, and forbade 
any challenge to its patents.269 Hamied refused the agreement.270  
Eleven other companies struck a deal with Gilead.271 The terms of the 
licenses include limits on export (forbidding, for example, export to Brazil and 
 
264. See TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 40(b).  
265. India Patents Act, supra note 101, § 69(4).  
266. See id. § 69(5); see also Posting of Shamnad Basheer to Spicy IP, 
http://spicyipindia.blogspot.com/2008/08/roche-vs-cipla-is-roche-osipfizer.html (Aug. 28, 2008, 
22:54).  
267. See Third World Network, Indian Opposition to Drug Patents, Third World 
Network Info. Service, May 23, 2006, http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/health.info/ 
twninfohealth018.htm. 
268. Press Release, Gilead, Gilead Offers Voluntary Licenses for Manufacturing of Viread 
in Developing World (May 10, 2006), available at http://www.gilead.com/pr_1147371459. 
269. Interview with Dr. Yusuf Hamied, Chairman & Managing Dir., Cipla Co., in Mumbai, 
India (May 30, 2007) (transcript on file with author).  
270. Id. 
271. See Press Release, Gilead, Gilead Announces Licensing Agreements with Three India-
Based Companies for Manufacturing and Distribution of Generic Versions of Viread in the 
Developing World (Aug. 14, 2006), available at http://www.gilead.com/pr_895671; Press 
Release, Gilead, Gilead Announces Licensing Agreements with Eight India-Based Companies for 
Manufacturing and Distribution of Generic Versions of Viread in the Developing World (Sept. 22, 
2006), available at http://www.gilead.com/pr_908393.  
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China), limits on the sale of APIs outside of India and the purchase of APIs 
from unapproved sources, and the transfer of know-how.272 The last is notable, 
given the pending patent oppositions, because the inclusion of know-how could 
provide a basis for the continuing validity of the license even if the patents are 
denied. The license appears to exclude the requested restriction on opposing 
Gilead’s patents, likely because it would contravene local patent misuse law.  
If interpreted expansively, India’s patent misuse provisions would forbid a 
series of terms that patent-based companies might otherwise seek to impose in 
licenses. If we were to presume costless transactions, the end result could be 
fewer voluntary licenses. Given the resource and informational asymmetries 
between patent-based companies and particularly the smaller local companies, 
it is equally plausible that the result will be less restrictive licensing 
agreements. Furthermore, if patent holders refuse to grant licenses, local 
competitors can avail themselves of some of India’s other levers by, for 
example, seeking to invalidate the patents or to obtain compulsory licenses to 
override them.  
India’s patent misuse provisions appear to be fully consistent with TRIPS. 
Article 40.1 of the Agreement recognizes that “some licensing practices or 
conditions pertaining to intellectual property rights which restrain competition 
may have adverse effects on trade and may impede the transfer and 
dissemination of technology.”273 Article 40.2 notes that TRIPS does not 
“prevent Members from specifying in their legislation licensing practices or 
conditions that may in particular cases constitute an abuse of intellectual 
property rights having an adverse effect on competition in the relevant market,” 
and lists as examples “exclusive grantback conditions, conditions preventing 
challenges to validity and coercive package licensing.”274 India’s law simply 
mirrors TRIPS with regard to these latter three terms. India’s restrictions on 
tying are clearly targeted at activities thought to “have an adverse effect on 
competition in the relevant market.” India’s model thus illustrates a final 
TRIPS lever that is rarely discussed, but that developing countries might adopt 
in order to constrain the terms of voluntary agreements and thus limit the 
leverage of patent holders. 
F. Conclusion 
There is now a significant resemblance between Indian law and U.S. law: 
both include the same key components of patentability (novelty, obviousness, 
and utility), and Indian law no longer categorically excludes patents on 
pharmaceutical compounds. This resemblance has important consequences, as 
the next Part will show. But it is also superficial. If implemented in their most 
 
272. License Agreement between Gilead and Indian Licensees (on file with author) 
(provided by Brett Pletcher, Vice President, Corporate Legal Affairs at Gilead Sciences, Inc.).  
273. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 40.1.  
274. Id. art. 40.2. 
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ambitious form, the nuances in India’s law would permit it (and other 
developing countries) to produce results in the pharmaceutical domain 
dramatically different from those we see in the United States. Pharmaceutical 
patents would be largely limited to patents on new compounds, substantially 
reducing the number of patents related to medicines. This move alone would 
put a large number of medicines into the public domain, and significantly 
reduce the terms of exclusivity available for medicines subject to at least one 
valid patent. Some proportion of the remaining patents would be eliminated by 
a stringent obviousness requirement. Others would be invalidated because 
applicants failed to comply with procedural requirements or on the basis of 
information gathered through these requirements. Those patents still standing 
would provide exclusive rights, but only yield injunctive remedies in cases 
where there was no significant risk that poor patients would lose access to the 
medicine in question. In the rare case where these measures left in place 
exclusivity that caused concern from a public health standpoint, government 
use provisions and compulsory licenses could be deployed.  
A substantial number of drug patents valid in the United States thus would 
be rendered invalid in India, and even valid medicine patents would provide 
very limited assurances of exclusivity. India would have made serious inroads 
into the ability of TRIPS to produce what its proponents desired, and yet almost 
certainly be in compliance with its TRIPS obligations.  
III 
LIMITATIONS ON TRIPS FLEXIBILITY  
Under pressure from local industry and activists, the Indian government 
has creatively implemented TRIPS in a manner that leaves substantial scope for 
competition in the pharmaceutical sector. As a formal matter, this demonstrates 
that TRIPS cannot force developing countries to deeply harmonize their patent 
laws with those of developed countries. This Part demonstrates that TRIPS 
nonetheless sets up a strong harmonizing dynamic because it inserts developing 
countries into a transnational circuit that fills in gaps in the Agreement and 
works against the use of flexibilities.275 The effects of this can be observed in 
 
275. Although many discussions of TRIPS flexibilities operate at the formal level, some 
scholars have done important work to show that contextual factors affect developing countries’ 
ability to use TRIPS flexibilities. For discussions of the influence of unilateral pressure, see, for 
example, Fredrick M. Abbott & Jerome H. Reichman, The Doha Round’s Public Health Legacy: 
Strategies for the Production and Diffusion of Patented Medicines Under the Amended TRIPS 
Provisions, 10 J. Int’l Econ. L. 921, 980–81 (2007), and Musungu & Oh, supra note 99, at 43–
50. For accounts of the influence of technical assistance and resource limitations, see, for 
example, Deere, supra note 12, and Peter Drahos, “Trust Me”: Patent Offices in Developing 
Countries, 34 Am. J.L. & Med. 151 (2008). My contribution here is to offer a structured and 
detailed account of how such obstacles operate in the Indian context, to demonstrate that resource 
limitations and transnational culture are as important as the more commonly discussed obstacle of 
unilateral retaliation, and to show that all of these obstacles are not ancillary to, but shaped by, the 
transnational legalization of patent law. 
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India in three domains. The first relates to resources. As I will show, limitations 
on resources, particularly in the patent offices, interfere with consistent and 
independent interpretation of Indian law. These resource limitations are 
particularly acute because they are relative, and exist within a harmonized 
framework of patent law. Indian examiners face rising numbers of patent 
applications each year, facilitated in substantial part by the administrative 
harmonization imposed by the PCT and the changes in Indian patent law that 
render new subject matters open to protection.  
These resource disparities are exacerbated by the influence of a second 
domain: transnational legal culture. Today, a robust network of transnational 
influences challenge India’s ability to sustain its alternative vision of patent law 
over time, particularly in the context of limited resources. These influences are 
also conditioned by TRIPS. Although the Agreement does not require deep 
harmonization, it does produce formal similarity in the law of its members. 
This facilitates the provision of expertise from developed countries in the form 
of both training and doctrine—expertise that is keyed to the broad similarities 
rather than the differences between local law and the law of the country 
providing the assistance.  
Third, exploitation of the more politically salient policy levers, and 
particularly of compulsory licensing, may be influenced by extralegal pressures 
from countries whose trade policies are responsive to the patent-based 
pharmaceutical industry. These pressures are in some ways constrained by 
TRIPS (at least in theory), but they also work in conjunction with it, by 
discouraging developing countries from adopting expansive interpretations of 
the Agreement’s flexibilities. 
A. Resource Limitations 
The recent amendments inaugurated dramatic changes in Indian patent 
law. India’s judiciary and patent offices are thus approaching for the first time 
the many complex questions associated with these developments. There is 
substantial worry among those following the implementation of the new law 
that it will not be interpreted accurately, and that provisions such as section 
3(d), with its undefined reference to “efficacy,” leave too much discretion in 
the hands of individuals with little exposure to the issues.276 My interviews in 
three of India’s four patent offices indicate that different offices, and even 
different examiners in the same office, took substantially different views on 
questions such as the meaning of the term “efficacy” or the proper approach to 
the inventive step inquiry. According to some observers, by simply perusing 
the titles of granted patents one can tell that patents are being granted on clearly 
unpatentable subject matter.277 This is not unusual in resource-poor settings. As 
 
276. See, e.g., Interview with Dr. B.K. Keayla, supra note 29, at 7–8. 
277. Interview with K.M. Gopakumar, supra note 83.  
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others have noted, “the task of determining whether the criteria of novelty, 
inventive step, and industrial applicability [are] met [is] often beyond the 
technical, legal, or scientific competence of national IP officials” in developing 
countries.278 As a result, “the practice of rubber-stamping patents already issued 
elsewhere . . . , whether or not consistent with national IP laws, [has] continued 
widely across Africa and the developing world.”279 
Some of these issues may be transitional. However, administering a patent 
system is a resource-intensive business, requiring substantial financial input 
and skilled examiners. Resource-poor countries simply lack the ability to 
marshal the kinds of resources allocated to patent examinations in, for example, 
the United States. Officials in Indian patent offices note that there are too few 
examiners in India and that examiners are lured away by higher salaries in the 
private sector.280 Although the same complaints can be heard at the USPTO,281 
the following data show that Indian examiners must do nearly twice the work 
with just 3 percent of the funding per patent of U.S. examiners (or, if funding is 




278. Deere, supra note 12, at 202. 
279. Id. 
280. See, e.g., Interview with Controller #1 (notes on file with author). Some interviewees 
in the patent offices requested that I not use their names and refer to them only as, for example, a 
patent examiner, or a patent examiner from a particular office. In order to protect the 
confidentiality of those who sought it, and for the sake of consistency, I refer to all of those who I 
interviewed in the patent offices by title alone. I also give each interviewee or group of 
interviewees a number, so that readers can identify statements made by the same interviewee(s). I 
conducted the interviews in person at three of India’s four patent offices (all except Kolkata) in 
June 2007.  
281. See, e.g., U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office: Hiring Efforts Are not Sufficient to Reduce the Patent Application Backlog 
13–17 (2007) (reporting problems with attrition and excessive workloads).  
282. A rupee in India buys much more than it would in the United States. Comparing costs 
across countries is thus notoriously difficult. A rough comparison can be generated using the 
World Bank’s “purchasing power parity” (PPP) exchange rates, which estimate the amount of 
money required in different countries to purchase a set basket of goods. See World Bank, 
International Comparison Program—Overview, http://go.worldbank.org/X3R0INNH80 (last 
visited Nov. 11, 2009). The latest (2007) conversion rate for India is 16.537 rupees to the dollar. 
See United Nations, Millenium Development Goals Indicators, 
http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/SeriesDetail.aspx?srid=699 (last visited Nov. 11, 2009). The PPP 
method has been sharply criticized, and likely underestimates the actual degree of inequality 
between countries, particularly when considering the very poor. See Sanjay G. Reddy & Thomas 
W. Pogge, How Not to Count the Poor, SocialAnalysis.org, Oct. 29, 2005, 
http://www.socialanalysis.org/. PPP figures thus should be treated very cautiously. 
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Table 3: Average Workload & Resources, Indian vs. U.S. Examiners (2005–08) 
 Avg. Number 
of Examiners, 
2005–08283 
Avg. Annual Requests 





India 137 20,930 153 
















India $1.89 million 20,930 $90 $1425 
United States $1.4 billion 454,643 $3232 $3232 
 
283. Indian data from IPO Annual Report 2008, supra note 155, app. A; Office of the 
Controller Gen. of Patent Designs & Trademarks, Gov’t of India, Annual Report 
2006–2007 app. A (2007), available at http://www.patentoffice.nic.in/; Office of the 
Controller Gen. of Patent Designs & Trademarks, Gov’t of India, Annual Report 
2005–2006 app. A (2006), available at http://www.patentoffice.nic.in/; Office of the 
Controller Gen. of Patent Designs & Trademarks, Gov’t of India, Annual Report 
2004–2005 app. A (2005), available at http://www.patentoffice.nic.in/. U.S. data from U.S. 
Patent & Trademark Office, Performance and Accountability RepoRT 143 (2008) 
[hereinafter PTO Annual Report]. 
284. Data from IPO Annual Report 2008, supra note 155, at App. D; PTO Annual 
Report, supra note 283, at 62. The U.S. system requires examination of every patent while the 
Indian system requires examination only upon the request of the patent holder. The figures thus 
compare numbers of requests for examination in India with numbers of applications in the United 
States. If the Indian system of requests for examination weeds out a substantial number of patents 
that would be easy to resolve, the workload for Indian examiners would be yet more 
disproportionate, because each application would be on average more difficult to resolve. 
285. The Indian estimate is consistent with reported quotas, which are between ten and 
fifteen applications per month (for a total of 120 to 180 applications per year). Interview with 
Controller #1, supra note 280.  
286. This is the average expenditure from the years 2005 to 2008. For the Indian figures by 
year, see IPO Annual Report 2008, supra note 155, at 12; Office of the Controller Gen. 
of Patent Designs & Trademarks, Gov’t of India, Annual Report 2006-2007, at 6 
[hereinafter IPO Annual Report 2007]; Office of the Controller Gen. of Patent Designs 
& Trademarks, Gov’t of India, Annual Report 2005-2006, at 7; Office of the Controller 
Gen. of Patent Designs & Trademarks, Gov’t of India, Annual Report 2004-2005, at 4. 
The Indian average was converted to dollars using prevailing exchange rates at the time of 
writing. The USPTO does not report estimates of the costs of examining a patent. But because 
funding for the USPTO budget comes almost entirely from fees collected from users of the 
system, we can get a rough estimate of the amount available for patent examination. See PTO 
Annual Report, supra note 283, at 74–75. The average revenues from patent filing fees from 
2005 to 2008 were about $1.4 billion per year. Id. at 56. This compares favorably to Merges’s 
estimate, derived in the same way, from the mid-1990s. See Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six 
Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System 
Reform, 14 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 577, 692 (1999) (citing available revenues of about $3000 per 
patent).  
287. See supra note 284. 
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The funding limitations might be alleviated in part by allocating more of 
the revenues that the Indian patent offices generate directly back to their 
activities. The patent office took in about $35.3 million last year, most of which 
went to the central government.288 If more of that funding were allocated 
instead to the patent offices, parity in terms of purchasing power estimates 
(although not absolute parity) could be produced. Of course it is not clear that 
this budgetary allocation would be superior, given the competing demands on 
India’s budget. 
The true disparities, however, are more substantial than these comparisons 
reveal. Indian offices are only beginning to digitize, meaning that they benefit 
from very few of the efficiency gains that may be associated with information 
and communication technologies.289 Examiners recently gained access to a 
serious prior art database, but some report that the access is insufficient because 
of the limited funds allocated to pay for searches.290 Others report that it is still 
difficult to gain access to basic prior art materials such as journals and books.291 
Shortages of examiners and difficulty predicting the type of examiners that will 
be needed mean that examiners are sometimes assigned outside of their area.292 
With so many fewer examiners, it is of course also impossible for the Indian 
office to specialize to the degree possible at the USPTO. This means that 
examiners in India must inevitably evaluate a broader range of technologies 
than examiners in the United States. Alongside these challenges come 
substantial time pressures: Indian examiners are expected to produce a 
preliminary examination report in just three months.293 That report is reviewed 
by a controller, with a time limit of six months from the date of requested 
examination to the first response to the applicant.294  
 
288. IPO Annual Report 2008, supra note 155, at 4. 
289. All applications filed after January 1, 2005 have reportedly been digitized, but it is 
unclear whether the resulting database includes the full text of the applications or is readily 
searchable. See IPO Annual Report 2007, supra note 286, at 10. As of the summer of 2007, 
examiners did not have access to a full text-searchable database. See Interview with Patent 
Examiner #1 (notes on file with author).  
290. Interview with Patent Examiner #1, supra note 289.  
291. Interview with Patent Examiners #2 (notes on file with author); Interview with Patent 
Examiner #1, supra note 289. 
292. Interview with T.C. James (in his personal capacity), supra note 193; Interview with 
Patent Examiner #1, supra note 289 (noting that assignments are made according to very broad 
subject areas such as “chemistry,” and that examiners from one field, such as electronics, may be 
assigned to another field, such as biotechnology, if the office has too few examiners in an area); 
see also Mueller, supra note 12, at 618 (noting the need for more examiners in the “chemical 
arts”). 
293. The Patent (Amendment) Rules (India), 2005, at R. 24B(2)(ii), (amending The Patent 
Rules, 2003), available at http://ipindia.nic.in/ipr/patent/patents.htm. 
294. Id. at R. 24B(3). Because of the requirement of a request for examination, this is hard 
to compare to the U.S. process. For what it’s worth, the average period for a first action in the 
USPTO in 2008 was 25.6 months, with a target time of 26.9 months. PTO Annual Report, 
supra note 283, at 16.  
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If recent trends continue, the future is likely to bring substantially more 
applications. Driven by PCT applications and the new subject matter 
introduced in 2005, the Indian offices have recently seen significant increases 
in applications.295 In the past three years, for example, patent applications 
increased by 38 percent from 2003–2004 to 2004–2005, 40 percent from 2004–
2005 to 2005–2006, 18 percent from 2005–2006 to 2006–2007, and 22 percent 
from 2006–2007 to 2007–2008.296 These increases are substantially larger than 
the comparable figures in the United States, which are 8.1 percent, 8.8 percent, 
5.1 percent, and 5.7 percent.297 If applications continue to rise in similar ways, 
this will compound the resource disparities.  
Hiring a substantial number of new examiners in India is a challenge 
because of limits on infrastructure and space, and because hiring formalities 
can take up to two or three years.298 Moreover, examiners are often lured into 
the private sector once they have been trained, because the private sector offers 
substantially higher salaries.299 Attrition is a problem in many patent offices, 
but it is particularly acute in a country where there is such an explosive demand 
for patent expertise, and where examiners must learn a great deal on the job.  
Substantial disparities between the U.S. and Indian offices exist with 
respect to training. Examiners in India and the United States are subject to 
similar minimum educational requirements, typically a Bachelor of Arts degree 
in a specified field of science or engineering.300 Once hired, Indian examiners 
are required to attend a two-week training institute and one week of in-house 
training, with occasional short trainings by a program funded by the EU or 
 
295. See Mueller, supra note 12, at 624–25 (reporting data showing a steady increase in 
patent applications after India joined the PCT, and showing that “37 percent of . . . FY 2004–05 
filings claimed chemical-, drug-, or food-related inventions”); see also id. at 626 (reporting that 
PCT applications made up 60 to 61 percent of patents filed from 2002 to 2005). 
296. IPO Annual Report 2008, supra note 155, at 4. 
297. PTO Annual Report, supra note 283, at 62. These figures are for financial years 
2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008, respectively.  
298. Interview with Controller #1, supra note 280. 
299. Id. (noting that the government salaries are about Rs. 22,000 to 23,000 per month for 
examiners while private sector jobs may offer twice as much). As an executive in one of India’s 
leading drug companies put it, “the Government of India is going to find it very hard to hold on to 
patent examiners because the moment they learn something about patents they will be snapped up 
by our industry.” Interview with Raghu Cidambi, supra note 25. The revolving door between the 
Patent Office and private firms also raises concerns of influence on examiners who hope to make 
the move to the private sector, and by those now seeking patents before the Office. See Interview 
with K.M. Gopakumar, supra note 83. Although there is speculation about serious corruption 
regarding certain individuals or cases, most of those I interviewed expressed the view that any 
influence would be felt in a minor, “greasing-the-wheels” fashion. See, e.g., Interview with K.M. 
Gopakumar, supra note 83; Interview with Biswajit Dhar, supra note 36. One patent examiner 
whom I interviewed did, however, state that some examiners and controllers took money from 
applicants. Interview with Patent Examiner #1, supra note 289. 
300. See USPTO, PATENT EXAMINER POSITIONS (Nov. 16, 2003), http://www.uspto.gov/ 
web/offices/pac/exam.htm#req; Interview with Controller #1, supra note 280.  
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conducted by the EPO.301 Examiners in the United States, in comparison, attend 
eight months of full-time study, which includes “extensive lecture and lab 
training, . . . the examination of real patent applications in a setting that 
provides immediate assistance when needed,” and “classes in more than a 
dozen specialized applications used in patent examination, multiple search 
systems, databases, and commonly used office applications.”302 For the first 
two years of employment, U.S. examiners are also subject to an ongoing 
program of mentoring and training.303   
Providing comparable training in India would require substantial resource 
investments, and would be difficult to achieve in the context of India’s 
heightened demand for examiners and high attrition rates. In the meantime, 
examiners get supplemental training through the EPO and, to a much smaller 
degree, the USPTO—a phenomenon that raises its own concerns.   
B. Transnational Legal Culture 
The second influence on India’s ability to make use of the policy levers 
identified above is the increasingly transnationalized legal culture in which the 
Indian patent offices and courts operate. This transnational culture has been 
cultivated by the United States and Europe not only through efforts to 
harmonize substantive law (such as TRIPS), but also through much more 
mundane-seeming efforts to harmonize procedural aspects of transnational 
patent law and provide technical assistance to patent offices around the 
world.304 The Indian example thus offers a detailed and nuanced example of the 
dynamics of structural “isomorphism” that can lead organizations to become 
increasingly alike.305 
Transnationalized legal culture, as I intend the term, is generated in part 
(but only in part) by the “transnational regulatory networks” discussed by 
scholars of international relations and international law.306 Such regulatory 
 
301. See Interview with Patent Examiner #3 (notes on file with author); see also Interview 
with M. Sahasranaman, European Union Trade & Inv. Dev. Program, in New Delhi (May 29, 
2007) (notes on file with author) (describing trainings provided by the EU-funded “Trade and 
Investment Development Program”).  
302. PTO Annual Report, supra note 283, at 105.  
303. Id. 
304. See Marney L. Cheek, The Limits of Informal Regulatory Cooperation in 
International Affairs: A Review of the Global Intellectual Property Regime, 33 Geo. Wash. Int’l 
L. Rev. 277, 306–09 (2001); Drahos, supra note 275, at 152–54; Christopher May, Capacity 
Building and the (Re)production of Intellectual Property Rights, 25 Third World Q. 821 (2004). 
305. See Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Toward an Institutional Theory of Sovereignty, 55 
Stan. L. Rev. 1749, 1755 (2003). 
306. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (2004); cf. Sol Picciotto, 
Networks in International Economic Integration: Fragmented States and the Dilemmas of Neo-
Liberalism, 17 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 1014, 1035–36 (1996–1997); Kal Raustiala, The 
Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of 
International Law, 43 Va. J. Int’l L. 1 (2002); Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Transnational Regulatory 
Networks and Their Limits, 34 Yale J. Int’l L. 113 (2009).  
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networks are “informal multilateral forums that bring together representatives 
from national regulatory agencies or departments to facilitate multilateral 
cooperation on issues of mutual interest within the authority of the 
participants.”307 The term tends to be used to refer to relatively formalized 
interactions among regulators, and to exclude both treaty-based organizations 
and strictly bilateral arrangements.308 Some of the relationships that shape the 
transnational culture of patent law can be described as transnational regulatory 
networks of this sort, networks that are of course also shaped by laws and legal 
institutions. But the influence of transnational legal culture is not limited to the 
influence of such networks. It can also be found in the dynamic of cross-
referencing and citations that favor jurisdictions with readily accessible laws. It 
is also present in the exchange of policy and scholarly papers. Each of these 
components of transnational legal culture is disproportionately influenced by 
high-protection jurisdictions, which have a comparative advantage in 
generating, legitimating, and disseminating their writings.309 
Consider first the transnational regulatory network that has grown up in 
the patent domain over the past two or three decades. Since the 1980s, patent 
offices in Europe, the United States, and Japan have actively cooperated around 
a host of issues related to patent filing and administration.310 This “trilateral 
hub” has increased its degree of cooperation over time, and linked to other 
patents offices “via ‘spokes’ of bilateral or multilateral co-operation.”311 The 
trilateral hub has committed increasing resources to “technical assistance” for 
developing countries’ patent offices, and in at least some instances, has come to 
significantly influence their day-to-day operations.312 One analysis reports that 
 
307. Verdier, supra note 306, at 118. 
308. Id. at 118–19. 
309. Similarly, the concept of transnational legal culture overlaps with, but is distinct from, 
the concept of epistemic communities, as articulated by Peter Haas and others. “An epistemic 
community is a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular 
domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area.” 
Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination, 46 
Int’l Org. 1, 3 (1992). Such epistemic communities may include experts from a variety of 
disciplines, united by a shared set of beliefs and a common policy enterprise. Id. A transnational 
legal culture, in contrast, is centered on law as a central medium of exchange, and may be more 
diffuse than the networks of policy experts that make up an epistemic community. It encompasses 
not only patent officials coordinating policy across borders, but also, for example, judicial 
officials engaged in transnational legal cross-references in their opinions, and patent examiners 
who are targets of patent law trainings. But like the discourse of epistemic communities, a focus 
on transnational legal culture highlights the role that ideas or “epistemes” play in, for example, 
“fram[ing] the issues for collective debate” and “identifying specific policies for national and 
collective adoption.” Id. at 5, 26.  
310. Drahos, supra note 275, at 155; Cheek, supra note 304, at 308.  
311. Drahos, supra note 275, at 155–56. 
312. Id. at 157–58 (noting that “after co-operation projects with the EPO, [patent offices in] 
Argentina, Mexico, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand decide[d] to use the EPO’s search 
results to speed up their granting procedures”); id. at 158 (“[T]he steady drip-drip of technical 
assistance over a period of years has led to the formation of trust between the EPO and developing 
country offices”). 
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“every U.S. official in the international affairs division at the USPTO and the 
Copyright Office is involved in direct assistance to several countries,” with the 
most common task being “the review of draft legislation” to assist countries in 
complying with TRIPS.313 WIPO also engages in extensive “technical 
assistance” for developing countries, in the form of, for example, conferences, 
trainings, and the provision of draft laws.314 Because of the broad flexibilities in 
TRIPS, influence on the drafting and implementation of laws can have 
substantial effects. 
The influence of this transnational network on Indian examiners is most 
direct in the domain of training. Indian examiners are regularly trained in 
programs organized predominantly by the EPO, and to a lesser extent by the 
JPO and the USPTO.315 Some of these trainings occur in India, but others 
involve trips to Europe or the United States.316 Such trips tend to be highly 
desirable.317 According to D.G. Shah, they also 
ha[ve] a potential for abuse. Today the officials here are smart. They 
want only assistance, so they are sending people, examiners from here 
to [the] U.S. patent office for six months to study and understand how 
they operate. They are not letting [the] U.S. patent office touch India’s 
patent manual or guidelines for patent examination. . . . I am not 
personally happy with it because there is a potential for abuse. But at 
the moment it is not going against India’s interest.318 
The Director of the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion, which 
oversees India’s patent offices, similarly indicated that such trainings were 
intended to provide “exposure,” and would not lead examiners to confuse 
Indian law with, for example, the law of the EPO.319  
There is room for doubt, however. As Peter Drahos has argued, drawing 
on fieldwork in several developing-country patent offices, “Technical 
assistance of the long-term kind practised by the EPO creates in those receiving 
the assistance assumptions of reliability about the operation of systems 
(technocratic trust) and these in turn help to integrate the recipients of this 
assistance into the broader technocratic community that the EPO represents.”320 
Others have also noted that “[t]he high degree to which [developing country] IP 
offices have relied on external support [has] rendered them vulnerable to 
financial influence from donors” and contributed to “a compliance-plus 
 
313. See Cheek, supra note 304, at 306. 
314. See id. at 305–06; May, supra note 304, at 825–26.  
315. See Interview with Controller #1, supra note 280. Several examiners volunteered in 
interviews that they had been extensively trained by the EPO. Interview with Patent Examiners 
#2, supra note 291. 
316. Interview with Controller #1, supra note 280. 
317. Interview with Patent Examiner #1, supra note 289. 
318. Interview with Dilip G. Shah, supra note 28. 
319. Interview with T.C. James (in his personal capacity), supra note 193. 
320. Drahos, supra note 275, at 160.  
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approach to TRIPS implementation.”321 
Evidence of this dynamic can be discerned in India. As discussed in 
Part II, for example, India’s law incorporates what appears to be an 
“obviousness-plus” standard, requiring not only that an invention be non-
obvious to a person skilled in the art, but also that it embody a technical 
advance or have an economic effect. In my interviews with examiners and 
controllers in the patent offices, however, many insisted that Indian standards 
for inventive step are identical to those of the EPO and the United States.322 
The lead IP official in the Indian government acknowledged that examiners 
took this view, and gave some a personal briefing emphasizing that the 
standards were not the same.323 A lawyer in a prominent local law firm that 
deals regularly with patent issues noted that examiners seemed to rely 
especially on the EPO’s inventive step standard, and explained this as the result 
of the fact that examiners from the EPO regularly train local examiners.324 
The PCT preliminary search report system generates a similar form of 
influence. The PCT establishes a streamlined system for international patent 
applications with implications for both preservation of priority dates and for 
patent examination procedures. When applicants choose to use the PCT system, 
a preliminary opinion on patentability is completed by a designated search 
office (almost all in developed countries) and provided to national offices that 
receive the application.325 An applicant may also request an international 
“preliminary examination,” typically on an amended version of the 
application.326   
According to WIPO, any preliminary search report “should be considered 
by the [national] Offices but is not binding on them.”327 In resource-poor 
 
321. Deere, supra note 12, at 200 (also contending that “[c]ountries with the lowest 
technical capacity on IP, such as those in Africa, were particularly vulnerable to pro-IP capacity-
building”).  
322. Interview with Patent Examiners #2, supra note 291; Interview with Controller #2 
(notes on file with author); Interview with Controller #1, supra note 280. 
323. Interview with T.C. James (in his personal capacity), supra note 193. 
324. Interview with H. Rajeshwari, supra note 171.  
325. World Intellectual Prop. Org., Protecting Your Inventions Abroad: 
Frequently Asked Questions About the Patent Cooperation Treaty 8–11 (2006). The 
PCT and its rules establish broad standards to guide the inquiry of the international searching 
authorities. See, e.g., Patent Cooperation Treaty art. 33.3, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645, 1160 
U.N.T.S. 231 [hereinafter PCT] (“a claimed invention shall be considered to involve an inventive 
step if, having regard to the prior art as defined in the Regulations, it is not, at the prescribed 
relevant date, obvious to a person skilled in the art”); Regulations Under the Patent Cooperation 
Treaty, rule 65.1, June 19, 1970 (as in force from July 1, 2009), 28 U.S.T. 7645, 1160 U.N.T.S. 
231 (“[T]he international preliminary examination shall take into consideration the relation of any 
particular claim to the prior art as a whole.”). Because these standards are quite vague, examiners 
appear to follow their own national law on matters such as inventive step, which of course may 
not match the law of receiving countries. See Concise European Patent Law 487 (Richard 
Hacon & Jochen Pagenberg eds., 2007). 
326. World Intellectual Prop. Org., supra note 325, at 4.  
327. Id. at 12. 
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settings, however, it is easy to see how these preliminary results can play a 
decisive role. One Indian controller indicated that if the PCT report included a 
favorable determination on obviousness and novelty, this would decide the 
matter, because India had the same standards.328 Another indicated that 
examiners almost always followed the PCT determination, and that only in very 
rare cases would they disagree.329 One examiner reported that the Controller 
General had issued a confidential office order at one point indicating that if a 
patent had issued in other countries, no examination would be conducted in 
India.330 
One controller indicated that the PCT conclusion was not binding, but that 
examiners would only sometimes do their own search for a PCT application.331 
But he also noted that examiners sometimes came to a different conclusion than 
the PCT report, pointing to the Novartis Gleevec patent as an example.332 He 
suggested that these divergent results would probably be more likely in 
pharmaceuticals than in other areas, because oppositions were more common in 
this domain.333 Oppositions apparently operate here as an important signaling 
device, drawing attention to particular applications and offering arguments that 
differ from those found in a PCT report, oriented specifically to India’s law.334 
The influence of patent law’s transnational legal culture is not only felt in 
India through trainings and the PCT system. Examiners and controllers also 
seek out and rely on U.S. and particularly European patent law doctrines and 
precedents, because they have few of their own to rely upon. A patent litigator 
explained, for example, that it is very common to cite EPO and UK precedents 
in arguments to courts because they may be influential and are readily 
accessible.335 (This in turn points to the important role that the cohort of patent 
attorneys may have in influencing national patent offices.336) Examiners rely 
more heavily on EPO precedents than on U.S. precedents, and some rely on 
 
328. Interview with Controller #1, supra note 280. 
329. Interview with Controller #2, supra note 322.  
330. Interview with Patent Examiner #1, supra note 289. According to the same examiner, 
some examiners understood themselves to be there to grant patents and thus did not undertake any 
examination at all. Id. Some controllers apparently take the same view, and overrule examiners 
who raise objections without reference to the substance of the concern. Id. 
331. Interview with Controller #3 (notes on file with author). Others stated that they 
invariably conducted their own searches in PCT cases. See Interview with Patent Examiners #2, 
supra note 291.  
332. Interview with Controller # 3, supra note 331. 
333. Id. 
334. Interview with Patent Examiner #1, supra note 289 (noting that examiners were more 
diligent in cases where oppositions were filed). 
335. Interview with Ms. H. Rajeshwari, supra note 171. Alan Watson cites “accessibility” 
as the central criterion for the source of rules that are legally transplanted. Alan Watson, Legal 
Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law 113 (2d. ed. 1993). Watson also notes the 
“retention of, and even increased borrowing from, the law of a colonial power by a former 
dependency.” Id. at 120 n.23. 
336. See Deere, supra note 12, at 168; see also Helfer, Alter, & Guerzovich, supra note 
150, at 39.  
2 - Kapczynski FINAL (Do Not Delete) 2/9/2010  4:47 PM 
2009] HARMONIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 1627 
reports from EPO examinations rather than conduct their own examinations.337   
India’s Draft Patent Manual also draws very substantially on UK patent 
precedents.338 When preparing the draft, examiners and controllers in the Indian 
patent offices were instructed to go section by section to elaborate on the case 
law. In order of preference, they were to cite decisions by controllers in the 
patent offices, then Indian courts, and then foreign precedents, with UK 
precedents coming first because Indian law has been most influenced by British 
law.339  
Where there are few local precedents to rely on, the Draft Patent Manual 
refers to UK law. The requirement of inventive step was introduced into Indian 
law only in 2002, so it is unsurprising to find that the section of the Draft Patent 
Manual on inventive step relies almost exclusively on UK law.340 A recent 
decision of the Intellectual Property Appeal Board similarly follows the 
practice of high-protection jurisdictions and deems India’s inventive step 
requirement to be met upon a showing of “surprising” and beneficial effects.341 
The unique aspects of India’s inventive step standard, in the process, 
effectively disappear. 
C. Unilateral Retaliation 
The deployment of TRIPS levers may also be met with unilateral 
retaliation, or threats thereof. Such retaliation can come from a number of 
countries and on a number of fronts, but the most salient threats tend to 
emanate from the Special 301 process in the United States.342 Enacted by 
Congress in 1988, the Special 301 provisions of the Trade Act of 1974 oblige 
the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) each year to 
identify a list of “priority countries” within thirty days after the publication of 
the National Trade Estimate report.343 Priority countries are defined as those 
who “have the most onerous or egregious acts, policies, or practices” that “deny 
 
337. Interview with Patent Examiner #1, supra note 289; cf. supra note 312. 
338. See Patent Office (India), supra note 122, at 356–68.  
339. Interview with T.C. James (in his personal capacity), supra note 193.  
340. See Patent Office (India), supra note 122, at 33–51. Groups such as the National 
Working Group on Patent Law and the drug company lobbying organization IDMA strongly 
objected to this practice in their submitted comments on the Draft Patent Manual. See Letter from 
Nat’l Working Group on Patent Laws to V. Ravi, Controller Gen. of Patents, Designs, and Trade 
Marks (Apr. 16, 2008), available at http://ipindia.nic.in/ipr/patent/Patent_Manual_Feedback/ 
national_working_group_on_patent_laws_new_delhi.pdf; Letter from the Indian Drug Mfrs.’ 
Ass’n to the Office of the Controller Gen. of Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks (Apr. 24, 2008), 
available at http://ipindia.nic.in/ipr/patent/Patent_Manual_Feedback/INDIAN_DRUG_ 
MANUFACTURERS__ASSOCIATION__MUMBAI.pdf.  
341. Novartis AG v. Union of India, Order No. 100/2009 (Intellectual Prop. Appellate 
Board, June 29, 2009) at 184, available at http://www.i-mak.org/pharma-patent-decisions. 
342. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2242, 2411–16 (2006) (outlining Special 301 procedures). 
343. Under 19. U.S.C. § 2241(b)(2), this report must be compiled each year by the USTR, 
to identify “any act, policy, or practice” of foreign nations, including those related to IP, that 
create significant barriers to trade.  
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adequate and effective intellectual property rights,” or “deny fair and equitable 
market access to United States persons that rely upon intellectual property 
protection.”344 To be designated as a priority country, the USTR must also find 
that a nation is not “entering into good faith negotiations” or “making 
significant progress in bilateral or multilateral negotiations to provide adequate 
and effective protection of intellectual property rights.”345   
If a country is designated a priority country, the USTR must undertake an 
investigation, to be completed according to a timeline that depends upon 
whether the USTR finds that TRIPS is involved.346 Upon the investigation’s 
completion, the USTR is permitted, but not required, to retaliate.347 Additional-
ly, the law provides that a finding by a WTO dispute settlement proceeding that 
the provision in question is consistent with TRIPS would provide a permissive, 
but not mandatory, reason for the USTR not to retaliate.348   
The USTR has the authority to retaliate by imposing tariffs or import 
restrictions, or by withdrawing concessions granted under preferential trade 
agreements such as the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act349 and the 
Andean Trade Preference Act.350 The President may also direct the Trade 
Representative to retaliate in any area of trade or foreign relations that is within 
the President’s power.351 Although not provided for by statute, the USTR has 
created additional components to the Special 301 scheme, creating a “watch 
list” and a “priority watch list,” designations that “indicate[] that particular 
problems exist in that country with respect to IPR protection, enforcement, or 
market access for persons relying on intellectual property.”352 The watch lists 
thus serve as a warning to countries that they may face “priority country” 
listing in the future. 
The consistency of the Special 301 process with WTO law is a matter of 
some dispute. If the United States were to impose unilateral sanctions in 
violation of its WTO commitments—for example, enforcing a tariff greater 
than permitted in General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
schedules—it would clearly be violating its WTO obligations.353 However, the 
 
344. Id. § 2242(b)(1)(A). 
345. Id. § 2242(b)(1)(C). 
346. If TRIPS is implicated, the investigation must be completed within thirty days of the 
completion of a dispute settlement procedure; if not, it must be completed within six months of the 
investigation’s initiation. Id. § 2414(a)(3)(A). In the latter case, an extension of three months is 
possible in complicated cases. See id. § 2414(a)(3)(B). 
347. Id. § 2411(a).  
348. Id. § 2411(a)(2)(A). 
349. Id. § 2702(b)–(c). 
350. Id. § 3202(c)–(d). 
351. Id. § 2411(a)(1)(B)(ii). 
352. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 2008 Special 301 Report 18 (2008); 
see also id. (“Countries placed on the Priority Watch List are the focus of increased bilateral 
attention concerning the problem areas.”).  
353. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. II, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 
U.N.T.S. 194. 
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United States has many alternative options for sanctions, particularly with 
respect to developing countries. These alternatives include withdrawal of GSP 
preferences, military aid, humanitarian assistance, development assistance, and 
political support.354 
The WTO’s dispute resolution agreement also, however, requires 
members to seek redress for purported violations through the dispute settlement 
process,355 and forbids members seeking redress from “mak[ing] a 
determination to the effect that a violation has occurred . . . or that the 
attainment of any objective of the covered agreements has been impeded, 
except through recourse to dispute settlement.”356 In 2000, a WTO panel 
concluded that the United States would violate the dispute settlement 
agreement if it were to determine, before the completion of a dispute, that a 
country was in violation of its WTO obligations.357 The same logic would 
prevent the United States from determining that a country was acting in 
violation of TRIPS and retaliating in domains not regulated by the WTO, such 
as military or humanitarian aid.358 The dispute settlement agreement, however, 
does not explicitly prohibit any unilateral retaliation not designed to 
“redress . . . a violation of obligations or other nullification or impairment of 
benefits under the covered agreements.”359 This creates difficult questions 
about when retaliation on the basis of IP concerns constitutes retaliation “under 
the covered agreements,” and also of how that might be determined.  
 
354. Cf. Chad P. Bown & Bernard M. Hoekman, WTO Dispute Settlement and the Missing 
Developing Country Cases: Engaging the Private Sector, 8 J. Int’l Econ. L. 861, 866 (2005). 
The U.S. “Generalized System of Preferences” extends special trade benefits to developing 
countries. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461–66. 
355. According to article 23.1 of the DSU, “[w]hen Members seek the redress of a 
violation of obligations or other nullification or impairment of benefits under the covered 
agreements . . . they shall have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of this 
Understanding.” Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes 
art. 23.1, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 
2, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter DSU]. 
356. Id. art. 23.2(a). 
357. See Panel Report, United States—Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act of 1974, ¶ 7.96, 
WT/DS152/R (Dec. 22, 1999) (“[T]he statutory language of Section 304—by mandating a 
determination before the adoption of DSB findings and statutorily reserving the right for this 
determination to be one of inconsistency—must be considered presumptively to be inconsistent 
with the obligations in Article 23.2(a).”); id. ¶ 7.126 (also accepting U.S. guarantees that it would 
not exercise the statutory discretion in this fashion); see also Appellate Body Report, United 
States—Import Measures on Certain Products from the European Communities, ¶ 111, 
WT/DS165/AB/R (Dec. 11, 2000); Panel Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting 
Trade in Commercial Vessels, ¶ 7.207, WT/DS301/R (Apr. 22, 2005). The Panel in the 301 case 
presumably understood such determinations as problematic where they were linked to efforts to 
obtain “redress,” as is suggested by the language of article 23. See DSU, supra note 355, art. 23 
(forbidding unilateral determination of a violation “in such cases,” apparently referring to cases 
where “Members seek the redress of a violation of obligations”).  
358. See Michael J. Trebilcock & Robert Howse, The Regulation of 
International Trade 434 (3d ed. 2005). 
359. DSU, supra note 355, art. 23.1. 
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The implications of WTO obligations for the “watch list” element of 301 
are also unclear. A country listed on the watch list or priority watch list is not 
subject to sanctions (this occurs only after a “priority country” designation), but 
is identified as a subject of U.S. concern, and as a possible future target of 
retaliation or dispute settlement. The United States has made frequent use of 
the watch list system to press developing countries on its IP priorities in recent 
years.360 There are several notable and recent examples of the use of 301 
against countries contemplating compulsory licensing, for example. In 1998, 
South Africa was placed on the Special 301 watch list because of a law that 
permitted compulsory licensing.361 In 1999, Thailand was threatened with 
“sanctions on core Thai exports” when it was considering compulsorily licens-
ing an AIDS drug.362 In 2007, the Thai government issued several compulsory 
licenses, a fact cited in its priority watch list listing a year later.363 PhRMA has 
urged that the USTR designate Thailand a priority country on the basis of these 
licenses, a step that the United States has so far declined to take.364   
If past is prologue, countries that engage in compulsory licensing may 
face threats of U.S. retaliation through the 301 process and otherwise.365 Some 
interviewees in civil society groups expressed concern that such threats will 
discourage the Indian government from using levers like compulsory 
licensing.366 Others were not convinced, and doubted that the United States will 
engage in substantial threats or retaliation against India, particularly in light of 
the current terms of trade.367 D.G. Shah suggested that “[t]he question is of 
political will—of implementation, whether government will invoke compulsory 
license[s] in such situations,” and that this “would ultimately depend at that 
point of time [on] the incumbent government and what message it wants to give 
to the rest of the world.”368 It is clear, however, that the possibility of unilateral 
retaliation will be a factor in the exercise of TRIPS policy levers, although one 
that will be modulated by the overall relationship between the relevant 
governments and the local agendas of national leaders.369 
 
360. See Deere, supra note 12, at 341–42 (charting 301 pressure on developing countries 
from 1995–2007); see also Brook K. Baker, Ending Drug Registration Apartheid: Taming Data 
Exclusivity and Patent/Registration Linkage, 34 Am. J. L. & Med. 303, 324–26 (2008) 
(cataloguing examples). 
361. Susan K. Sell, Post-TRIPS Developments: The Tension Between Commercial and 
Social Agendas in the Context of Intellectual Property, 14. Fla. J. Int’l L. 193, 209 (2002). 
362. Id. at 210. 
363. See Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, supra note 352, at 37. 
364. USTR Not Preparing a Case Against Thailand for Compulsory Licenses, Inside U.S. 
Trade (Feb. 29, 2008); Phusadee Arunmas, Thailand Could Face Sanctions After Lobbying by 
Drug Firms, Bangkok Post, Jan. 31, 2008. 
365. See Deere, supra note 12, at 231 (also noting that such pressures are particularly acute 
for middle-income countries). 
366. Interview with K.M. Gopakumar, supra note 83. 
367. Interview with Dilip G. Shah, supra note 28. 
368. Id. 
369. Cf. Deere, supra note 12, at 165–66 (documenting a number of developing countries, 
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D. Conclusion 
Although TRIPS leaves developing countries substantial flexibility as a 
formal matter, the constraints imposed by resource disparities, transnational 
legal culture, and the persistent threat of unilateral retaliation mean that such 
countries have far less flexibility in practice than they do in theory. As the 
Article’s Conclusion will discuss in more detail, these limitations gain a 
substantial portion of their force from the increasingly transnational circuit of 
legality in which India finds itself. For example, the limited resources available 
to Indian patent offices are particularly problematic in light of the fact that 
TRIPS and the PCT facilitate transnational patent applications, by standardize-
ing the application process and helping applicants secure rents to spend on 
seeking patents in new jurisdictions. Transnational legal culture and threats of 
unilateral retaliation also gain some of their purchase through the transnational-
ization of law, which facilitates these pressures as well as channels them. 
Analyzing the various constraints on the use of TRIPS flexibilities also 
demonstrates that the most important avenues of such flexibility may be 
different than one might expect from the literature’s characteristic focus on 
compulsory licensing. The subject matter lever, for example, may be less 
susceptible to the threat of unilateral retaliation than the government authoriza-
tion lever. While PhRMA urged the USTR to designate India a “priority 
country” in 2008 (which would make sanctions possible), citing pre-grant 
oppositions and section 3(d) in particular, India remained on the “priority watch 
list” in 2008 and the USTR did not identify any specific aspect of India’s patent 
law as a concern.370 As noted above, Thailand’s recent compulsory licenses, in 
contrast, were cited in the elevation of the country to the U.S. priority watch list 
in 2008. Although scope of patentability issues have been cited in 301 reports 
in some instances, they may be less likely to be the focus of extensive public 
criticism or WTO disputes.371 A government decision to override a patent can 
easily be framed as expropriation or “stealing.”372 A government decision 
adopting strict standards for patentability cannot so readily be cast in the same 
terms, and has the positive connotation of seeking to promote genuine rather 
than trivial innovation. The architectural framing effects of law might also play 
 
including India, that appear not to have yielded to the pressures exerted via the Special 301 
process). 
370. See Pharmaceutical Research & Mfrs. of Am., supra note 192, at 64–68; Office 
of the U.S. Trade Representative, supra note 352, at 35–36. 
371. The difficulty pharmaceutical companies had in obtaining patents on “methods of 
treatment or diagnosis” in China was cited in the 2007 301 Report. Office of the U.S. Trade 
Representative, 2007 Special 301 Report 22 (2007). In that report, China remained on the 
priority watch list, though it is difficult to determine the role played by patent issues and those 
played by the more prominently discussed copyright and trademark issues (which the United 
States pursued in a dispute settlement negotiation that year). Id. at 2. 
372. For a discussion of the relationship between law and framing, see Kapczynski, supra 
note 8. 
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a role:373 the United States can more readily criticize a country for issuing 
compulsory licenses to reduce prices for drugs than for seeking to tailor its 
patent law to restrict trivial patents. This is because the United States commits 
itself to the latter practice but not the former. Developed countries also may be 
reluctant to invite a WTO panel to constrain a country’s standards of 
patentability because a ruling could call into question policy space that 
developed countries themselves wish to retain.374 
Resource limitations and the influence of transnational legal culture may 
make the subject matter lever more useful in developing countries than the 
inventive step lever. Patent examiners are likely to find it easier to apply an 
exclusion on salt patents than to apply an obviousness test such as the one that 
sometimes invalidates salt patents in the United States.375 Patent applicants may 
be able to avoid subject matter restrictions with artful drafting,376 but firms may 
not find it worthwhile to tailor their applications to small markets. The subject 
matter lever also can route around the influence of transnational legal culture,\ 
when subject matter restrictions have no developed country analogues.  
The procedural lever similarly appears comparatively more important in 
the context of limited administrative resources and transnational legal culture. 
Oppositions with broad standing allow a resource-poor administrative agency 
to harness the power of third-party participants to identify suspect patents and 
cheaply mine arguments against them. Disclosures can also substantially 
decrease administrative burdens, particularly if policed with the sanction of 
patent rejection or invalidation. Both levers construct procedural firewalls 
against the pull of transnational legal culture, because they focus attention on 
patents that may be problematic under local standards. These strategies also 
may be less susceptible than the government authorization lever to unilateral 
threats, for the reasons noted above.  
The most effective strategy to limit the influence of exclusive rights in the 
pharmaceutical context in developing countries may involve the remedies lever. 
The lever could be as influential as the government authorization lever, but is 
less amenable to unilateral retaliation. It may be politically more difficult to 
attack the decisions of judges than to attack decisions made by those in the 
executive branch, particularly if the judges in question are applying a legal 
 
373. For a description of architectural framing effects, see id. at 864.  
374. For example, the obviousness standard in the United States has varied over time. See, 
e.g., Adam B. Jaffe & Josh Lerner, Innovation and Its Discontents 35 (2004). See also 
Reichman & Dreyfuss, supra note 141, at 103–06 (discussing the uncertainty in policy circles in 
Europe and the United States regarding the need for reforms to their patent systems). 
375. Pfizer v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007). India’s requirement that 
the salt patent be granted if an applicant can show “increased efficacy” adds complexity to what 
would be an otherwise straightforward analysis. For countries with still fewer administrative 
resources, a categorical ban on such patents might be necessary to achieve the central objective.  
376. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae of 22 Law and Business Professors in Support of 
Appellants at 9–11, 21–25, In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (No. 2007-1130). 
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standard used around the world. Nonetheless, this lever is not without 
difficulties. The most important of these is the challenge of guiding the exercise 
of judicial discretion. Resource constraints will likely affect the consistency 
and predictability of court decisions, and judges also participate in the 
transnationalized culture of patent law.377 There are questions about the degree 
to which governments can, consistent with article 44.1 of TRIPS, guide the 
discretion of judges through a statutory framework.378 If the remedies lever 
becomes increasingly guided by statute, the insulation provided from unilateral 
retaliation will also likely diminish. 
Considering constraints imposed by resource limitations, the increasingly 
transnationalized legal culture surrounding patent law, and the potential for 
unilateral retaliation, countries may find the government authorization lever 
less attractive than commonly assumed, and levers such as subject matter 
limitations, oppositions and disclosures, and remedial limitations relatively 
more attractive. A more precise articulation of the suitability of each lever, of 
course, requires more attention to the context of the country in question. For 
example, government authorization requires far fewer technical resources than 
the application of most other levers. It is thus likely to be comparatively more 
useful in settings with more extreme limitations on technical and administrative 
resources.   
This does not mean that any of these levers are trivial to implement—all 
face obstacles. Barriers exist even in a country like India, which has 
exceptionally strong and engaged health advocates and generic industry actors, 
has more administrative resources than many other developing countries, and is 
somewhat more insulated than many others from the influence of transnational 
legal culture and unilateral threats of retaliation.   
IV 
FRAGMENTATION, MIMICRY, AND COUNTER-HARMONIZATION 
Given these obstacles, can developing countries make TRIPS flexibilities 
real? To understand the dynamics of TRIPS implementation, we must explore 
the strategies that countries have at their disposal to address the aforementioned 
constraints. For example, countries might increase the resources they allocate to 
patent examinations, refuse offers of technical assistance from high-protection 
jurisdictions, and simply decide to ignore the threat posed by the U.S. Special 
301 process. Such national-level measures would do little, however, to counter 
 
377. For example, George Washington University Law School has an “India Project” 
designed to raise “awareness in India of the benefits of a strong IP law regime.” George 
Washington School of Law, India Project, http://www.law.gwu.edu/Academics/research_centers/ 
india/Pages/Overview.aspx (last visited June 16, 2009). The project trains Indian High Court and 
Supreme Court judges on patent law. GW Law School in India: Building Bridges & Strengthening 
Capacity, GW Magazine, Sept. 2006, http://www.gwu.edu/~magazine/archive/2006_sept/docs/ 
feature_lawindia.html.  
378. See supra text accompanying notes 219–22. 
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the transnational dynamics that give these dynamics much of their force. TRIPS 
implementation refers countries like India to a transnational context that makes 
it difficult for them to implement an autonomous patent law. Are there a series 
of compensating strategies that can act upon the same transnational circuits that 
condition the problem?   
The following Part describes three strategies evident in the Indian context 
that can help to slow or rewrite circuits of transnational influence, strategies 
that I call fragmentation, mimicry, and counter-harmonization. Such strategies, 
and particularly counter-harmonization, will be critical to the ability of 
developing countries to utilize TRIPS flexibilities effectively, in light of the 
obstacles identified above.  
A. Fragmentation 
What did India do by adopting section 3(d) into its law? Viewed from a 
domestic perspective, it simply established a high standard for patentability. 
But section 3(d) has had another effect, which must be understood in a 
transnational context: because it was new to patent law when introduced in 
India, Indian patent officials cannot look to other jurisdictions to elaborate its 
meaning. Several controllers, for example, who asserted that U.S. and EPO law 
were the same as Indian law with respect to obviousness also stated that Indian 
law was different with respect to patentability, citing section 3(d).379 With 
respect to section 3(d), then, examiners cannot simply follow the EPO or the 
PCT recommendation. Indian courts must instead rely on local legislative 
history and their own interpretation of the meaning of terms like “efficacy” in 
section 3(d), because no other precedents are available. Specific and unique 
local provisions such as this offer administrative officials and judges some 
insulation from the influence of transnational legal culture.   
Similarly, India’s law, unlike patent laws in the United States and 
European Union, requires disclosure of the “source and geographical origin of 
biological material” in a patent specification,380 and states that patents may not 
be granted on inventions that are, “in effect, . . . traditional knowledge [or an] 
aggregation of traditionally known component or components.”381 Local 
officials and judges will be unable to rely upon PCT opinions, UK or U.S. 
precedent, or trainings from foreign patent offices in interpreting these 
provisions. If other developing countries have similar clauses, Indian officials 
and judges could draw on those interpretations. But such interpretations are 
likely to be relatively less accessible, suggesting that there will be a margin of 
freedom in the adoption of legal requirements unknown in the jurisdictions that 
 
379. Interview with Controller #2, supra note 322; Interview with Controller #1, supra note 
280.  
380. India Patents Act, supra note 101, § 10(4)(d)(ii)(D). 
381. Id. § 3(p). 
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largely constitute the transnational legal culture of patent law.382 
Both examples are instances of a strategy that I call fragmentation, which 
involves the adoption of unique or semi-unique national variations in law that 
create legal “friction,” impeding the flow of the transnational circuits that 
challenge countries’ abilities to implement autonomous local law. Such friction 
clearly diminishes the effects of transnational legal culture, but it also counters 
the transnational pressures on administrative resources. Fragmented provisions 
counteract one of the central aims of recent international IP law-making 
endeavors: the reduction of transaction costs for multinational companies 
seeking exclusive rights around the world. Both section 3(d) and the geographic 
origin and traditional knowledge requirements generate specialized 
requirements that oblige applicants to tailor their applications to the jurisdiction 
in question, increasing the costs of applying, and potentially decreasing the cost 
of local implementation.  
A major benefit purportedly provided by the PCT system is a single 
application form that all PCT members must accept.383 Applicants can amend 
their claims after filing that application in national offices, and must do so to 
comply with specialized local law.384 This entails costs. If the requirements of 
Indian applications are treated as obligatory and if failure to comply with them 
provides grounds for rejection or invalidation of a patent, the applicant must 
bear the cost of tailoring his application or run the risk that it will be rejected. 
This relative increase in costs for multinationals is likely an unintended side-
effect of fragmented patent provisions, but one that might ameliorate some of 
the impact of the disparities in administrative resources. Applicants will either 
provide more information to local offices or decide that tailoring their 
applications to the local requirements is not worth the costs, thus reducing the 
number of applications.  
Fragmentation is a way of making a country less locatable to the 
transnationalized dynamics of patent law today—of introducing friction into 
the transnational circuits of influence discussed above. It can generate a small 
amount of protection from the flood of applications associated with joining the 
PCT, but only if protection in the jurisdiction is not worth the additional cost to 
applicants of tailoring their applications. It can also permit local patent officers 
to interpret their law more autonomously, but only if local officials are 
sophisticated and motivated enough to use this margin of freedom to do so. It 
 
382. Alternatively, if the interpretations of other developing country jurisdictions were 
available, India could take advantage of some of the benefits of counter-harmonization. See infra 
Part IV.C. 
383. World Intellectual Prop. Org., PCT Applicant’s Guide—International 
Phase 5 (2009). Nearly 70 percent of patent applications in India today are filed through the PCT, 
presumably in part because of this advantage. See IPO Annual Report 2008, supra note 155, at 
app. C.  
384. The PCT guarantees that applicants through the PCT system must have at least one 
opportunity to amend their claim. PCT, supra note 325, art. 28(1).  
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may be difficult, especially in the most resource-constrained settings, to 
generate the distance from transnational legal culture needed to implement a 
strategy of fragmentation. It is common for a developing country’s laws to fail 
to make use of even the most basic TRIPS flexibilities, in part because of the 
role of “technical assistance” from organizations like WIPO.385 Fragmentation 
is thus likely to be a strategy of fairly limited scope.  
B. Mimicry 
Might countries also use the transnational nature of patent law discourse 
to their advantage, to undermine some of the effects of unilateral pressure, for 
example? One such strategy illustrated in the Indian context can be called 
mimicry, which I define as a strategy of transformative copying.386 Here, 
“recipient” countries model and legitimate their local law with reference to the 
law of “dominant” countries. But rather than adopt wholesale the meanings of 
these provisions, these texts are revised or reinscribed. Mimicry is legal 
transplantation with a difference.387 Transplantation designates the simple 
“moving of a rule of law or a system of law from one country to another.”388 It 
identifies a kind of mindless borrowing; “transplanted” rules are typically not 
transformed when adopted, though they may evolve once implemented.389 
Mimicry, in contrast, is a dynamic reworking cast as a sharing or borrowing.  
The Indian context offers an illuminating example of the practice. Recall 
Roche v. Cipla. There, the Delhi High Court denied a preliminary injunction 
against an alleged patent infringer, concluding that the disparity in price 
between the generic and patented version of the drug would work irreparable 
harm for patients who could no longer afford the medicine. In defending this 
interpretation, the court in two prominent places cited the U.S. case of eBay v. 
MercExchange.390 In the first reference, the court articulated the general 
 
385. On the limited use of flexibilities in developing countries, see Sisule F. Musungu, 
United Nations Dev. Programme (UNDP) Reg’l Serv. Centre for E. and S. Afr., Access 
to ART and Other Essential Medicines in Sub-Saharan Africa: Intellectual Property 
and Relevant Legislations (Sept. 2007), available at 
http://www.soros.org/initiatives/health/focus/access/ 
articles_publications/publications/artafrica_20090313. On concerns about the nature and influence 
of WIPO technical assistance, see World Intellectual Prop. Org., Proposal to Establish a 
Development Agenda for WIPO: An Elaboration of Issues Raised in Document 
WO/GA/31/11, Apr. 6, 2005, available at http://www.wipo.int/meetings/ en/ 
doc_details.jsp?doc_id=42376. 
386. My use of the term here shares something with Homi Bhabha’s influential articulation 
of the concept. Bhabha uses it to refer to “a sign of a double articulation; a complex strategy of 
reform, regulation and discipline, which ‘appropriates’ the Other as it visualizes power.” Homi 
Bhabha, The Location of Culture 122 (2004). Mimicry designates a form of “almost the 
same, but not quite,” that is “at once resemblance and menace.” Id. at 123.  
387. For the classic work on legal borrowing, see Watson, supra note 107, at 21. 
388. Id. 
389. Id. at 27, 95–96. 
390. 547 U.S. 388 (2006).  
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principle that “courts should examine the claim for interlocutory injunction 
with some degree of circumspection,” defending this by noting that  
[t]his view accords with the trend in the United States, where in eBay 
v. MercExchange, the Supreme Court of United States rendered a 
significant judgment relevant in the present context . . . . The Supreme 
Court . . . held that courts should consider the traditional four-factor 
test for issuance of an injunction, (i.e. existence of prima facie case, 
balance of convenience, irreparable injury and public interest) and 
should not issue injunctions automatically. Such an approach has been 
also favoured by two decisions of this court. . . . The Calcutta High 
Court too has endorsed this view.391  
The court invokes eBay again in its discussion of the central holding of 
the case. After declaring that “the Court cannot be unmindful of the right of the 
general public to access life saving drugs which are available and for which 
such access would be denied if the injunction were granted,” it says “[e]ven the 
United States Supreme Court was not unmindful of such considerations when 
recently it disavowed the liberal practice of granting injunctions, and 
underlining [sic] the necessity of weighing relevant factors, including public 
interest, in eBay.”392 
Why the pointed references to eBay? There is of course a resemblance 
between the standard invoked by the Roche court and that invoked in eBay,393 
but it is at best skin deep. The Indian cases cited by the court in the first 
reference reflect skepticism towards injunctions not found in contemporary 
U.S. cases, and that renders preliminary injunctions in patent cases very 
difficult to obtain.394 And while one could fit the reasoning of the Roche court 
under the “public interest” prong of the eBay test, it will surprise no one 
 
391. Roche v. Cipla, ¶ 63, I.A 642/2008 IN CS (OS) 89/2008 (Delhi H.C., Mar. 19, 2008), 
available at http://www.i-mak.org/storage/F%20Hoffmann%20La%20Roche%20v%20Cipla% 
20Ltd%202008.pdf (internal citations omitted).  
392. Id. ¶ 85.  
393. For example, the cases the Roche court refers to do hold that to obtain a preliminary 
injunction “the plaintiff in a patent case must show a prima facie case of an infringement, and 
further that the balance of convenience or an inconvenience is in his favour.” Standipack Private 
Ltd. v. Oswal Trading Co., 2000 A.I.R. 23 (Del.) ¶ 20. See also Hindustan Lever Ltd. v. Godrej 
Soaps Ltd., 1996 A.I.R. 367 (Cal.) ¶ 59 (reflecting the same standard). It is not surprising that 
Indian and U.S. courts invoke similar terms when evaluating injunctions in equity, given the 
influence of UK law in both jurisdictions.  
394. One case states, for example, that injunctions will be denied in India “when the patent 
in question is a new one the validity of which has not been established in any legal proceedings 
and the validity whereof is under serious dispute or challenge.” Hindustan Lever Ltd., A.I.R. ¶ 12. 
Another case declares that “in a patent case the onus of showing a prima facie case justifying the 
grant of an injunction is a heavy one and it’s comparatively easy for the respondent to establish a 
defence sufficient to prevent the grant of such an injunction.” Standipack Private Ltd., A.I.R. ¶ 20. 
The third indicates that “[s]tultification of defendant’s investment, loss of employment, public 
interest in the product (such a life saving drug), product quality coupled with price, or the 
defendant being smaller in size, may go against the plaintiff.” Franz Xaver Huemer v. New Yash 
Engineers, 1997 A.I.R. 79 (Del.) ¶ 33. 
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familiar with the Federal Circuit to learn that the court has not done so. Rather, 
it has upheld injunctions issued by district courts over arguments that these 
injunctions would impede access to affordable medicines,395 noting, for 
example, that “the public interest includes consideration of whether, by shifting 
market benefits to the infringer while litigation is pending for patents that are 
likely to withstand the attack, the incentive for discovery and development of 
new products is adversely affected.”396 
It is to be expected that courts applying broad equitable standards will 
come to different conclusions in different contexts. Indeed, the “balance of 
convenience” may in fact tilt more decisively towards patent holders in the 
United States than in India.397 But given the differences in their approaches, the 
Roche court’s insistent references to eBay is notable. It could be seen as a 
symptom of the effects of transnational legal culture on courts. On that theory, 
the difference would be unintended, and perhaps an example of the kind of 
wandering that those associated with the concept of legal borrowing have 
suggested occurs.398 But a close reading of the case suggests instead that the 
references to eBay represent not a borrowing, but something more complex—a 
kind of mimicry, where the Roche court cites eBay precisely because it knows 
the difference.   
Roche, as described above, has expansive implications that work against 
the interests of patent holders. To cast the decision as the simple application of 
standards adopted in the United States and the United Kingdom may lend some 
legitimacy to the court’s decision, in domestic as well as international circles. If 
India’s courts are viewed as applying the same standards as U.S. courts, it may 
be more difficult for the United States to object to the outcome of those cases. 
TRIPS itself may be difficult to apply to differential applications of the same 
formal standards.399 By framing India’s standards as being the same as those of 
the United States, Indian courts may also make it more difficult for countries 
like the United States and for multinational firms to publicly criticize their 
decisions.  
Adopting similar language and laws but interpreting them differently and 
strategically casting local laws as analogous to those of high-protection 
jurisdictions may be appealing strategies that diminish some of the effects of 
 
395. See, e.g., Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 544 F.3d 1341, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir. 2008); 
Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 470 F.3d 1368, 1383–84 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
396. Abbott Labs., 544 F.3d at 1362–63. 
397. Courts in India might be responding, for example, to concerns about the lack of an 
effective antitrust framework, or out of different priorities associated with development. See, e.g., 
Hindusthan Lever Ltd., A.I.R. ¶ 13–14. The impact that patents have on access to medicines in a 
context largely without health insurance is also of course quite different than in a context where 
health insurance is common.  
398. See supra note 389. 
399. See Yoshifumi Fukunaga, Enforcing TRIPS: Challenges of Adjudicating Minimum 
Standards Agreements, 23 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 867, 903–06 (2008). 
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unilateral pressure. But these strategies also have limitations, such as their 
susceptibility to the pull of transnational legal discourse. The court in Roche 
may be engaged in mimicry, but a later court may take the references to eBay 
more literally and move the doctrine toward subsequent U.S. decisions 
implementing eBay. Strategic citation of legal precedents from other 
jurisdictions may evolve into a more general adoption of foreign rules of law as 
the effects of transnational legal networks make themselves felt. Thus, it may 
thus be difficult to sustain mimicked interpretations over time.   
C. Counter-Harmonization 
If countries with similar aims in TRIPS implementation coordinate their 
legal frameworks, they can reduce the collective administrative costs of 
adopting an alternative patent regime, create a transnational “counter-culture,” 
and increase the costs to their opponents of extralegal retaliation. I call this 
process “counter-harmonization.”400 It is a strategy that works less by resisting 
the transnational circuit of patent law than by rewriting it. 
Counter-harmonization allows countries to pool their resources to lower 
administrative costs. The costs of identifying patents that fail provisions like 
section 3(d), for example, is high in India and relatively higher in countries 
with fewer administrative resources. But if multiple developing countries 
adopted such provisions, they could share the expense of identifying invalid 
patents, with wealthier developing countries effectively cross-subsidizing the 
examination efforts of poorer ones. Because firms file the same patents in 
multiple jurisdictions, oppositions drafted for one jurisdiction could be 
deployed in others, further expanding the pool of potential opponents and 
helping compensate for resource limitations in patent offices.  
Courts and patent officials in counter-harmonizing countries could also 
look to one another for guidance and assistance. Counter-harmonization thus 
takes advantage of the same mechanisms as the influence of transnational legal 
culture, but in the opposite direction. More precisely, counter-harmonization 
facilitates the creation of a transnational counter-culture that shares the costs of 
implementing patent laws tailored to the needs of developing countries. 
Counter-harmonization might also provide a measure of protection against 
political retaliation from more developed countries, if it enhances the 
legitimacy of alternative interpretations of TRIPS and increases the overall 
costs of retaliating for developed nations.401  
 
400. One might instead use the term to mark efforts by developing countries to impose 
their preferred form of harmonization on developed countries (for example, by seeking universal 
protection for traditional knowledge). I thank Peter Yu for this point. Because my interest here is 
in TRIPS implementation, I define counter-harmonization rather as a process whereby developing 
countries collectively adopt and implement an alternative regime of patent law keyed to their 
needs. 
401. See Andrew T. Guzmán, How International Law Works: A Rational Choice 
Theory 46–48 (2008) (discussing the role that the overall cost of retaliation plays in discouraging 
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Resource limitations, though, create an entry barrier to a system of 
coordination. The gravitational pull of the transnational legal culture dominated 
by developed countries, which will continue to have greater resources to 
conduct trainings and make their legal regimes accessible as models, also 
works against this strategy. While counter-harmonization can make political 
retaliation more expensive for developed countries, it can also make it more 
worthwhile. A set of unusual flexibilities adopted in one developing country 
may not be worth the effort of a concerted response. A set of coordinated 
flexibilities deployed in several countries is a more compelling target. Notably, 
high-protection jurisdictions are already targeting some of the flexibilities 
discussed in Part II. Some bilateral preferential trade agreements negotiated by 
the United States include obligations to issue second-use patents, restrictions on 
patent oppositions and compulsory licensing, and obligations to introduce 
forms of data exclusivity that might be susceptible to far fewer flexibilities than 
are patents.402 High-protection jurisdictions have also for many years sought to 
negotiate a Substantive Patent Law Treaty that would “adopt identical rules 
concerning what constitutes a novel and useful invention, when a technical 
advance meets the requirement for an ‘inventive step’ (nonobviousness), and 
how much information must be revealed by the patent disclosure.”403 The 
recent Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement negotiations launched by Japan 
and the United States could restrict countries’ flexibilities with respect to 
remedies and introduce new requirements for customs’ seizures of disputed 
medicines.404 
Counter-harmonizing efforts thus cannot be expected to succeed in every 
case. Nonetheless, there are several reasons to see the counter-harmonization 
strategy as the most promising of the three. A more compelling target is also a 
more costly target, from the perspective of a retaliating country. Developing 
 
retaliation in the international context). Helfer, Alter, and Guerzovich offer an intriguing example 
of the potential benefits of counter-harmonization that is also judicialized. They discuss several 
rulings of the regional Andean Tribunal of Justice that have enforced Andean Community patent 
law to reject local patent reforms that increased the strength of patents. See Helfer, Alter, & 
Guerzovich, supra note 150, at 26–30. These rulings, they conclude, have “helped Andean 
countries to resist pressure from the United States to expand IP protection for foreign 
corporations.” Id. at 46.  
402. See Richard D. Smith, Carlos Correa, & Cecilia Oh, Trade, TRIPS, and 
Pharmaceuticals, 373 Lancet 684, 687 (2009).  
403. See Reichman & Dreyfuss, supra note 3, at 90. 
404. See U.S. Trade Representative, The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement—Summary of Key Elements Under Discussion 1, 3 (2009), available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/ files/uploads/factsheets/2009/asset_upload_file917_15546.pdf. 
The negotiations do not currently include developing countries, but signatories would likely press 
other countries to join any agreement concluded. The recent push to define “counterfeit” 
medicines as those that violate patent rights (rather than as medicines that are substandard or 
violate a trademark) may also have important implications for generic producers. See, e.g., Kevin 
Outterson, Import Safety Rules and Generic Drug Markets, in Import Safety: Regulatory 
Governance in the Global Economy (Cary Coglianese, Adam Finkel, & David Zaring, eds., 
forthcoming 2009). 
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countries that coordinate their flexibilities must forego some of the benefits of 
fragmentation, because it will be easier for transnational companies to identify 
and meet the requirements of their laws. But such laws also have independent 
purpose. Counter-harmonizing the requirement of reporting the source of 
genetic material, for example, could increase the likelihood that such reporting 
is done, and that failure to disclose is detected. That in turn would make it 
feasible to enforce limitations on patents obtained in violation of local rules on 
informed consent. If coordination is possible, developing countries likely have 
more to gain than to lose from the potential for increased adherence to such 
requirements.   
India is well positioned to lead a new counter-harmonizing trend. It has 
developed innovative tools such as section 3(d) and its active pre-grant 
opposition system, and has sketched out others, such as limitations on 
injunction remedies. India has more technical capacity, resources, and political 
and economic power than many other developing countries, yet would itself 
benefit from sharing the burden of articulating and legitimating an alternative 
vision of patent law. Several national and transnational NGOs, as well as 
international agencies such as the WHO, lobbied for many of the pertinent 
provisions in Indian law, and therefore may be conduits to the introduction of 
elements of that law in other jurisdictions.405  
Notably, there are already some signs that India could provide a new pole 
for counter-harmonization. The Philippines recently adopted a new exception to 
their patent law modeled on section 3(d) of the Indian Act. The law was 
explicitly modeled on India’s law, which the WHO, among others, recommend-
ed.406 More recently still, Zanzibar also adopted a similar provision.407 
Oppositions are another emerging locus of coordination. In July 2008, the 
Brazilian Interdisciplinary HIV/AIDS Association announced that it had filed 
two oppositions to patents on Gilead’s important anti-HIV drug Tenofovir—
one in Brazil, and another in India in conjunction with Indian NGOs.408 The 
Indian application has yet to be resolved, but the Brazilian opposition was 
granted in September 2008.409 This was the first time a patent on an 
 
405. See the Philippines example, infra note 406.  
406. Senate of the Philippines, Comms. on Trade and Commerce & Health, Demography 
and Finance, Comm. Rep. No. 6, at 9 (Oct. 1, 2007) (on file with author). For the text of the new 
law, see An Act Providing for Cheaper and Quality Medicines, Amending for the Purpose 
Republic Act No. 8293 or the Intellectual Property Code, Republic Act No. 6675 or the Generics 
Act of 1988, and Republic Act No. 5921 or the Pharmacy Law, and for Other Purposes, Rep. Act 
No. 9502, §§ 5–6 (June 6, 2008) (Phil.), available at 
http://www.senate.gov.ph/republic_acts/ra%209502.pdf. 
407. Intellectual Property Act, 2008, § 3(v) (Zanzibar) (excluding from patentability “new 
uses or forms of known product or process”) (on file with author). 
408. Brazil & India Are Increasingly Challenging Prices by Opposing Patents, Economist 
Intelligence Unit, July 2, 2008, http://viewswire.eiu.com/index.asp?layout=ib3Article& 
article_id=793514664&pubtypedid=1152462500&rf=0.  
409.  Médecins Sans Frontières, Press Release, Brazil Rejects Patent on an Essential AIDS 
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antiretroviral drug had been denied in Brazil because of a pre-grant 
opposition.410 NGOs have also begun to explore the possibility of oppositions 
in other countries411 and to publicize opposition decisions to facilitate their use 
in other developing countries.412 
Others have noted the value that cooperation might have for developing 
countries seeking to implement TRIPS to their advantage.413 But most of the 
discussion of collective action in the literature has focused on the domain of 
trade negotiations, and has assumed that “countries usually stand alone when it 
comes to translating WTO law into national policy.”414 The concept of counter-
harmonization identifies the potential benefits of coordination in the realm of 
implementation, and helps us identify the broad range of benefits that such 
coordination may provide. Developing countries that counter-harmonize may 
benefit not only from protection in numbers against threats of unilateral 
retaliation, but also from the ballast that such counter-harmonization can create 
against the effects of transnational legal culture and the cost savings it can 
provide to their administrative agencies. While strategies of fragmentation and 
mimicry can address some of the obstacles to the implementation of TRIPS 
flexibilities articulated above, counter-harmonization appears to have the 
greatest scope of the three strategies identified here.  
CONCLUSION 
To date, the academic conversation about the dynamics of TRIPS 
implementation has been largely theoretical. The primary aim of this Article 
has been to use an empirical case study approach to enrich our understanding of 
the nature and utility of TRIPS flexibilities, and of the potential for TRIPS to 
serve as a harmonizing force.  
The Indian example shows that that TRIPS leaves developing countries a 
more diverse and wide-ranging set of flexibilities at the formal level than the 
existing literature typically suggests. If India implemented its adopted 
 
Medicine (Sept. 3, 2008), available at http://www.msf.org/msfinternational/invoke.cfm?objectid= 
28630EB3-15C5-F00A-251F391A2B46443A&component=toolkit.pressrelease&method=full_html.  
410. Id. 
411. See, e.g., Tahir Amin, I-MAK, Pre-Grant Patent Opinions in Vietnam and 
Their Role in Access to Medicines: A Brief Practical Guide (2006), available at 
http://www.law.fsu.edu/ gpc2007/materials/Pre-grantPatentObservationsinVietnam.pdf. 
412. See, e.g., I-MAK, Pharmaceutical Patent Case Law, http://www.i-mak.org/pharma-
patent-decisions/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2009).  
413. See, e.g., Abbott & Reichman, supra note 275, at 985; Peter Drahos, Four Lessons for 
Developing Countries from the Trade Negotiations over Access to Medicines, 28 Liverpool L. 
Rev. 11, 24 (2007); Reichman, supra note 11, at 458; see also Sisule F. Musungu, Susan 
Villanueva & Roxana Blasetti, S. Centre, Utilizing TRIPS Flexibilities for Public 
Health Protection Through South-South Regional Frameworks (2004), 
http://apps.who.int/ medicinedocs/en/d/Js4968e/; Peter K. Yu, Access to Medicines, BRICS 
Alliances, and Collective Action, 34 Am. J.L. & Med. 345, 394 (2008). 
414. Deere, supra note 12, at 21. 
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flexibilities to their full potential, it could generate significant scope for 
competition in the pharmaceutical sector without ever issuing a compulsory 
license. TRIPS cannot force deep harmonization between countries because its 
formal standards permit countries to take materially different approaches to IP, 
deploying the substantive and procedural flexibilities that the Agreement 
permits. Nonetheless, TRIPS channels a strong harmonizing force. Resource 
limitations, the influence of a highly transnationalized legal culture dominated 
by high-protection jurisdictions, and the persistent threat of unilateral pressure 
all make it difficult for a country like India to effectively implement a relatively 
autonomous vision of patent law. Nonetheless, countries have recourse to 
compensating strategies of fragmentation, mimicry, and counter-harmonization 
that can counteract the transnational dynamics that militate against the use of 
flexibilities. While no silver bullet, the last strategy shows the most promise for 
countries seeking to take maximum advantage of TRIPS flexibilities. Because 
of India’s leading role as a generic supplier in the world pharmaceutical 
market, and given the novelty and expansiveness of the implementation 
approach it has taken, the flexibilities adopted in the Indian patent context may 
well become central to new interpretive conflicts over TRIPS.  
The case study offered here suggests that as we enter into the era of 
TRIPS implementation, we should expect a new period of political 
polarization—not over whether developing countries will adhere to TRIPS, but 
over what it means to adhere to TRIPS. In previous work, I have discussed the 
role of international agreements in constituting transnational “publics,” by 
recruiting social actors into the terms of law as these groups compete for the 
instrumental and symbolic power of law.415 This dynamic is also evidenced in 
the Indian context, as Part I shows: Indian firms and health activists were 
drawn into the terms of IP law through their encounter with TRIPS, and played 
an important role in recasting the terms of TRIPS as they pressed India to adopt 
the substantial flexibilities that it chose. Here I extend this perspective to 
include state actors. Rather than reject TRIPS, Indian government actors have 
engaged in creative acts of legal interpretation that take extensive advantage of 
known TRIPS flexibilities, and that have also generated new ones.416 In the 
process, India has paved the way for new interpretive disagreements over the 
meaning of TRIPS. The dynamic has clearly operated beyond India as well. 
The process of TRIPS implementation has more generally led developing 
countries to make new demands with regard to TRIPS reform, and to become 
“more active participants in global IP debates.”417  
Those who lobbied in favor of TRIPS have often spoken as if the primary 
question about the Agreement were whether or not developing countries would 
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comply with it.418 Notably, leading voices in that group have begun to reassess 
that view, recognizing that they crafted a legal agreement, and thus entered into 
an interpretive struggle with their opponents (understood here to be developing 
country governments). Perhaps the single most important figure behind the 
TRIPS Agreement, Jacques Gorlin, recently had this to say: 
The biggest problem [for] those of us who were involved in the take 
off of TRIPS is that, after the TRIPS agreement went into effect, the 
lawyers took over. Most of us who have a background, not in 
intellectual property, but in trade, looked at the TRIPS agreement not 
so much as a legal instrument but as more of a political document that 
included minimum standards of intellectual property protection.419 
Another key advocate of TRIPS, Charles Levy, came to a similar 
conclusion: “Those of us involved in the negotiations thought that, for the most 
part, we had a clear idea of what the provisions meant. Now, even what should 
be the most straightforward provisions are being challenged.”420 He concluded: 
“we underestimated the ability of countries to reinterpret the commitments in 
TRIPS to respond to domestic political and economic pressures.”421 
According to these accounts, key proponents of the Agreement 
misunderstood the potential of the legalization of their political victory to 
provide flexibility to their opponents. Or, they failed to realize that countries 
like India did not need to cheat; they could lawyer instead. This view supports 
the long tradition within trade law scholarship that argues that legalization of 
the world trade regime will benefit countries with relatively less economic 
power.422 But as this Article shows, the implications of legalization in the 
Indian context have been far more complex than the statements of Gorlin and 
Levy, or a simple identification between legalization and the leveling of power 
differences, suggest. It is true that TRIPS leaves developing countries 
substantial flexibility, and that India has been able to craft a creative new patent 
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law that could produce dramatically more competition in the pharmaceutical 
sector than other TRIPS-compliant countries enjoy. But it is equally clear that it 
is quite difficult for developing countries—even those as comparatively well-
resourced and powerful as India—to make practical use of the legal flexibilities 
that the Agreement permits. (Recall too that many other developing countries 
have implemented IP laws that are more restrictive than TRIPS requires, in part 
because of the same resource limitations, transnational cultural circuits, and 
extralegal pressures that influence the implementation of India’s law.)423 Even 
a highly flexible agreement such as TRIPS sets up a strong harmonizing 
dynamic, because it inserts countries into a transnational circuit that fills in the 
gaps in the Agreement.   
Such pressures are not independent of the dynamic of legalization, but are 
shaped by it. The standardization of patent laws makes resource disparities 
more acute, because developing country offices face a rapidly growing field of 
transnational applicants who can spend substantial sums on patenting and take 
advantage of economies of scale through systems like the PCT. Technical 
assistance such as that provided to India by the EPO is predicated on the 
general similarity of the laws in question. (It is difficult, for example, to 
imagine that the kind of technical assistance offered in the patent context could 
be offered or received with respect to India’s personal law.)424 The pressure 
that may be exerted by developed countries outside of the realm of TRIPS, 
though it may in fact be somewhat constrained by the Agreement, also can 
work in tandem with the Agreement, pressing countries away from more 
ambitious interpretations of the Agreement’s provisions. Countries can, as I 
have shown, slow or rewrite these circuits of transnational influence, using 
strategies like fragmentation, mimicry, and counter-harmonization. While the 
last strategy is the most promising, none offer a simple solution to the 
dilemmas produced by the attempt to comply with TRIPS while creatively 
adapting its requirements to local needs. 
The notion that TRIPS implementation can be expected to lead to a new 
period of political polarization about what it means to adhere to TRIPS also 
brings a new perspective to the debates about the “constitutionalization” of the 
WTO. Such debates have today become “the centre of academic writing” in the 
field of trade law.425 From the beginning of the transition from the GATT to the 
more formal, institutionalized WTO, “the idea that the WTO might be 
constitutionalizing began to take hold.”426 Notably, the term has come into use 
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without any agreement about what it means, and despite considerable unease 
about its suitability and implications.427 Constitutions are, of course, identified 
with national-level governance. In the United States in particular they are 
identified with a unitary written text that serves as a broad national charter, 
establishing not only basic structures of government but also normative 
principles that define the aspirations of a national community. If this is the 
model, there are clearly many reasons that the term “constitutional” is a poor fit 
for the WTO. Those who find value in the use of the term note, however, that it 
is “difficult to say what is the core meaning of ‘constitution’, and what is a 
trope,” and charge those who reject the term outright with a “false rigidity” that 
prevents us from identifying and talking about aspects of the world trading 
order that may have features associated with constitutions.428 
Deborah Cass has usefully identified the three dominant visions of the 
constitutionalization of the WTO.429 The first, “institutional managerialism,” is 
associated most prominently with the influential trade law scholar John 
Jackson. Jackson identifies the term with the process of institutionalization, 
which he in turn associates with greater predictability and rule-orientation.430 
He presents the constitutionalization of trade law as both desirable and 
inevitable. As he puts it, “To a large degree, the history of civilization may be 
described as a gradual evolution from a power oriented approach, in the state of 
nature, towards a rule oriented approach,” and he asserts that “to a certain 
extent this same evolution must occur” in international law.431 The trend is also 
to be welcomed, particularly in trade law, because it promises “less reliance on 
raw power,” “a fairer break for the smaller countries, or at least a perception of 
greater fairness,” and structure that is both reasonably predictable and 
reasonably open to the influence of engaged citizens.432 
A second vision, that of “rights-based constitutionalism,” is most 
prominently associated with Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann.433 This theory equates 
constitutionalism with the defense of the “equal rights of the citizens against” 
abuses of government power.434 More controversially, it asserts that economic 
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freedoms such as the security of property and the right to trade are fundamental 
human rights, and that the WTO is constitutionalized because it protects 
individuals’ economic freedoms and prevents economic discrimination.435 
A third vision has been promoted by Cass herself, and equates 
constitutionalization with “judicial norm-generation.”436 It suggests that the 
WTO dispute-resolution system acts as a constitutionalizing force because it is 
developing doctrines common in constitutional systems (e.g., of jurisdiction), 
creating “system making” rules (e.g., regarding the relationship between the 
WTO and other domains of law), and taking on traditionally domestic subject 
matters such as the environment and health.437 
In a recent article, Jeffrey Dunoff points out that despite their differences, 
the three dominant accounts incorporate a similar conception of the purpose 
and effects of constitutionalism. Constitutionalism is identified with the 
“principled and authoritative settlement of divisive issues.”438 It occurs 
“through reference to a meta-agreement . . . [that] can then be used to resolve 
and pre-empt debate over what would otherwise be controversial issues.”439 
The “turn to constitutionalism” in trade law thus represents, according to 
Dunoff, both a desire for and an attempt to build “a mechanism for 
withdrawing controversial and potentially destabilizing issues from the parry 
and thrust of ordinary politics.”440 For Jackson, this occurs through institutions 
that bind power to rules.441 For Petersmann, it occurs by promoting economic 
freedoms over other basic rights.442 For Cass, it occurs through the judicial 
development of basic norms and rules for the world trading order.443 Dunoff 
objects to the anti-political characterization of constitutionalism offered in 
these accounts, and argues that “the turn to constitutionalism is self-defeating 
because constitutionalism does not and cannot generate finality on highly 
contested issues.”444  
The present study suggests an alternative way of understanding the 
constitutional nature of the WTO, one that identifies constitutionalism not with 
the suppression of politics, but rather with new theories of “democratic 
constitutionalism” that emphasize “the deep and inevitable interdependence of 
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constitutional law and politics.”445 Democratic constitutionalists argue that 
constitutionalism does not, and cannot, render issues “off-limits to politics.”446 
Rather, it provides a means of “negotiat[ing] the tension between the rule of 
law and self-governance.”447 This uneasy and always incomplete reconciliation 
occurs not through the suppression of dissent, but through a process of dialogic 
engagement between mobilized social actors and legal institutions (most 
typically, courts). The “open-ended” nature of certain constitutional 
commitments, and their claim to “express[] national ideals,” invite and channel 
contestation over the meaning of these ideals, producing conflict over 
constitutional meaning but also helping to ensure that constitutional law retains 
democratic legitimacy.448 
The theory of democratic constitutionalism provides an alternative way to 
understand the constitutional capacities of the WTO. It suggests that if the 
WTO does have a “constitutional” nature, it lies in the institution’s capacity not 
to suppress or authoritatively end disputes, but rather to constitute and channel 
transnational disagreement. The Indian example illustrates this: the TRIPS 
Agreement has helped bring not only the Indian government but also its drug 
industry and health activists into a transnational debate about the proper scope 
and meaning of IP law, anchored in the legal obligations that WTO members 
must comply with under TRIPS. It is likewise doing so in the dozens of other 
countries around the world that have recently had to bring their law into 
conformity with the Agreement. This in turn may have the effect of 
legitimating the TRIPS Agreement, as it both creates new possibilities for the 
implementation of TRIPS that are more palatable for developing countries, and 
leads such countries to seek to comply with rather than reject the Agreement. 
On this account, the new interpretive conflicts that TRIPS is generating signal 
not the failure of the constitutional nature of the WTO, but its success. Such 
contestation may provide a means to negotiate the tension between law and 
legitimacy that pervades this increasingly legalized institution. 
A full account of the implications of a theory of democratic constitutional-
ism at the WTO cannot be provided here. Such an account would provoke, and 
would therefore have to address, many important questions. The first of these is 
the value and appropriateness of “constitutional” language in this context. What 
is special about a constitution in the theory of democratic constitutionalism, and 
does the WTO have that something? If the processes of democratic constitu-
tionalism turn on the identification between “We the People” and a given text 
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or normative order, for example,449 the WTO clearly falls short. If it is instead a 
product of legal texts that are at once open-ended, highly consequential, and 
extremely difficult to amend,450 then the WTO looks exceptionally susceptible 
to the dynamics of democratic constitutionalism. Could a theory of democratic 
constitutionalism at the WTO help us theorize how the WTO might reconcile 
demands for the kind of stability sought by Jackson with the “sociological 
legitimacy” sought by Dunoff?451 Perhaps. By considering the traditions of 
constitutionalism that permit the successful alchemy of politics and law under 
this theory, we might gain insights into practices that would permit a better 
reconciliation of the two at the WTO. Alternatively, we might come to better 
understand why the WTO may be unable, over time, to successfully mediate 
between the two. 
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